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ABSTRACT 
The choice of law dilemma for international 
accidents is the subject this thesis. Part A 
contains an outline and discussion of the traditional 
judicial approaches adopted for torts in general in 
various epochs by a variety of jurisdictions. The lex 
fori, the lex loci delicti and a combination of both, 
which is the traditional English approach, are considered. 
A selection of modern academic alternatives to the 
traditional rules follows. In Part B some legislative 
solutions both actual and proposed, national and inter-
national are given. 
It is the aim of the firsttwo parts of thesis 
to demonstrate that law, especially in jurisdictions 
which follow the traditional English approach,is in an 
unsatisfactory state of flux. Whilst unification of the 
rules of private international law are seen as the ultimate 
goal, it is argued that there a need an immediate, 
albeit less ambitious,solution. Because of the dearth of 
judicial decisions in many jurisdictions it is suggested 
that legislation on a national basis be adopted. The aims 
of such legislation are considered and a proposed Draft 
Bill is presented in Part c. 
The Draft Bill is applied to a sample of decided 
cases to illustrate that if implemented at a national level 
it would provide an immediate adequate solution for 
international accidents. 
By way of conclusion a sur.unary in diagramatical 
form compares the law applied in decided cases with both 
ii 
the proposed Draft Bill and other legislative approaches 
discussed in Part B. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the motor vehic and the jet air-
craft has led to a rapid increase in tortious situations 
containing an international element. 
The problem is easily demonstrated. If A from 
one jurisdiction is involved in a motor vehicle accident 
with B from another jurisdiction and the accident takes 
place in a third jurisdiction, the question is which law 
to determine the rights and liabili of the parties 
concerned. In the above example, the problem is academic 
if the laws as applied to the facts are identical. However 
if the laws of the three jurisdictions ffer the matter 
which law to apply is of considerable practical impor-
tance. Various solutions1 )for resolving the dilemma 
have been advanced and these are discussed in Parts A and 
B. 
1) These solutions apply not just to international 
accidents but to all torts with an international 
element. 
PART A 
THE LEX I;ORI 
c 
" •• The judicial tend~ncy to apply the judges' 
ovm law has always been strong ..• All over 
the world, judges are inclined to apply their 
own law wherever they can and this favor legis 
fori will always stand in the way of inter-
national harmony or uniformity and will there-
fore be obnoxious to an academic lawyer's 
desperate sense of tidiness .. " 1} 
To apply the lex fori to an international accident 
means that the domestic law of the forum is used to 
determine the issue. 2 ) 
In the early stages of the development of private 
2 
international law the lex fori played a dominant role in 
the solution of questions of tort liability. 3 ) In America 
for example it has been suggested that the lex fori was 
applied because the common law was assumed to be the same 
everywhere and the application of another law was never 
contemplated. Once such a possibility was realised the 
lex lo.ci delicti .gained ascendancy. 4 ) 
1) O. Kahn Freund. The Growth of Internationalism in 
English Private International Law. p.l3 (1960). 
2) " •• the lex fori .• always means the domestic law of 
the forum i.e. (if the forum is England) English 
Law .• " J.H.C. Morris. The Conflict of Laws 2nd 
Edition (1980) p.9 (hereinafter cited as Morris). 
"the lex fori i.e. the local law of the place vJhere 
the Court is situate •. " Cheshire's Private Inter-
national Law. lOth Edition p.3 (1979) (hereinafter 
cited as Cheshire). It can be argued that even 
when the forum adopts another lavl it is in fact the 
lex fori vlhich is being applied. What is happening 
is that the judge is creating a law which is as 
nearly as possible similar to the foreign law which 
the foreign court would have applied had it been 
seized of the case. See Cheshire p.9 and see 
W.W. Coo~ The Logical and Legal Basis of the 
Conflict of Laws 33 Yale L.J. 457 (1924). 
3) C.G.J. Morse. Torts in Private International Law (1978) 
p.S (hereinafter cited as Morse). 
4) M. Hancock. Torts in the Conflict of Laws (1942) p.22 
(hereinafter cited as Hancock) 
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In England where questions of jurisdiction and 
choice of law have traditionally intermingled the lex fori 
was applied as a result of the peculiarities of English 
procedural law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 1 ) 2 ) 
In the twentieth century no jurisdiction applies 
the lex fori with total disregard the foreign element -
to do so would be to deny the very problem, however the lex 
fori is referred to for differing reasons. 
It may be referred to in jurisdictions which adhere 
to the lex loci delicti rule (the place of wrong ) on 
the grounds of public policy; the lex fori can be used 
as a jurisdictional prerequisite pending application of the 
lex loci delicti or the lex fori as the substantive law, 
and it may be used as a last resort, by default, when no 
state is interested in seeing its law applied, or as the 
proper law of the tort. 3 ) 
1) R.H. Graveson. Choice of Law and Choice of Juris-
diction in the English Conflict of Laws. 28 B.Y.B.I.L. 
273 at~289(1951) notes that jurisdiction and choice 
of law are interrelated as former is depend~ ~ 
on the latter which determines characterisation. ~·· 
2) Juries were chosen from the place where the cause 
of action arose. To overcome the difficulty of 
international elements it was possible to resort 
to a fiction whereby the plaintiff avered that the p_\)P(I c· A 
foreign place was a place in England which was 
subject to the Court's jurisdiction. Thus, for 
example, the plaintiff would allege that the facts 
occurred "in the city of Paris, in France 11 and then 
add "to wit in the parish of St. Mary le Bow iri the 
nard of Cheap". Hancock, p.S. See also Morse 
pp.8-9. 
3) Discussed ,at p. 41 
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Academic support for the lex fori has never 
been lacking. Early eminent conflicts scholars such 
as W~chter and Savigny held that the lex fori did and 
should govern tort liability1 ) and many modern writers 
also favour the lex fori approach. 2 ) The late Professor 
Ehrenzweig 3)for example contended that 
" .•• Foreign law was applied in cases from time 
to time but the application of the lex fori has 
always been the basic principle of conflicts 
law ... 11 
The advantages of applying the lex fori may be 
summarised as follows: 
1. From a practical point of view its application 
is " ... conducive to convenience, simplicity, 
4) 
efficiency and economy in the judicial process". 
Judges and lawyers are trained and gain expertise 
in one particular jurisdiction; the intrusion 
of a foreign element almost always involves an· 
encounter with the unfamiliar, and this can lead 
to complexity and consequently the risk of error 
is increased. Expert witnesses are required and 
1) see 13 Am. J. Comp. Law 414 (1964) being a trans-
lation of vJachter' s Archiv fu"r die civilistische 
Praxis by Nadelmann and see Savigny's System des 
heutigen roemischen Rechts (1849) translated by 
Guthrie (1st Ed. 1869) and see' Morse :pp. 5-7. 
2) A. Shapira The Interest Approach to Choice of Law 
with Special Reference to Tort Problems (1977) 
(hereinafter cited as Shapira) lists at p.SO a 
"host of modern scholars" in favor of the prima facie 
applicability of the domestic law of the forum. 
3) A.A. Ehrenzweig. A Treatise on Conflict of Laws 
(1962) p.316. (hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig). 
4) A Shapira. Manna for the Entire World or Thou Shalt 
Love Thy Neighbour as Thyself. Comment on Neumeier 
v. Kuehner. 1 Hofstra L.R. 168 at pl71 (1973). 
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inevitably the cost of the case mounts. 
2. To apply the .lex fori enables the court to judge 
the case before it according to its notions of 
justice and reason. 
" .. It enables the English Courts to give 
judgment according to their own ideas of 
justice ... nl) 
Against these two points it may be said:-
1. Both (1) and (2) reflect a parochial attitude, 
such views " •• represent a negation of any 
system of conflict of laws and shows a 
predilection for the sole application of English 
law ... " 2 ) 
Other reasons commonly given for applying the lex fori 
are:-
1. As torts are like crimes the lex fori should 
apply. All agree that the application of 
foreign law is inapplicable in criminal cases, 
and by analogy the foreign law should not be 
appli~able in tortious situations. 3 ) 
2. It has been suggested that tortious liability is 
closely connected with the public policy of the 
forum and should thus be determined by that law. 4 ) 
1) Lord Pearson in Boys v. Chaplin [197J)' A.C. 356 
at p.406. Lo~d Wilberforce made the same point at 
pp.387-8 and both their Lordships made reference 
to the advantages of certainty and ease of applic-
ation. 
2) H. McGregor. The International Accident Problem 
33 M.L.R.I at p.5 (1970). 
3. Discussed by Morris p.244 
4. Ibid. 
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Against these points it has been argued that:-
1. Tort law has long since broken away from criminal 
law and furthers very different objectives. 1 ) 
2. Tort does not have any closer connection to the 
public policy of the forum than any other branch 
of the law. 2 ) 
Although having its supporters the lex fori is 
not without eminent critics. . 3) Horr1s says 
" .. It (the lex fori). still has at least one 
supporter in the United States. But out-
side the British Commonwealth it has been 
abandoned nearly everywhere as impractical 
and unjust."4) 
Dis_advantages not already mentioned include:-
1. Forum shopping. 5) This is or could be encouraged 
by the application of the lex fori. . 6) Morr1s 
points out that since the jurisdictional rules 
of the English Courts in actions in personam are 
very liberal the plaintiff may end up with a 
choice of forum; however it is possible that 
I the prevrlance and dangers of forum shopping have 
.. 
\ 
1) Morris. p.244 
2) Ibid 
· 3) Ibid 
4) Compare Ehrenzweig's views supra p.4 There would 
appear to be a conflict amongst some conflict 
scholars when considering the popularity or lack 
thereof of any given approach in any given epoch. 
Personal preferences possibly color the past. 
5) Forum shopping is "the deliberate choice of a 
suitable forum in order to attract the application 
of a system of law favourable to the plaintiff's claim~ 
Morris p. 245. 
6) Ibid 
7 
been overstated.l) 
2. The application of the lex fori is unjust in that 
assumes knowledge of the lex fori by foreign persons. 
~~ •.. One of the basis rules of our legal system 
is that every person who appears before the 
Courts is conclusively presumed to know the 
law; this rule only extends to the lex fori. 
Not even the Judges are presumed to know 
foreign law; in fact such laws must be 
proved in each case, although there is a 
presumption that they are the same as the lex 
fori. Just as subjects of the forum are not 
presumed to know the content of foreign laws, 
the subjects of foreign states should not be 
presumed to know the content of the lex fori. 
In applying the lex fori as the lex causae in 
all cases, the forum will often apply a law 
to the acts of a person who did not know nor 
could be presumed to know, the rules of that 
lavJ. n 2 ) 
However it could be argued that this in practice 
does not put the foreign subject in a particularly adverse 
position, many torts,not just accidents,are unintentional 
and therefore not in the party or parties contemplation 
and the presumption as to knowledge of the law is a legal 
fiction and thus in practice the citizen of the forum and 
the foreign subject are really in the same position. 
Robb 3 )also argues that: 
" •.. The inevitable consequence of applying 
the lex fori to all cases is that every 
person in the world - and 1 persons are 
potential defendants - must act in accord-
ance with the laws of all common law juris-
dictions. This task is impossible so its 
imposition on the defendant manifestly unjust .. " 
1) see for example R. Kramer. Interest and Policy 
Clashes in Conflict of Laws Vol.XIII Rutgers Law 
Review 523 at pp.560-61 (1959) and Shapira p.38-39. 
2) S.D. Robb. The Tort Rule of Private International 
Law. The Chimera Incarnate. 8 Syd. L. Rev. 146 at 
p.l71 (1977) 
3) Ibid 
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Despite Ehrenzweig's views 1 )the lex fori has not 
had the support enjoyed by the lex loci delicti. 
Although used initially in the United States and from 
time to time applied in Continental Europe it is the 
Commonwealth, Japan and China that have favored the lex 
fori with the rest of the world adopting alternative 
solutions. 2 ) 
2. THE LEX LOCI DELICTI OR THE LEX LOCI DELICTI 
CONMISSI 
To apply the lex loci delicti (or lex loci delicti 
cornrnissi) means that the law of the place of the tort 
~etermines the issue. 3 ) 
Initially the lex loci delicti was evoked as a 
defence. In applying the lex fori the court allowed the 
defendant to refer to the lex loci delicti and if his acts 
were ]ustified' by the lex loci delicti then the plaintiff 
failed. Blads 3 )case is the earliest English example. 
Some English traders brought an action against Blad, a Dane 
for allegedly seizing their property in Iceland. The 
Privy Council held that Blad could avail himself of the 
provisions of the law in force in Iceland in so far as it 
~fforded a justification for his act. 
A hundred years later Lord Mansfield said in 
. 4) 
Mostyn ~ Fabrigas 
1) Ehrenzweig. supra p.4 
2) Infra, at p. 9 note 8 
4 ) ( 16 7 4) 3 Swan 6 0 3 
5 ) ( 17 7 4 ) 1 Cowp . 161 
3) See Cheshire at p.259 
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" .• For whatever is a justification in the 
place where the thing is done ought to be a l) 
justification where the cause is tried •• " 
This view was adopted in the leading English case of 
Phillips v. Eyre 2 )and remains part the English 
approach. 3 ) 
Meanwhile in other jurisdictions 4 )the lex loci 
delicti came to be the sole determinant of liability. 5 ) 
and 
"The theory of the foreign suit is that, 
although the act complained of was subject 
to no law having force in the forum it gave 
rise to an obligation ••• which follows the 
person and may be enforced wherever the 
person may be found .•. n6) 
" .• It seems normal to start from this 
indisputable social fact that whatever occurs 
in a given territory is subject to the law 
in force that territory .•• (it)is the law} 
which most naturally governs ••• " 
By the 1930's the lex loci delicti was the 
prevailing approach throughout the world. 8 ) As a concept 
it wa~.explicable by reference to the now unpopular theory 
of territorial sovereignty. Its advantages may be 
1) Ibid at p.l75 
2) (1870) L.R.6 Q.B.l 
3) See infra 
4) eg. Continental European countries,United States. 
5) Subject usually to the public policy of the forum. 
6) per Holmes J. in Slater v. Mexican National Rly. (1904) 
193 u.s. 120 at p.l26. This is the obligatio or 
vested rights doctrine championed by Beale whose 
philosophycontrolled the First American Restatement on 
Conflict of Laws in 1934. 
7) J.P. Niboyet. Territorality and Universal Recognition 
of Rules of Conflict of Laws. 65 Harv. L.R~.582 (1952) 
8) Except Commonwealth jurisdictions, China and Japan. 
E. Rabel. The Conflict of Laws A Comparative Study. 
Vol.II (1960) (Hereinafter cited as Rabel) lists the 
jurisdictions. p.235. · 
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sunmarised as follows: 
l. The lex loci delicti has an important interest 
in protecting and preserving its legal order. It 
has, for example, an interest in the standard of 
driving within its borders as this affects health 
and safety and is closely connected with social 
legislation. 
2. Application of the lex loci delicti accords with 
the parties expectations. Those engaging in 
activities which involve some risk should be able 
to insure. Critics of the approach point out 
that many torts are unintentional and that the 
place of the tort may be fortuitous. 1 ) 
3. One can also justify the lex loci on the grounds 
of certainty and that it produces uniformity 
of results. The very fact that the lex loci delicti 
rule "is simple and mechanical could provide 
decisions untainted by provincial bias and eliminate 
. l t' 112) man1pu a 1on ... It is arguable that no matter 
where the forum the end result be the same, rights 
and duties should not be substantially altered by a 
fortuitous choice of forum. 
\ 
The main arguements against the lex loci delicti approach 
are that:-
l. It is fortuitous in many cases. However except in 
certain cases 3 ) it can be argued that it is no more 
l) eg as in an air disaster. See J.A. Clarence-Smith. 
Torts in the Conflict of Laws. 20 ~1.L.R. 447 (1957) 
2) F. Juenger. Choice of Law in Interstate Torts. 118 
University of Pennsylvania L.R. 202 atp222 (1969) 
3) Such as air and tr~in disasters. 
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fortuitous than the lex fori might in fact be. 
-Some decisions will be arbitrary whatever approach 
is used because of the very nature of the problem. 
2. To apply the lex loci delicti requires knowledge 
of the foreign law, expert witnesses must be called 
the case increases in complexity and becomes more 
costly. 
3. Problems of renvoi can arise as the reference to 
the lex loci delicti is to the entire foreign law. 1 ) 
4. The lex loci delicti approach presupposes a 
determination of the place where the wrong has 
been committed. Whilst cases involving facts 
located in more than one jurisdiction are the 
exception rather than the rule there has been 
considerable academic discussion 2 )on the various 
'solutions' to the problem. These solutions may 
be summarised as follows:-
a) The Place of Acting Theory 
The great majority of European writers 3 ) 
define the place of wrong as that where the 
the defendant. 
conduct was carried out by 
It ~s argued that the actor 
is entitled to count on the laws ofthe state 
alleged tortious 
where he acts, as he has to obey those laws 
he should be entitled to their protection. 
1) See infra p. 118 point I 
2) For example .Horse and Rabel both devote a chapter 
of their texts to the problem. 
3) Rabel Vol.2 p. 304. 
b) 
It can 
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so be argued that the state where 
the defendant acts is interested in having 
law applied to that act so as to protect 
the integrity of its legal order. 1 ) 
Adherents of this theory argue that fects 
can occur in a plurality of states and thus 
the place of acting preferable to the 
'place of feet' theory. 
The 'Last Event' 
Under the traditional American rule the wrong 
is considered as being done where the injury 
takes place. 2 ) Thus paragraph 377 of the 
First Restatement the Conflict Laws 
states:-
"The place of wrong is the State where 
the last event necessary to make an 
actor liable for an alleged tort takes 
place." 
Here it is argued that the plaintiff is entitled 
injured, that the theory is in keeping with the 
modern tort idea of compensating the victim 
rather than punishing the wrongdoer. 3 ) As with 
the place of acting tneory, it is possible to 
argue that the State of injury has an interest 
in having its law applied. 
1) See Morse p.ll3 
2) See Rabel Vol.2 p. 301 et. seq.Morse 118 et seq. 
3) Morse, p. 118. 
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¢~. An elective solution 
Here the injured plaintiff may choose between 
the above two theories and the chosen law is 
applied in its entirety on the whole facts so 
as to determine all requirements of the cause 
of action and its effects. 1 ) Whilst adopted 
by some European Courts 2 ) it has never been used 
b 1 . . d' t' 3 ) y a common aw JUrls 1c 1on. 
d) The Place of the 'Substance of the Hrongdoing' 
The gist of this approach is that the Court must 
have regard to "the substance of the wrongdoing" 
in arriving at its solution to the question of 
where the tort is committed. 4 ) The cases 
using this approach have arisen in the context 
of jurisdiction rather than choice of law. 
The argument here is that the answer to the 
question of the definition of the place of a 
tort can only be given in the light of the 
nature of the particular tort in question and 
cannot properly be resolved by resort to place 
of acting and place of harm theories. 
Cases exist to support all four approaches and 
each 'solution' has its academic supporters. In the 
Commonwealth the weight of authority in negligence cases 
1) Rabel Vol.2 pp.304-305. Morse 124 et seq. 
2) Notably the German Reichsgericht and recently by the 
European Court of Justice in Case 21/76 Handelskwekerij 
G.J. Bier & Stichting Reinwater v. Hines de Potasse 
d' alsg.ce [1977J 1 C.M.L.R. 284 
3) Morse, p. 127 
4) Ibid 
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seemed to be on the side of the place of actingl) although 
most of the cases were concerned with jurisdiction rather 
than choice of law. Two recent decisions 2 ) however, 
suggest that 
"The right approach is, when the tort is 
complete to look back over the series of 
events constituting it and ask the question: 
Where in)substance did this cause of action 
arise?" 3 - "a more flexible, qualitative and 
quantitative test".4) 
The most recent New Zealand decisionS) which 
again concerned jurisdiction supports this approach. 6 ) 
3. A COMBINATION OF THE LEX FORI AND THE LEX LOCI 
DELICTI OR THE TRADITIONAL ENGLISH RULE 
"The Rule on th~ matter is very far from 
Satisfactory"?) 
The commonly accepted starting point for a 
discussion of the traditional English approach to torts 
in the conflict of laws is Willes J. statement in 
Phillips v. Eyre8 ) where he held that 
1) e.g. George Munro Ltd. v. American Cynamid & Chemical 
Corporation fl944J 1 K~B. 432; Anderson v. Nobel's 
ExplOSlVe Co. (1906) 12 O.L.R. 644; Abbott-Smith v. 
Univers1ty of Toronto (1964) 45 D.L.R. 2d. p.672 
2) Distillers Co. (Bio-Chemicals) Ltd. v. Thompson 
[19717 All E.R. 694 /19717 A.C. 458 and Moran v. 
Pyle National (Canada) Ltd. 43 D.L.R. 3d. 239 (1973) 
3) /l971/ 1 All E.R. 694 at p.700 
/19717 A.C. 458 at p. 468 
4) 43 D.L.R. 3d. 239 at p.250 (1973) per Dickson J. 
5) My v. Toyota Motor Co. Ltd. £1977_7 2 N.Z.L.R. 113 
6) Ibid at p.ll7 7) Cheshire. p.263 
8) (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B.l 
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11 As a general rule in order to found a suit 
in England for a wrong alleged to have been 
committed abroad, two conditions must be 
fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of 
such a character that it would have been 
actionable if committed in England ••• 
Secondly, the act must not have been justifiable 
by the law of the place where it was done. 11 1) 
However differing interpretations, accorded both 
judicially and academically to Willes J. formula have 
created doubts and uncertainties, and in particular differ-
ences of opinion exist as to the meaning of specific words 
such as 11 actionable 11 and 11 justifiable 11 and secondly -
whether the two limbs, tests or conditions relate to 
jurisdiction and/or choice of law. 
i. Actionable if committed in England: 
Two years before Phillips v. Eyre Lord Selwyn 
said in The Halley2 ) 
11 It is in their Lordships opinion alike 
contrary to principle and to authority to 
hold that an English Court of Justice will 
give a remedy in the shape of damages in 
respect of an act which, according to its 
own principles, imposes no liability on the 
person from whom the damages are claimed. 11 
Willes J. used The Halley as authority for the 
first limb of his rule. The case involved a 
British steamship owned by a British Corporation 
which had allegedly damaged a Norwegian barque 
in Belguim waters whilst under the control of a 
compulsory pilot. Under Belguim law the owners 
would have been held liable. Whilst English law 
could excuse the owner as it had no control over 
the choice of pilot, Belguim law had an interest 
1) Ibid at pp.28-29 
2) (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 193 at p.204 
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in seeing foreign ship owners pay for the 
damage done by their boats in Belguim waters. 
It was in this context that Lord Selwyn made his 
all embracing statement as to English law. 
The only judicial criticism of The Halley 
appears to have been made in 1949 by Lord Keith 
in M'Elroy v. M'Allister~) All other relevant 
cases accept or actively approve the decision. 2 ) 
Academic writers have, however, not been so kind. 
For example, Karsten 3)feels that "their Lordships 
approval of The Halley is quite the mo regrett-
able feature Boys v. Chaplin whilst Hancock4 ) 
considers the dictum "gross" (although confined to 
its own facts and considered in the light of 
existing English law The Halley was correctly 
decided).Lorenzen5~uggests that "the rule as laid 
down by the Privy Council in The Halley was far 
wider than was necessary for the decision and has 
isolated our jurisprudence from what is almost the 
unanimous rule of all civilised countries, with 
the exception of China and Japan." Robertson6 ) 
1) ( 19 4 9 ) S . C • 110 at pp . 13 2-13 3 • 
2) For example Boys v. Chaplin [197ll A.C. 356 
3) I.G.F. Karsten.Chaplin v. Boys: Another Analysis 
19 I.C.L.Q. 35 at p. · 45 (1970) 
4) M. Hancock. Torts Problems in Conflict of Laws 
Resolved by Statutory Construction: The Halley 
and other older Cases revisited. u. of Tor. L.J. 
331 at p.340 and p.345 (1968). 
5) E.G. Lorenzen. Tort Liability and the Conflict of 
Laws 47 L.Q.R. 483 at p.499 (1931). 
6) A.B. Robertson. The Choice of Law for Tort 
Liability in the Conflict of Laws 4M.L.R. 27 at 
p.32 (1940) 
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suggests " •.• The conflict of laws •..• would be 
a sterile science and a poor instrument of justice 
unless a right or remedy is given in situations 
where neither would be available pursuant to 
municipal law."l) 
Cheshire2 )asks "why such a tenderness •.. 
should be shown so generously to the defendant in 
a case of tort when it is withheld in other 
branches of the law." 
On the actual meaning of "actionable" Dicey 
& Morris Rule 178 (l) (a) states: 
"As a general rule, an act done in a foreign 
country is a tort and actionable as such in 
England, only if it is both (a) actionable as 
a tort according to English law, or in other 
words is an act which, if done in England, 
would be a tort ..... 3) 
Hancock 4 )takes the view that instead of the actual 
act being a tort in both countries the requirement 
is that that kind of liability exists in the forum. 
" ... the plaintiff must show that English 
internal law recognises an actionable tort 
of the same character, but he need not 
necessarily show that English law would 
impose liability in the identical circum-
stances of the particular case ..... 5) 
He is very much against rule 178(1) (a) which 
"envisages a suppositious transplanting of 
the operative facts of the case to the soil 
of the forum in order to consider what would 
have been their legal eff~yt had that been 
their original location." 
l) See also H.E. Read. What should be the law in Canada 
Governing Conflict of Laws in Tort? Canadian Legal 
Studies l (1968} 277 at p.280. 
2) Cheshire p.267 
3) Dicey & Morris. The Conflict of Laws. 9th Ed. p.938 
(hereinafter cited as Dicey & Morris) 
4) M. Hancock. Torts in the Conflict of Laws the First 
Rule in Phillips v. Eyre 3 U. of Tor. L.J. 400 (1940) 
5) Ibid p.407 
6) Ibid p.400 
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However, there would appear to be more judicial 
support for the former view since the publication 
of Hancock's article in 1940. In Anderson v. 
Eric Anderson (Radio & T.V.) Pty Ltdl) the forum 
was New South Wales where contributory negligence 
was a complete bar to a negligence claim; the 
accident occurred in the Australian Capital 
Territory where contributory negligence was a 
ground for apportioning damages. The appellant 
failed. Whilst an actionable tort in New South 
Wale~ had the collision occurred there, the 
appellant would have met with the defence of 
contriburory negligence which would have been an 
effective bar to his claim. The majority of the 
judges held that "actionable" had a meaning akin to 
"give rise to a cause of action". 2 ) 
In M'Elroy v. M'Allister 3 )the court held that 
actionability in the abstract was insufficient. 
In order to satisfy the first limb the widow had 
to show that the defendant's negligence would have 
been actionable had the accident occurred in Scotland. 
The Court ·of Session, by a majority dismissed the 
claim on the grounds that·by Scots law the driver's 
negligence was not actionable at the suit of the 
widow, despite the fact that it would be action-
able in the abstract. 
1) (1965) 114 C.L.R. 20 
2) Infra at p. 147 
3) 1949 S.C. 110 
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Yntema1 )suggests that "actionable" must be 
construed as "triable" or "cognisable". 
Adherents of this view argue that the first limb 
relates to jurisdiction and not choice of law. 
2 ) k' ' ' th t t I Morse ta 1ng an oppos1ng v1ew, argues a Yn ema s 
approach is unacceptable as Willes J. cited his 
authority as The Halley in which no question of 
jurisdiction was raised. Secondly Morse said both 
limbs must be satisfied before "a suit may be found" 
and he suggests that it is difficult to see how 
Willes J. could have meant an English Court to 
have jurisdiction if only the first limb was 
satisfied. It is a violation of Willes J. express 
words, Morse says, to say that the first condition 
relates to jurisdiction. Thirdly there was no 
reason why Willes J. would formulate a new 
jurisdictional rule for torts nor is there any 
evidence to indicate that he intended to do so. 
Finally Morse notes that the only judicial support 
for the view that the first limb is jurisdictional 
(and the second choice of law) is Lord Diplock's 
dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal in 
Chaplin v. Boys 3 )and that the House of Lords in 
Boys v. Chaplin4 ) and the majority of the High 
5) 
Court of Australia in Andersons case rejected the 
argument. 
1) H.E. Yntema in a review of Prof J.D. Falconbridge 
Essays on the Conflict of Laws. 27Can.Bar Rev. 116 
at p.ll9. 
2) Morse, p.46 
3) f1968] 2Q.B. 1 at pp 38-39 
4) [1971J A.C. 356 at pp. 385-387 
5) (1965) 114 C.L.R. 20 at pp.42-44 
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Other writers contending that the first limb 
is jurisdictional include Pearll) Spence 2 ) Nygh 3 ) 
and Gerber 4 ) whilst Dicey & MorrisS) Cheshire6 ) 
Webb and North7 ) suggest otherwise. 8 ) Judicial 
support exists in the House of Lords in Boys v. 
Chaplin 9 ~or both views, as discussed below. 
Hhether jurisdictional and/or choice of law 
the first limb has, as Webb & NorthlO)note, "emerged 
unscathed" as a result of Boys v. Chaplin:l) Apart 
from criticism arising as a result of viewing the 
limb as jurisdictional and/or choice of law both 
academic writers and judges alike have attacked 
the rule for two principle reasons. 
Firstly the limb may be criticised for being 
founded on insufficient authority. Dicey & Morri~ 2 ) 
note that there is far less authority than is 
commonly supposed for the first condition and Morris13 ) 
1) D. Pearl. Case and Comment. Camb.L.J. 200 [196a} 
2) D. Spence. Conflict of Laws in Automobile Negligence 
Cases 27 Can. Bar. Rev. 661 at p. 662 (1949) 
3) P.E. Nygh. Boys v. Chaplin or the Maze of Malta 
44 A.L.J. 160 L' 1970} 
4) P. Gerber. Tort Liability in the Conflict of Laws 
40 A.L.J. 44 and 73 Esp. p. 49 [1966J 
5) Dicey & Morris Ch. 33 
6) Cheshire. Ch. 10 
7) P.M. North & P.R.H. Webb. Fo:r-eign Torts and English 
Courti The effect of Chaplin v. Boys 19 I.C.L.Q. 24 
(1970) 
8) Infra at pp.27 et.seq. 
9) fl971J A.C. 356 
10) Webb & North op. cit., supra note 7 at p.26 
'11) [19 7 1J A. C . 3 56 
12) Dicey & Morris op. cit., supra note 5. 
13) Morris p. 248 
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suggests Lord Selwyn's statement in The Halley1 ) 
is simply not true; further Robertson2 ) argues 
that of the two grounds suggested, that is 
principle and authority, "neither bears close 
scrutiny". Two cases were cited in The Halley, 
The Amelia 3 )and Simpson v. Fogo~)the first 
concerned statutory interpretation and the latter 
the enforcement of foreign judgments. Robertson 
poin~·out that The No~tra Signora de los Dolores 5 ) 
and The Zollverein6~ere totally disregarded. 
Webb & Brown 7 ) summarise these two cases which 
appear to lay down the simple rule that the rights 
and merits of the parties to an action in England 
upon a foreign tort would be governed by the law of 
the place where such rights and merits originated. 
On the question of principle, Robertson 8 ) 
suggests The Halley is equally unconvincing and 
quotes Mr. Justice Cardozo's famous passage in 
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. 9 )" •.• we are not so 
1) (1868) L.R. 2 P.C. 193 
2) Robertson op. cit., supra at P-16 note 6 at p.30 
3) 1 Moo.P.C. (N.S.) 484 (1863) 
4) 1 H & M 195 (1863) 
5) 1 Dodson, 290 (1813) 
6) Swabey Adm 96 (1856) 
7) P.R.H. Webb & D.J.L. Brown. Case Book on the Conflict 
of Laws (1960) p. 281. 
8) Robertson. op.cit., supra note 2 at p. 32 
9) 224 N.Y. 99, 110, at p. 111 (1918). 
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provincial as to say that every solution to a 
problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise 
. at home •.• 11 
This overlaps with the other main criticism of the 
first limb which is that by having the rule the 
plaintiff has two hurdles to cross and this can lead 
to injustice as well as being "parochial"l) 
"illiberal" 2 ) and possibly a reason for the lack 
of reported cases in common law countries. 3 ) 
However, as stated above, The Halley was 
unanimously approved by the'House of Lords in Boys 
v. Chaplin albeit obiter and thus the first limb 
clearly continues to form part of the traditional 
approach. 
ii) The Act must not have been justifiable by the law 
of the place where it was done: - The Second Limb 
Cheshire4 )says that "justifiable" is a strange 
word to use in connection with conduct that has 
caused injury to another and it can result in a 
remedy being obtained where none would be available 
in the place afthe wrong, Machado v. Fontes5 ) 
being an obvious example. A libel was published 
in Brazil where criminal P.roceedings only were 
possible. The Court held the second limb 
satisfied. 
1) per Lord Wilberforce Boys v. Chaplin /l971} A.C. 356 
at p. 387 
2) Lorenzen, op.cit. supra at p.l6 note 5 
3) Richards v. McLean {1973J 1 N.Z.L.R. 521 is the only 
reported New Zealand case to date. 
4) Cheshire at p. 269 
5) [1897} 2 Q.B. 231 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
Willes J. in using the word was echoing 
Lord Mansfield's words in Mostyn v. Fabrigas1 ) 
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where he said "whatever is a justification in the 
place where the thing is done ought to be a 
justification where the cause is tried." 
Willes J. appears to have based his second 
condition on three cases, Bl~ds Case~)Blad v. 
f . 1 3 ) d b . . 4 ) h . t Bam ~e a an Do ree v. Nap1er w ere 1 was 
appropriate to use the word "justifiable" rather 
than any other term. Furthermore it was natural 
for vJilles J. to have used the word "justifiable" 
for the fact situation in Phillips v. Eyre itself. 
The defendant, a former Governor of Jamaica had 
had to quell a rebellion and in the course of 
restoring peace had allegedly arrested and falsely 
imprisoned Phillips. Later an Act of Indemnity 
was passed which had the effect of rendering 
lawful all the Governor's actions during the 
rebellion. Thus the word "justifiable" 
described the arrest much more accurately than 
"not actionable". 
Difficulties arose when the word was used in 
subsequent cases and its meaning "tortured" 5 ) or 
(1774) 1 Cowp. 161 at p. 165 
3 Swan 603 (1673) 
3 Swan 604 (1674) 
2 Bing. N.C. 781 (1836) 
~ 
Robertson op. cit. supra at p.l6 note 6 at p.38 
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or "strained"~) Yntema 2)suggests that there 
seems to have been a "muddleheaded conspiracy" 
to give meanings and interpretations which 
Willes J. language cannot in justice be made 
to bear. Willes J. language reflects historic 
doctrine and the conditions have been taken out 
of context. 
In Machado v. Fontes 3 )the second limb was 
satisfied where the act, a libel, gave rise to 
a criminal penalty only in Brazil (the place where 
it was published). Lopez J. said in the ~case 
that the act must be innocent for the defendant 
to have a good defence. Judicial and academic 
views have taken remarkably differing stands as 
to the correctness of the Machado v. Fontes 
interpretation of the second limb. 
Cheshire4 )considers it to be "heretical", 
whilst Lorenzen 5 )suggests that justice 1s what 
was actually achieved; he said " .•. if an English 
Court feels that a person who has committed a 
crime in Brazil should respond to damages to the 
plaintiff, without regard to nationality or 
residence of the parties, although he would not 
be so liable under Brazilian law, the writer for 
one would hesitate to brand the decision as 
1) J.G. Foster 16 B.Y.B.I.L. 84 at p. 95 (1935) 
Some Defects in the English Rules on Conflict of Laws. 
2) Yntema, op.cit. supra at p.l9 note 1 at p.l21 
3) [l897J 2 Q.B. 231 at p.233 
4) Cheshire, p. 269 
5) Lorenzen, op.cit. supra at p.l6 note 5 at p.490 
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erroneous". He does however note that the 
arguments used in support of the conclusion "are 
not beyond criticism" however much the decision 
is justified. 
Pollock1 ) thought it hard to see why either 
a Brazilian or an Englishman who publishes a libel 
in Brazil where no civil liability would be incurred 
should be liable when an action is brought against 
him in England. 
Gutteridge2 ) says "it would be a strange result 
if an Englishman who in a foreign country publishes 
a libel concerning another Englishman can thereby 
save his pocket from payment of damages". 
Robertson3 ) suggests the decision is inconsistent 
with the principle that the penal and criminal laws 
of one country are not enforced in another. 
Hancock4 ) says the decision is at "glaring 
variance" with the policy that a plaintiff should 
not be given an undue advantage by a fortunate 
choice of a forum. 5 ) 
1) F. Pollock (note} 13 L.Q.R. 233 (1897) 
2) H.C. Gutteridge. A New Approaph to Private Inter-
national Law. 6 Carob. L.J. 16 (1938) 
3) Robertson. op.cit. supra at p. 16 note 6 at p.63 
4) M. Hancock. A Problem in Damages for Tort in the 
Conflict of Laws. 22 Can. Bar. Rev. 843 (1944) 
5) See also Schmitthoff. Torts Committed Abroad 27 
Can. Bar Rev. 816 (1949) and J.D. Falconbridge. 
Essays on the Conflict of Laws. p. 815 (2nd Ed.) 
(1954). 
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Later cases have both approved and dis-
approved the decision l)and in the leading English 
case of Boys v. Chaplin2 } Milmo J. at first instance 
and Lord Donovan in the House of Lords followed 
or approved the decision; Lord Denning and Diplock 
L.J. in the Court of Appeal and Lord Hodson, 
Lord Wilberforce (both expressly} and Lord Guest 
(implicitly) rejected Machado v. Fontes. 
Apart from meaning "innocent" other inter-
pretations have been given to "justifiable". 
Rheinstein 3)says, for exampl~ that the act must not 
be "disapproved of" by the lex loci, and Morse 4 ) 
contends that the lex loci must attribute legal 
consequences of a civil nature to the act in 
question. In The Mary :f\1oxham5 ) James L.J. said 
that if the act is "lawful", "excusable" or 
"legitimised" by the lex loci the defendant 
will not be answerable. 
1) e.g. disapproved in Scotland. See Naftalin v. 
London etc. R.Co. fl933J S.C. 259. and in 
Victoria in Varawa v. Howard Smith Co. /19107 
Vic. L.R. 509 and in Canada in Walpole v. Canadian 
Railway Co. (1921} Sask. L.R. 75 but more often followed 
eg. see· :l-1cLean v. Pettigrew [1945] 2 D.L.R. 65 and 
Martin v. Marmen $96$' 6 D.L.R. 77 {3rd Session} 
2) /196~ 2 Q.B. 1; [1968J 1 All E.R. 283; /196a/ 2 W.L.R. 
328; 111 Sol.Jo. 968 C.A. ; affirmed sub nom Chaplin 
v. Boys, /1971] A.C. 356; [196~ 2 All E.R. 1085; 
[1969J 3 W.L.R. 322; 113 Sol. Jo. 608, H.L. 
3) M. Rheinstein. The Place of Wrong: A Study in The Method 
of Case Law. 19 Tulane L.R. 4 at p. 23 (1944} 
4} Morse, p. 55 
5} (1876) l.P.D. 107 (C.A.) 
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To conclude,,Cheshire1 ) suggests that whilst 
"justifiable" might have been an apt word for use 
in Phillips v. Eyre itself, it does not follow t~at 
it should be used for laying down the broad doctrine 
applicable to torts in general. 
Leaving aside the problem of determining the 
correct interpretation to be placed on the word 
"justifiable" the major concern is to determine 
whether the second limb refers to jurisdiction 
and/or choice of law. Machado v. Fontes 2 )and 
Boys v. Chaplin3 ) are perhaps the two most import-
ant cases here. 
The former case suggests the first limb is a 
choice of law rule and that the only reference to 
the lex loci delicti is to establish that the act 
is "not innocent", in other words the second limb 
is jurisdictional. One can however argue that 
Boys v. Chaplin overruled Machado v. Fontes. The 
facts~)agreed before the trial were that Chaplin 
negligently driving in Malta injured Boys. Both 
were British Servicemen who, after the accident, 
returned to England. Chaplin had no defence. 
Under Maltese law Boys could receive£53 as 
special damages whilst English law allowed general 
1) Cheshire, p. 269 
2) £1897} 2 Q.B. 231 
3) [197~ A.C. 356 
4) Discussed in detail see infra at p. 137 et.seq 
\ 
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damages for pain and suffering which were 
assessed in excess of£2,500. The question was 
which law, Maltese or English, was to determine 
the problem. 
In 1 the Court of Appeal, Lord Denningl) held 
both tests to be jurisdictional whilst Diplock2 )L.J. 
dissenting held the first limb to be jurisdictional 
and the second choice of law. Lord Upjohn 3 ) held 
that once the act was not justifiable by Maltes~ 
law, English law applied thus adhering to the view 
that the first limb is choice of law and the second 
jurisdictional. 
In the House of Lords 4 )some of the judgments 
are difficult to follow, Lord Hodson, for example, 
seems to hold that both tests were intended to 
be jurisdictional5 ~ Lord Donovan "entirely agreed" 
with Lord Upjohn and Lord Guest did not discuss 
the problem. Cheshire 6 ) suggests that Lord 
Donovan and Lord Guest both imply that Phillips v. 
Eyre is a matter of jurisdiction. Lord Wilber-
force held that the first limb was not jurisdic-
tional but a choice of law rule subject to civil 
liability between the actual parties in the lex 
loci delicti. Finally Lord Pearson's judgment 
suggests that he does not consider Phillips v. Eyre 
to relate to jurisdiction. 
1) See supra at p.26 note 2 
2) Ibid 
3) Ibid 
4) Ibid 
5) See discussion by Cheshire p. 272 et seq. and see 
North & Webb op.cit. supra at p.20 note 7 
6) Cheshire, p. 272 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
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There would thus appear to be four possibilities 
open as to the jurisdiction/choice of law problem: 
a) First limb is a jurisdictional requirement, 
second limb relates to choice of law. 
b) Both limbs are jurisdictional; 
c) First limb is choice of law and the second 
limb jurisdictional; 
d) Both limbs are choice of law, a "double 
actionability". 
a) With regards the first possibility Yntema favours 
this view as noted above as does Lord Diplockl) 
in Boys v. Chaplin. However, Lord Wilberforce 2 ) 
and, according to His Lordship, Andersorls case3 ) 
are against this interpretation. Morse4 )himself 
against Yntema's views, suggests all their Lord-
ships in the House of Lords in Boys v. Chaplin 
"provide clear authority against the view". 
It would seem that there is today little academic 
or judicial support for this interpretation of 
_ Phillips v. Eyre. 
b) There is however more support for the second 
interpretation. Spence5 )for example, finds 
support from passages in Willes J. 6 )judgment. 
" •.. The civil liability arising out of a 
wrong derives its birth from the law of the place, 
[l968J 2 Q.B. 1 at pp.38-39 
/l971J A.C. 356 at pp. 385-387 
(1965) 114 C.L.R. 20 
Morse, p. 47 
Spence, op.cit. supra at p.20 note 2 
( 18 7 0) L.R. 6 Q.B.l 
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and its character is determined by that law." 
Thus, Spence says, Willes J. would have 
applied Jamaican law to determine liability had 
it been necessary, as it was the jurisdictional 
requirement of actionability in the forum had not 
been met and so the problem of a choice of law 
rule never became relevant. 
Pearl1 )and Gerber 2 ) also adopt this view and 
Windeyer J. 3 >in Anderson's case said:-
"But when the two conditions are fulfilled -
when the act is wrongful by the law of the forum 
and in the place where it occurred- what then? .• 
The case is one that the court will entertain but 
by which law is it to judge.'ft?" 
Windeyer J. 4 > in Anderson's case also said: 
"I take the first condition to mean that the 
acts a plaintiff alleges were done must be 
such that had they been done in the country of 
the forum, here N.S.W., they would have given 
him a good cause of action there against the 
defendant according to the lex loci, here the 
law of N.S.W. That a plaintiff had a good 
cause of action in this sense does not mean 
that no mat~er exists that would answer or 
defeat it."·· 
Morse5 ) believes that there would be little merit 
in allowing the plaintiff to succeed when applying 
the lex loci at the jurisdictional level and then 
have him fail when applying the lex loci at the 
later choice of law stage; 
One can interpret Lord Guest and Lord Donovan 
in Boys· v. Chaplin as giving support to this view. 6 ) 
1) Pearl. op.cit. supra at p. 20 note 1 at p.220 
2) Gerberc, op.cit. supra at p. 20 note 4 at p.44 et.seq. 
3) (1965) 114 C.L.R. at P·41 
4) Ibid at p.41 
5) Morse, p.51 
6 ) /19 71J A. C • 3 56 at pp • 3 8 o·- 3 8 3 • 
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Critics, on the other hand, include Morsel) 
who notes that this view imposes two "threashold 
hurdles" and is difficult to justify on policy 
grounds. 2 ) McClean 3)considers the view "heretical". 
Both writers take the view that if the proper law 
of the tort4 )is applied, then to require both limbs 
to be jurisdictional prerequisites would be the 
height of absurdity. 5 ) McClean6 ) also notes that 
the proper law of the tort is sometimes seen as 
an alternative to Phillips v. Eyre and that it 
impossible to imagine the proper law of the tort 
being a jurisdictional requirement. 
Despite the attractiveness of viewing both 
limbs as jurisdictional prerequisites it is suggested 
that since Boys v. Chaplin it can no longer be the 
prevailing approach in England. 
c) The third approach has found favour in some 
Commonwealth jursidications; it has been adopted by 
Australian and Canadian Courts. 
Nygh7 ) discusses the Australian cases and 
concludes that the law in Australia is developing 
along different lines to England law and thus in 
effect emphasising that tnis approach is not the 
current English approach. 
d) English law would appear to be that both limbs 
are. choice of law requirements. The judgmen~s of 
1) Morse, pp.48-50 2) Ibid 
3) K.D. McClean. Torts in the Conflict of Laws 43 A.L.J. 
185 (1969) 
4) Infra at p.41 
5) Morse, p.50 
6) McClean, op.cit, note 3 
7) P.E. Nygh. Boys v. Chaplin in the Antipodes 4 U.of Tas. 
L.R. 161. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
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Lord Wilberforce and Lord Pearson1 )suggests this. 
Cheshire 2 )after discussing the various judgments 
in Boys v. Chaplin concludes that "on balance" in 
England Phillips 
. . 3) D1cey & Morrls 
Likewise North & 
v. Eyre relates to choice of law. 
agree as do Morse 4 )and KarstenS). 
Webb 6 )see this as the "only tenable" 
view after Boys v. Chaplin. Assuming this to be 
the correct view the next problem is whether or not 
actionability by both the lex loci delicti and the 
lex fori resolves the issue of substantive law. 
In Boys v. Chaplin7 ) the judgments provide no 
clear answer. Cheshire8 )notes that there is support 
"on one basis or another" for applying the lex fori 
as the substantive law whilst Dicey & Morris 9 ) take 
the view that the opinions of Lord Hodson and Lord 
Wilberforce are destined to prevail, as they thus 
formulate their Rule 178(2) to read: 
"But a particular issue between the parties may 
be governed by the law of the country which, with 
respect to that issue, has the most significant 
relationship with the occurrence and the parties." 
/1971_} A.C. 356 at pp.385-387 and p. 398 
Cheshire p. 273 
Dicey & Morris, p. 941 
Morse, Ch.4 
I. G. F. Karsten. Chaplin v. Boys: Another Analysis 
19 I.C.L.Q. 35 (1970) 
6) North & Webb, op.cit. supra at p. 20 note 7 at p.27 
7) /1971/ A.C.356 
8) Cheshire, p.276 
9) Dicey & Morris, p. 945 
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Clause 2 is modelled on Sectionl45 of the 
American Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws. 
Support for a flexible approach can be traced back 
1) . 
to Phillips v. Eyre where Wi J. prefaced h1s 
formula with "As a general rule " . . . . However 
other than stating that Lord Denning M.R. in 
v. International Drilling Co. 2 )considered Lord 
Wilberforce and Lord Hodson•s 3 ) views were destined 
to prevail no other reasons are given for the 
assumption by Dicey & Morris. 
It was perhaps possible that Rule 178(2) was the 
wish of Professor Morris rather than the current 
state of the law. 4 ) 
However, since the 9th edition of Dicey & Morris 
the Court of Appeal in Church of Scientology of 
California v.· Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis5 )has accepted that in Boys v. Chaplin 
a majority had laid down a rule of double 
actionability which was subject to a limited 
exception in appropriate cases on the basis of the 
views expressed by Lords Wilberforce and Hodson. 
As this is the st English statement, Lord 
Hilberforce's and Lord Hodson's judgments in Boys 
v. Chaplin6 ) now assume greater significance. 
\\Thilst accepting that as a general rule actionability 
1) (1870) L.R. 6.Q.B.l 
2) [197lJ 1 W.L.R. 1176 and see The Times Oct.25, 1977. 
3) Dicey & Morris, p.945 note 28 
4) Discussed below, see infra at p.41 
5) (1976) 120 Sol.Jo. 690 
6) [1971} A.C. 356 
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is required under the lex fori and the lex loci 
delicti their Lordships saw room for flexibility 
and both were influenced by the draft of the 
Second Restatement. Section 145(1) of the 
American Restatement {second) Conflict of Laws holds: 
" •.. the rights and liabilities of the parties 
with respect to an issue in tort are determined 
by the local law of the state which as to that 
issue has the most significant relationship to 
the occurrence and the parties ••• " 
It would seem possible to frame an exception on the 
lines of the Second Restatement from the combined 
judgments of Lords Wilberforce and Hodson, however 
neither judge gave explicit instructions as to when 
the exception was to be applied. Lord Wilberforce1 ) 
said that the general rule must apply unless "clear 
and satisfying grounds are shown why" it should be 
departed from, and 
"No purely mechanical rule can properly do 
justice to the great variety of cases where 
persons come together in a foreign jurisdiction 
for different purposes with different pre-
existing relationships, from the background 
of different legal systems."2) 
and Lord Hodson held that "as a general rule" should 
be interpreted so as to leave some latitude in 
cases where it would be against public policy to 
admit or exclude claims. 3 ). 
It is regretable that there has been no other 
1) [1971J A.C. 356 at p.391 
2) Ibid 
3) Ibid at p. 378 
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significant English decisions since Boys v. 
Chaplin 1 ~ t . d 1' 2 )h, . 't lf As men 1one ear 1er t lS 1n 1 se 
suggests that in England the law favours to a 
marked degree the defendant and further that 
potential plaintiffs are possibly being advised 
against instituting proceedings in view of the 
enormity of their task. It seems strange that 
over a decade could pass in England without another 
important decision coming before the English Courts, 
when taking one branch of torts along, namely 
accidents, one considers the volume of vehicles, 
both tourist and commercial which have entered and 
left England annually since she became a member 
of the European Economic Community. 3 ) 
Likewise there appears to be no significant 
developments outside England. Canada continues 
to adhere faithfully to Machado v. Fontes 4 )without 
having had the opportunity to consider Boys v. 
Chaplin at a suitably high level. 
1) In Sayers v. International Drilling Co. /19717 l.W.L.R. 
1176 Lord Denning M.R. was of the opinion that the 
Proper Law of ~the Tort was the rule whilst in Church of 
Scientology of California v. Commissioner of Police for 
th~ Metropol~s (1976) 120 Sol.Jo. 690 and The Times Oct 
25, 1977 per Lord Denning M.R. the C.A. accepted that a 
majority of their Lordships in Boys v. Chaplin had 
enunciated a rule of double actionability which was subject 
to a limited exception in appropriate cases on the basis of 
the views expressed by Lords Hodson & Wilberforce. 
2) Supra at p.22 
3) In 1978 there were 12.6million visits by people from 
overseas to Britain of which 6.2million were made by 
residents of other European Economic Community countries. 
Britain 1980 p.223. For the same period 6,900 people 
were killed on British roads, 83,000 were seriously 
injured and 261,000 slightly injured, ibid p.295 
4) fl897J 2 Q.B. 231 
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1) In La Van v. Danyluk the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia noted that Boys v. Chaplin had 
overruled Machado v. Fontes but Kirke Smith J. 
felt bound to follow McLean v. Pettigrew2 ) which 
had been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
1945. Thus the Canadian view is that "justifiable" 
means "not innocent" and that the first limb of 
Phillips v. Eyre relates to choice of law whilst the 
second limb is jurisdictional. 
Likewise in Scotland no significant development 
has taken place. Cases such as Naftalin v. London 
Midland & Scottish Rail Co. 3 ) and M'Elroy v. 
M'Allister4 ) have not had a judicial airing at a 
high level since Boys v. Chaplin. Thus Machado v. 
Fontes 5 )remains rejected and both limbs of Phillips 
v. Eyre pertain to choice of law, thus making 
recovery for a plaintiff particularly difficult. 
In the latest Scottish case of Mitchell v. 
McCulloch6 )the Lord Ordinary (McDonald) would not 
allow a pursuer to recover for heads of damages 
allowable in the Bahamas (the lex loci delicti) but 
which by Scottish law were too remote. The lex 
loci delicti "should not create or extend a right 
not. recognised by the forum". 7 ) 
1) (1970) 75 W.W.R. 500 and see infra at p.l43 et.seq. 
2) [l945J 2 D.L.R. 65 
3) 1933 S.C. 259 
4) 1949 S.C. 110 
5) [1897J 2 Q.B. 231 
6) 1976 S.L.T. 2 
7) Ibid at p.5 
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As noted above the traditional approach in 
Australia following Koop v. Bebb1 )and Anderson's 
case
2 ) is that both limbs of Phillips v. Eyre 
are jurisdictional with the lex fori determining 
liability. Nygh3 ) argues that the law in Australia 
is developing along different lines to that of 
England. The first reported case after Boys v. 
Chaplin was Joss v. Snowball 4 ) and the impact of 
Boys v'. Chaplin on it says Nygh5 ), was "nil". 
However, the conflict point is not strongly argued. 
Similarly in Kemp v. Piper 6 ) the Court was not 
required to determine whether the extent of liability 
should be co-determined by the lex loci delicti or 
not. In Kolsky v. Mayne Nickless Ltd. 7 )both limbs 
of Phillips v. Eyre were treated as jurisdictional~. 
and the lex fori as the substantive law, •.•. 
the Australian "heresy". 8 ) The possible effect of 
Boys v. Chaplin on the traditional Australian rule 
was however considered by the Court which concluded 
that their Lordships had arrived at the application 
of English law by such a variety of reasons that no 
gounds existed for departing from traditional 
Australian authorities. 
l) (1951) 84 C.L.R. 629 
2) (1965) 114 C.L.R. 20 
3) Nygh, 4 U.Tas. L.R. 161 (1973) 
4) (1970J l N.S.W.R. 426 
The Court felt that:-
5) Nygh, op.cit. supra note 3 at p.l64 
6) /l971J S.A.S.R. 25 
7 ) /19 7 QJ 3 N • S . \'7. R • 511 
8) McCBan, op.cit. supra at p.3l note 3 at pp.l83-l85 
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"This introduction of the concept of 
flexibility is, as it appears to us, the real 
point of departure in Boys v. Chaplin."l) 
In Warren v. Warren, 2 } Matthews J. gave unqualified 
support to Lord Wilberforce's judgment in 
Chaplin but the following year in Schmidt v. 
Government Insurance Office of New South Wales 3 ) 
the traditional Australian view was again in the 
fore and no reference to Boys v. Chaplin in the light ~ 
of Warren v. Warren was made. Nygh's 4)conclusion is, 
in effect, that Boys v. Chaplin has had virtually 
no impact in Australia. 
In concluding this chapter, one may tentatively 
summarise the present English position as follows:-
1. The first limb of Phillips v. Eyre remains law and 
thus where the lex fori itself imposes no liability 
whatsoever upon the defendant he will not be liable. 
2. Where the lex loci delicti imposes no liability 
whatsoever on the defendant then again he will not 
be liable. 
3. Where the lex loci delicti has subsequently rendered 
the act justifiable or wholly innocent then the 
defendant will not be liable. 
4. The act must have been such that had the conduct 
occurred in the lex fori it would have entitled the 
particular plainti to sue the particular defendant. 
5~ Both limbs of Phillips v. Eyre relate to choice 
1) (1970) 72 S.R. (N.S.W.} 437 at p. 449 
2) [l972J Qd.R. 386 
3) /1973} lN.S.W.L.R. 59 
4) Nygh. op.cit. supra at p. 37 note 3 at P·l76 
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law. Both the lex fori and the lex loci delicti 
(double actionability) apply to determine liability. 
~vhilst this is the general rule it may be departed 
from in circumstances yet to be determined. 
6. 1 - 5 above illustrate the complexity of English 
law in this field. As the law stands at present 
in Phillips v. Eyre jurisdictions the only advice 
one could give a client is that uncertainty prevails 
and that all things considered to embark on 
litigation would be really rather hazardous. It 
is noteworthy that there are no reported New Zealand 
decisions directly on choice of law for accidents in 
particu_lar or torts in general and very few in other 
Phillips v. Eyre jurisdictions. Before suggesting 
a tentative solution to this state of affairs, it 
is proposed to outline some other jurisdictions 
attempts at resolving the dilemma. 
o-o-o 
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4. SOME ALTERNATIVES 
"Too often the field of Conflicts appears to be 
a mental game with infinite complications, 
destitute of clarity fnd simplicity and without 
any certain rules .. "l 
Alternatives to the lex fori and lex loci delicti 
approaches are of recent origin and have for the most part 
been developed in the United States. A notable exception 
however is the "Proper l.aw of a Tort" theory developed by 
Professor Morris in the early 1950's (and even this he 
developed whilst in America). The two most important 
approaches are those of Professors Currie and Cavers, 
these theories or approaches will be outlined along with 
some other tentative solutions. Whilst specific criticisms 
of each view are noted in their context the more fundamental 
or general criticisms of these recent approaches are 
reserved for the conclusion of the chapter. 
The specific approaches discussed are as 
follows:-
(i) The Proper Law of a Tort. 
(ii) Governmental Interest Analysis 
(iii) Caver's Principles of Preference 
(iv) The 'Contacts' or Centre of Gravity Approach 
(v) The Better Law Approach 
(vi) The Forum Centred or True Rules Approach 
(vii) The Comparative Impairment Approach 
\ 
(viii) The Functional Approach 
(ix) The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1969) 
1) J.P. Niboyet. Territorality and Universal Recognition 
of Rules of Conflict of Laws. 65 Harv.L.R. 582 at 
p.586 (1952) 
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(i) 'The Proper Law of a Tort' 
Morris' first published mention of the proper law 
is found in a comment on M'Elroy v. M'All ter in 19491 ) 
that "appalling decision" which was reached through ''equally 
appalling and arid logical channels 2 ~ It was not until 
1950-51 as visiting Professor at Harvard University that he 
developed his concept of the 'proper law' of a tort which 
he defined as "the law which on: policy grounds, seems to 
have the most significant connection with the chain of acts 
and consequences in the particular situation before us. 3 ) 
" ••• The gist of this (the proper law) theory is that, while 
in man~perhaps most, situations there would be no need to 
look beyond the place of wrong, we ought to have a conflict 
rule broad enough and flexible enough to take care of the 
exceptional situations as well as the more normal ones: 
otherwise the result will begin to offend our common sense .• " 4 ) 
Morris suggested that his concept would provide 
flexibility and would enable different issues " .• to be 
segregated and thus facilitate a more adequate analysis of 
the social factors involved."S) 
1) 12 M.L.R. 248 (1949) and see The Proper Law of 
a Tort 64 Harv.L.R. 881 
2} R.D. Childres. Towards the Proper Law of the Tort 
Texas L.R. 336 at p.336 (1962) 
3) Morris op.cit. supra note 1 at p. 888 
4) Morris, p.259 (1st Ed. 1971) 
5} Ibid, pp.i59-260 
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(ii) Governmental Interest Analysis. 
Currie writing in 1963 said:-
"L 'When a Court is asked to apply the Law of 
a foreign state different from the law of the 
forum, it should inquire into the policies 
expressed in the respective laws, and into the 
circumstances in which it is reasonable for the 
respective states to assert an interest in the 
application of those policies. In making these 
determinations the Court should employ the 
ordinary processes of construction and inter-
pretation. 
2. If the Court finds that one state has an 
interest in the application of its policy in 
the circumstances of the case and the other 
state has none, it should apply the law of the 
only interested state. 
3. If the Court finds an apparent conflict 
between the interests of the two states it 
should reconsider. A more moderate and 
restrained interpretation of the policy or 
interest of one state or the other may avoid 
conflicts. 
4. If, upon reconsideration, the Court finds 
that a conflict between the legitimate interests 
of two states is unavoidable it should apply the 
law of the forum. 
5. If the forum is disinterested, but an unavoid-
able conflict exists between the laws of the two 
other states, it should apply the law of the forum -
until someone comes along with a better idea. 
6. The conflict of interest between states will 
result in different dispositions of the same problem, 
depending on where .. the action is brought. If 
with respect to a particular problem this appears 
seriously to infringe a strong national interest in 
uniformity of decision, the Court should not attempt 
to improvise a solution sacrificing the legitimate 
interests of its own state but should leave to 
Congress, exercising its powers under the full faith 
and credit clause, the determination of which 
interest shall be required to yield".l) 
Currie in developing his Governemtnal Interest 
Analysis distinguished between three types of conflicts; 
a true conflict exists where two jurisdic~ions have 
1) . \ B. CurrJ.e. Comments on Babcock v. Jackson. A Recent 
Development in Conflict of Laws. 63 Columbia L.R. 
1212 at pp.l242-1243 (1963) and see B. Currie 
Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963). 
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identifiable policies that would be furthered by the 
application of their respective laws. In a false conflict 
one state has no claim (or a spurious claim) for the 
application of its law and the other state has a legitimate 
claim whilst the third situation is the "unprovided for'' case 
here "neither state cares what happens" 1 )or a disinterested 
forum is unable to choose between competing policies in 
which it has no stake. 2 ) 
Currie insists that the forum should resolve the 
conflicts because balancing the relative importance of 
competing state interests is not a judicial function, it 
" is a political function of a very high order. This 
is a function that should not be committed to Courts in a 
democracy. It is a function that the Courts cannot perform 
effectively for they lack the necessary resources." 3 ) 
McDougal 4 ) suggests Currie's approach 'ls still 
less than fully helpful" and has 'parochial' characteristics -
presumably a reference to the lex fori applying in a true 
cocflict situation. 
Sedler5 ) has "reformulated" Currie's approach, 
firstly Sedler suggests that if the forum has a 'real 
interest' it applies forum law assuming this will not be 
fundamentally unfair to the other party. Secondly if the 
1) B. Currie. op.cit. supra at p. 42 note 1 at p.l52 
2) Ibid, see Ch.3 generally. 
3) Ibid, p.l82 
4) L.L. McDougal. Choice of Law: Prologue to a Viable 
Interest Analysis Theory. 51 No.2 Tulane L.R. 207 at p.242 
(1977) 
5) R.A. Sedler. Choice of Law in Michigan: A Time to go 
Modern. 24 No.3 Wayne L.R. 829 at p.835 (1978) 
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other state and not the forum has a real interest that law 
is applied again assuming no fundamental unfairness. 
Thirdly "when. neither state has a real interest in applying 
its law on the point in issue, the choice of law decision 
should be made with reference to the common policies 
reflected in the laws of the involved states. 1 ) 
Writing in 1973, Sedler 2 )suggested that Courts 
should decide conflicts problems on a case by case basis 
with reference to considerations of policy and fairness to 
the parties. He states that conflict cases, especially in 
the field of torts, tend to fall into certain fact law 
patterns, and that with stare decisis a body of conflict 
law will emerge. 
Kramer 3 ) suggests that in order to determine whether 
it is a true or false conflict situation regard must be had 
to three types of interests; these are 'public at large' 
individual and group interests respectively. Ratner 4 ) on 
the other hand suggests three policy values to be taken into 
consideration in the conflict cases, namely the avoidance of 
internal policy stultification5 ~ "home protection" and 
"fulfilment of expectations". 6 ) .Ratner cites Cipolla v. 
Shaposka 71s .i.llustrative of his second value where it was 
1) Ibid pp.835-836 
2) R.A. Sedler. Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided for 
case: Reflections on Neume·ier v. Kuehner 1 Hofstra L.R. 
125 at p.l31 (1973) and elaborated in Vol.2 Rutgers-Camden 
L.J. (1970) 
3) R. Kramer. Interest & Policy Clashes in Conflicts of Laws 
Vol XIII Rutgers L.R. 523 (1959) 
4) L .. G •. Ratner. Choice of Law Interstate Analysis and Cost 
Contribution No.3 47 So.Calif.L.R. 817 at p.824 (1973/4) 
5) Ibid at pp.826-827 6) Ibid 
7) 439 Pa. 563, 267:. A. 2d. ,854 (1970) 
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saidl)" •• it seems only fair to permit a defendant to rely 
on his home state's law when he is acting within that 
state .•• " 
Westbrook 2 )considers that viewed as a whole 
Professor Currie's approach is "basically a philosophy of 
surrender" which does not provide a complete answer. 
However, it does achieve greater certainty by referring 
the Court back to the forum than other approaches which 
require the court to choose between conflicting state 
interests. 
(iii) The Principles of Preference Approach 
Cavers has formulated 5 principles as guidelines 
for determining the choice of law problem. He says 3 ) 
"l. Where the liability laws of the state of 
injury set a higher standard of conduct or 
of financial protection against injury than do 
the laws of the state where the person causing 
the injury has acted or had his home, the laws 
of the state of injury should determine the 
standards and the protection applicable to the 
case, at least where the person injured is not 
so related to the person causing injury that the 
question should be relegated to the law governing 
their relationship. 
2. Where the liability laws of the state in which 
the defendant acted and caused an injury set a lower 
standard of conduct than do the laws of the home 
state of the person suffering the injury, the laws 
of the state of conduct and injury should determine 
the standard of conduct applicable to the case, at 
least where the person injured is not so related to 
the person causing the injury that the question 
should be relegated to the law governing the 
relationship. 
1) Ratner op.cit~ supra at'F.44 note 4 at pp.826-827 
2) J.E. Westbrook. A Survey & Evaluatio~ of Competing 
Choice of Law Methodologies: The case for Eclecticism. 
40 Missouri L.R. 407 at p.459 (1975) 
3) D.F. Cavers. The Choice-of-Law Process Ch.4 (1965) 
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"3. Where the state in which the defendant acted 
has established special contro , including the 
sanction of civil liability, over conduct of the 
kind in which the defendant is engaged when he 
caused a foreseeable injury to the plaintiff in 
another state, the plaintiff, though having no 
relationship to the defendant, should be accorded 
the benefit of the special standards of conduct, 
and of financial protection in the state of the 
defendant's conduct, even thougn the state of injury 
has imposed no such controls or sanctions. 
4. vfuere the laws of a state in which a relationship 
has its seat has imposed a standard of conduct or 
of financial protection on one party to that relation-
ship to the benefit of the other party which is 
higher than the like standard imposed by the sta,te 
of 1njury, the law of the former state should determine 
the standards of conduct or of financial protection 
applicable to the case for the benefit of the party 
protected by that state's law. 
5. Where the law of a state in which a relationship 
has its seat has imposed a standard of conduct or 
of financial protection on one party to that relation-
ship for the benefit of the other party which was 
lower that the standard imposed by the state of 
injury, the law of the former state should determine 
the standards of conduct or of financial protection 
applicable to the case for the benefit of the party 
whose liability that state 1 s law would deny or limit." 
These principles are illustrative, "they do not 
form a system":} For each principle Cavers gives at least 
one illustration, thus the first principle is illustrated 
by the following fact situation:-
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
plainti from 
defendant from 
(being the Deceased's 
personal representative) 
Place of injury 
Forum 
California 
Arizona 
California 
Arizona 
In Arizona personal injury claims do not survive the tort-
feasor whilst the reverse applies in California. 
1) Ibid p. 136 
(e) 
Whilst 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
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Law applied California as 
" .•. Californians should not be put in jeopardy 
in California simply because an Arizonian has 
come into California from a state whose laws 
provide a lower standard of1 yinancial protection than does California's ..• " 
for Principle II 
Plaintiff from New York 
Defendant from Massachusettes 
Place of Injury Massachusettes 
Forum New York 
New York law - unlike Massachesettes provides no monetary 
ceiling on damages. 
(e) Law Applies Massachusettes law as 
" •.. Inhabitants of Massachesettes should not be 
put in jeopardy of liability exceeding those 
which Massachusettes law creates simply because 
persons from states with higher standards of 2 ) financial protection choose to visit there •.. " 
By way of variation if the defendant is also from 
New York (a Boys v. Chaplin situation) then it is a false 
conflict and the principle should not be evoked. New York 
law is applied on the reasoning that the defendant pays 
no more than he expects to and Massachusettes law is only 
concerned with the defendants liability not with payments 
to widows and the like. 
Cavers realised that his principles were sufficiently 
novel for courts to be reluctant to apply them.until they 
had received academic support. Since their formulation 
they have been applied and received judicial support 
l) Ibid p.l42 
2) Ibid at pp .148-9 
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in the United States:) 
(iv) The 'Contacts'. or 'Centre-of-Gravity' Approach 
Here the jurisdiction with the most 'contacts' 
prevails. The approach is illustrated by Lord Denning 
in Sayers v. International Drilling Co. where he said:-
"So far as the claim in tort is concerned, the 
accident took place in the territorial waters 
of Nigeria. But it took place on an Oil Drilling 
Rig owned and controlled by a Dutch company and 
manned by employees of that company. The 
Nigerians had nothing to do with the Rig. So, 
Nigeria is out. The injured man was English, but 
his fellow employees (who were negligent) may have 
been English or American or some other nationality. 
The only common bond between them was that they 
were employed by the Dutch company. So, Dutch 
is in. If I were asked to decide the proper law 
of the tort (apart 2Trom contract) I should have said it was Dutch law." 
The approach is open to the criticism that it is 
mechanical and ignores the underlying policies in the 
laws allegedly in conflict. 3 ) 
(v) The "Better Law" Approach 
In 1952 Cheatham and Reese identified nine factors 
1) An example being Nuemeir v. Kuehner 31 N.Y.2d.l21 
286 N.E. 2d. 454 (1972) per Field C.J. discussed 
below, whilst also receiving academic criticism 
from scholars such as McDougal who consider Cavers 
principles to be "too broad". See McDougal op.cit. 
supra at p. 43 note 4 at p.248 
2) f1971] 1 W.L.R. 1176,/1971_7 3 All E.R. 163 at p.l66 
3) Nygh. Some thoughts on the Proper Law of a Tort 
26 I.C.L.Q. 932 at pp.933-934 (1977) 
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relevant in determining which law should apply. 1 ) Reese 
subsequently added a tenth2 ) whilst Yntema 3 } went on to 
list no less than seventeen considerations reducible to two 
primary groupings, namely security and comparative justice. 
However, it is Leflar's 4 ) 5 'choice-influencing considerations' 
which seem to have achieved the most popularity in the 
United States. The five considerations are: 
(a) which is the better law 
(b) the predictability of results 
(c) the maintenance of interstate and international 
order. 
(d) Simplification of the judicial task and 
(e) Advancement of the forum's governmental interests. 
1) E.E. Cheatham & W.L.M. Reese. Choice of the 
Applicable Law. 53 Colum.L.R. 959 (1952) in order 
of importance they are (i) the needs of the interstate 
and international system; (ii) application of local 
law unless there is good,reason for not doing so~ 
(iii) effectuation of the purpose of the relevant local 
rule in determining a question of choice of law; 
{iv) certainty, predictability, uniformity of results; 
b) protection of justified expectations; (vi) applic-
ation of the law of the state of dominant interest; 
(vii) ease in determination of applicable law, con-
venience of the court; {viii) the fundamental policy 
underlying the broad local law field involved~ and 
(ix) justice in the individual case. 
2) The court must follow the dictates of its own legislature, 
provided these dictates are constitutional. 28 Law & 
Contemporary Problems 679 atp682 (1963) 
3) Yntema. The Objectives of Private International Law 
35 Can. Bar Rev. 721 at pp.734-5 (1957) 
4) R.A. Lefler. American Conflicts Law p. 245 (1968) 
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These considerations are not listed in order of importance 
and Leflar specifically limited the number of considerations 
to a manageable number which could be used as a practical 
basis for making decisions. 
In a 'true conflict' the court presumably has still to 
determine which is the better law and this requires the making 
of value judgments and this can lead to a "mindless homeward 
trend"l)and should not be encouraged. 2 )"The court is assuming 
powers which should be left to its states legislature if it 
applies another state's law because of a belief that it is 
superior to a forum statute ••• " 3 ) 
Nygh4 )suggests that this approach was tacitly 
applied in Boys v. Chaplin" .•• no other reason could 
explain the fact that five law Lords arrived by three 
different methods of reasoning at the identical result .•• "s) 
The reason was not articulared; in fact Lord Wilberforce 
specifCally rejected the idea. 6 ) Certain American cases 
have however explicitly adopted the approach. 7 ) 
1) Nygh op.cit. supra at p. 48 note 3 at p.936 
2) D.F. Cavers in Symposium on the Value of Principled 
Preferences. 49 Texas L.R. 221 at p.221 (1971) 
3) J.E. Westbrook, op.cit. supra at p.45 note 2 at p.461 
4) Nygh, op cit supra at note 1 at p.937 
5) Ibid 
6) /1971J A.C. 356 at p. 392 
7) Uncritical acceptance in found in Hallis v. !11rs. Smith 
Pie Co. (261 Ark 622, 550 S.W. 2D 453 (1977)) 
(although it has been suggested that this is not a 
suitable case for the application of the consideration. 
See L.L. Hogue. Arkansas' New Choice of Law Rule for 
Interstate Torts. A critique of ·wallis, Williams and 
the Better Rule of Law. 4 Washington Univ. Law Quarterly 
713 at pp.717-8 (1978), and New Hampshire has decided to 
apply the law it deemed the "better" in such cases as 
Maguire v. Exeter Hampton Company 114 N.H. 589, 325 
A 2d. 778 (1974) 
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McDouga11 )notes that Leflar's factors are at "a 
high level of abstraction" which means courts will have 
to use an "inordinate amount of discretion" and this could 
lead to unpredictability. Morse 2 ) would seem to agree 
although, with precedents a body of case law could evolve 
and thus he says, certainty could be achieved. 
(vi) The Forum Centred or True Rules Approach 
Ehrenzweig champion of the lex fori looks at 
past decisions to see the "real" or "true reasons" for the 
application of a particular legal system. If no true rule 
was apparent then Ehrenzweig suggested that the lex fori 
govern unless on the policy grounds of the forum it should 
be displaced:) 
Ehrenzweig contended that American Conflict Law 
had developed true rules of choice in most of those 
situations in which parties can claim to have taken into 
account a specific law. 
11 \1hat is thus left for the residuary lex fori 
are such liabilities as those of tort ••• as to 
which application of forum law cannot be sa!1 to 
defeat a party's justified expectations ••• " 
1) McDougal, op.cit. supra at p.43 note 4 at p.249 
2) lvlorse, p.264 
3) A.A. Ehrenzweig. The Lex Fori: Basic Rule in the 
Conflict of Laws 58 Mich.L.R. 637 (1960) also 
Ehrenzweig , Ch.4 especially pp.352-3 
4) A.A. Ehrenzweig. A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: 
A "Restatement" of the Lex Fori Approach. 18 Okla.L.R. 
340 at p.352 (1965) 
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(vii) The Comparative Impairment Approach 
Here, the court is asked to measure the comparative 
impairment of the policies of the two states if the law 
of the other state was applied. Baxter, an exponant of 
this view suggests that when a court determines which state's 
inteinal objectives will be least impaired_it is doing some-
thing" ••• very different in kind from the weighing 
process often referred to by similar rubrics, but the two 
are often confused .•• "l) He suggests that the fact that 
" •.. super value judgments are separable from the comparative 
impairment principle is one of the cornerstones •• " of the 
approach. 2 ) 
The approach was used in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club3 ) 
where an accident occurred in California, the parties 
being both Californian. The defendant had been drinking 
at a ·club in Nevada where civil liability could not be 
imposed on the server of alcohol to a drunk person. The 
California Supreme Court noted that both states had an 
interest in seeing its rule applied but:~applied the law 
of California as that state's interest would be seriously 
impaired if Nevada tavernkeepers could serve drunk 
Californians who were likely to motor home and cause 
accidents. Weintraub4 )points out that a Nevada Court 
1) W.F. Baxter. Choice of Law, & The Federal System 16 
Stanford L.R. 1 at p.lB (1963) 
2) Ibid 
3) 16 Cal.3d. 313; 546 P 2d. 719; 128 ca.l.Rptr.215 (1976) 
4) R.J. Weintraub. The Futu~e of Choice of Law for Torts: 
What Principles should be Preferred. 41 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 146 at p.l58 
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using the same approach could reach the opposite 
conclusion and suggests that" •.• unless supplemented by 
specific objective criteria 'comparative impairment' is 
unlikely to be a method that is cogent, feasible to 
administer and predictable." 
(viii) The Functional Approach 
Here the Court firstly ascertains which juris-
dictions are concerned and then constructs a rule for 
each relevant jurisdiction. If these rules conflict 
then the next step is to determine whether or not one 
jurisdiction is predominantly concerned. A jurisdiction 
is predominantly concerned if analysis reveals that even 
though the domestic policies of the concerned jurisdictions 
are of relative equal weight, that of one jurisdiction in 
light ·-of its relation to a multistate transaction far 
outweighs that of the other jurisdictions, or that one 
jurisdiction has a greater "aggregation of concerns"l) 
that do the other jurisdictions. Should there be no 
predominantly concerned jurisdiction then analysis may 
reveal that "the claims of one jurisdiction are so clearly 
superior'that it should be recognised. 2 ) In this 
situation the lex fori is applied if the forum is concerned 
and if the forum is neutral it applies the concerned 
jurisdiction whose law "most closely approximates" the 
law of the. forum. 3 ) 
1) A.T. Von Mehren & D.T. Trautmann. The Law of the 
Multistate Problem pp.34 342 {1965) 
2) Ibid, p. 77 
3) Ibid, pp.407-408 
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This approach was developed by Von Mehren and 
Trautmann; the former also considered the possibility of 
developing special substantive rules for multistate 
problems. These rules are not necessarily to be chosen 
from amongst the provisions of the conflicting domestic 
jurisdictions concerned. Von Hehren1 ) discusses three 
types of situations where such rules could be advantageously 
applied. For the first situation he envisages a fact 
situation where two legal orders are both sufficiently 
concerned so that both rules should be given effect to 
but the two laws do not lend themselves to cumulative 
application. Secondly are those situations which because 
of their multistate characteristics involve considerations 
which do not have particular significance in comparable 
domestic settings. 2 ) and thirdly come the true conflict 
... -'-. 3) 
Sl cUU<..:':l:OnS • Von Hehren considers Neumeier v. Kuehner 
a true conflict situation with the law of New York "not 
having sufficient strength" to require its application 
to the situation and Ontario likewise refusing to apply 
its guest statute. The Ontario statute subordinates 
deterrance and compensation policies in favour of a 
policy against ungratitude and the desire to avoid 
collusion to the detriment of insurance companies. As 
the insurance company was a New York company only the 
1) A.T. Von Mehren. Special Substantive Rules for 
Multistate Problems: Their role & Significance in 
Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology. 88 Harv.L.R. 
347 (1974) 
2) Ibid, p. 358 
3) Ibid, p. 3 6 7 
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policy against ingratitude remains and so Ontario takes 
the view that deterrance and compensation should prevail. 
"If this analysis is correct, Neumeier presents a true 
conflict, since each concerned jurisdiction would choose 
to apply the other's domestic rule .• "l) Von Mehren then 
applies a multistate solution which recognises the pol~cies 
of both states, " ••• thus achieving harmony of decisions" 2 ) 
he lets the guest recover one half of the damages suffered~) 4 ) 
Von Mehren admits that the legislature is not likely 
to be active in developing these rules and so their 
formulation would be left to the judiciary and here he 
notes the "traditional hesitancy" to accord law making 
functions to the courts and "the general reluctance of 
all contemporary societies to assign additional tasks of 
great complexity and difficulty to already over burdened 
courts. 5 ) Cavers 6 ) recognised "the logical alternative 
that a rule derived from none of the domestic laws in 
question should be fashioned for the case" but rejected 
the approach on the grounds that the judge would lack 
guidance and that further multiplication of the rules 
of substantive law is undesirable. 
1) Von Mehren, ibid at p.368 
2) Ibid at p.348 
3) Ibid at p. 357 
4) G.G. Hoff. Adjustment of Conflicting Rights. 38 Virginia 
L.R. 745 at 761 (1952) calls this approach the 
"adjustment method". 
5) Von Mehren, op.cit. supra p.54 note 1 at p.357. 
6) D.F. Cavers. A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem 
47 Harv. L.R. 173 at p.l93 (1933) 
56 
The difficulties attached to the functional 
approach are obvious and numerous - what criteria should 
be used to determine a predominantly concerned juris-
diction, when is a claim superior to name but two 
obvious difficulties. 
(ix) The Restatement (Second) ·of Conflict of Laws 
adopt'ed by ·the· Am:e·rican Law 'Institute in 1969 
Paragraph 145:-
"1. The rights and liabilities of the parties to 
an issue in tort are determined by the local 
law of the state which, with respect to that 
issue, has the most significant relationship 
\vi th the occurrence and the parties under the 
principles stated in (para.) 6. 
2. Contacts to be taken into account in applying 
the principles of (para.) 6 to determine the law 
applicable to the issue include: · 
(a) The place where the injury occurred, 
(b) The place where the conduct causing the 
injury occurred. 
(c) The domicile, residence, nationality, 
place of business of the parties, and 
(d) The place where the relationship, if any, 
between the parties is centred. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according 
to their relative importance with respect to the 
particular issue." 
Paragraph 6 provides as follows:-
"1. A court, subject to constitutional 
restrictions, will follow a statutory directive 
of its own state on choice of law. 
2. Where there is no such directive, the factors 
relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of 
law include 
(a) the needs of the interstate and inter-
national systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) The relevant policies of other interested 
states and the relative interests of those 
states in the determination of the particular 
issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular 
field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of 
results, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of 
the law to be applied." 
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The Second Restatement in moving away from the 
lex loci delicti rule to the "most Significant Relationship" 
concept of Morris was not at the time a revolutionary 
step. Not only was there a volume of academic writing 
as outlined above, but judicial support for Morris and 
Cavers ideas had been present since the celebrated case 
of Babcock v. Jackson1 ) in 1963 where Fuld C.J. said2 ) 
"Justice, fairness and the best practical result •• 
may best be achieved by giving controlling effect 
to the law of th~ jurisdiction which, because of 
its relationship with the occurrance or the 
parties has the greatest concern with the specific 
issue raised in the litigation." 
Nearly a decade later, Fuld C.J. was to formulate 
3 rules to cover motor vehicle accidents, these are 
discussed below. 3 ) 
The Second Restatement has come in for considerable 
academic criticism, Ehrenzweig4 ) firstly pointed out that 
it is a widespread misconception that the Institute is an 
official agency and that especially in communist countries it 
has been seen as the principle source of American law, and 
he criticised the Second Restatement on the grounds of 
"vagueness"S) and with "give it up formulas". Juenger 
notes that " ••• it is not much of a rule since it fails to 
offer a definition of the central.word 'significant' •.. " 6 ) 
1) 12 N.Y. 2d. 473; 191, N.E. 2d. 279 (1973) 
2) Ibid at p. 481 
3) Infra at p. 67 
4) A.A. Ehrenzweig. The Second Conflicts Restatement: A 
last Appeal for Its Withdrawal. 113 Univ.of Pen.L.R. 
1230 at p.l232 (1965) 
5) Ibid at p. 1242 
6) F. Juenger. Choice of Law in Interstate Torts 118 Univ. 
of Pen. Law Review 202 at p.212 (1969) 
Others consider it a "question begging formula"l) a 
"mere counting of geographical contacts" 2 ) and that it 
can lead to uncertainty as no criter~a is given for 
assessing the relative importance of the choice of law 
principles in any given case. 3 ) Morse 4 } does note 
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howeve~ that uncertainty exists equally in the .academic 
approaches and that this particular problem is to a degree 
mitigated by the attempt to state specific but not 
invariable rules for each tort; for example paragraph 146 
which deals with personal injuries provides:-
"in an action for personal injury, the local la~ 
of the state where the injury occurred determines 
the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, 
with respect to the particular issue, some other 
state has a more significant relationship ••• to 
the occurrence and the parties, in which evedthe 
local law of the other state will be applied." 
McDougal5 ) considers the Second Restatement a 
,_,_disappointment" as only fragments of interest analysis 
were incorporated into paragraph 145 and to return to 
Ehrenzweig6 ), "surely, it is neither feasible nor 
desirable to 'restate' a beginning". 
A problem central to these approaches or rules 7 ) 
is that they lack certainty and predictability and can be 
1) Cavers. op.cit. supra at p.45 ·note 3 at p.207 
2) Morse, p. 260 
3) Ibid 
4) Ibid 
5) .McDougal, op.cit. supra at p. 43 note 4 at p.256 
6) Ehrenzweig, op.cit. supra at p.57 note 4 at p.l244 
7) For example Nygh op.cit. supra at p. 48 note 3 
at p.939 says that a Principle of Preference is in 
effect a new Choice of Law Rule. 
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seen as being of little help to a court. One wonders if 
a court really would find assistance from Cheatham & Reese's 
nine relevant factors (or Yentema's seventeen considerations) 
and to resort to "the ordinary process of construction 
and interpretation"!) is surely of little assistance to a 
court faced with an international tort. To determine 
the policy behind a purely domestic law is a difficult 
task and at an international level almost impossible. 
In Commonwealth jurisdictions a court must adhere to the 
rules pertaining to interpretation of Statutes as 
recourse to legislative history for purposes of inter-
pretatio~ is not permissible. 2 ) Statutes generally 
completely ignore problems raised by foreign elements 
and this appears to be so not only in Commonwealth 
jurisdictions but in the United States as well. 3 ) 
:Po1Tdy and the reason or reasons behind any given law 
often involve matters of degree and policy is invariably 
connected with the particular country or state's norms 
and values. Whilst the problem is perhaps not so great 
in the United States or Australia where there exists a 
common language and shared norms between the states 
there must surely be a tendancy to view one's own laws 
as best and a strong temptation must exist to prefer ones 
1) Currie. 63 Columbia L.R. 1212 at pp.l242-1244 (1963) 
and Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws (1963) 
2} However, Baade suggests that " .•• American Courts can 
look at Foreign legislative history even if the Courts 
of the relevant foreign country would' not do so. He 
does however seem to be the only exponent of this view. 
See H.W. Baade. The Case of the Disinterested Two States 
Neumeier v. Kuehner 1 Hofstra L.R. 150 at pp.l53-154 
(197 3) 
3) Kramer. op.cit. supra at p.44 note 3 at p. 537 
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own policy to that of an alien country. 
It is also hard to see how Federal Courts can 
develop any criteria for choosing rationally between 
clashing legitimate state policies in true conflict 
situations. 
Uncertainty could also arise. Babcock v. 
Jackson11nd subsequent New York cases illustrate this. 
The Jacksons took Miss Babcock in their motor vehicle on 
a weekend trip to Canada. The journey started and was 
to end in New York where the parties lived and where the 
motor vehicle was garaged and presumably insured. Whilst 
in Ontario the car ran off the road and as a result 
Miss Babcock was seriously injured. The lex loci delicti 
did not allow recovery in this situation, the forum was 
New York and by New York law Miss Babcock could obtain 
damages. The New York Court of Appeal allowed Miss 
Babcock to recover as New York law had the most significant 
contacts with the matter, '' ••• in sharp contract, OntBrio's 
sole relationship with the occurrence is the purely 
adventitious circumstance that the accident occurred there .. " 2 ) 
Moreland3 ) makes the point that as both the unlawful 
conduct (negligence) and the injury occurred in Ontario 
an Ontario Court faced with identical facts could very 
well decide that Ontario had the most significant 
relationship and apply its law. Thus different results 
1) 12 N.Y.2d. 473; 191 N.E. 2d. 279; 240 N.Y.S. 2d.743 
2) Ibid at p. 483, 284 and 750 respectively 
3) Moreland. Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Torts 
A Critique 56 Kentucky L.J. 5 at p.l3 (1967/8) 
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could arise from the same set of facts depending on the 
choice of forum and this could lead to injustice and that 
other evil - forum shopping. 
Ehrenzweig1 >suggests it is no wonder that Courts 
eager to apply the new doctrine expounded by the New York 
Court in Babcock's Case have found themselves in "complete 
confusion" when two years after refusing to apply the 
Ontaria guest statute the New York Court applied the 
Colorado guest statute in an action between two New Yorkers 
because of Colorado's prevailing interest, and then in 
the next year returning to the New York liability rule 
in another host-guest action arising out of an accident 
in Ontario. 2 } 
A second and connected problem is that all the 
approaches mentioned ·would involve considerable time and 
expense to administer. Also the ordinary adversary 
system or two party litigation cannot fully and adequately 
inform the court of the scope and extent of the issues 
involved and as Bradley3 )notes, a court has no duty to 
apply interest analysis until a party requests it to do 
so, and even if a court undertakes a party-initiated 
1) A.A. Ehrenzweig. False Conflicts & The Better Rule: 
2) 
Threat & Promise in Hultistate Tort Law. 53 
Virginia L.R. 847 at p.850 (1967) 
Dym v. Gordon 16 N.Y. 2d. 120; 209 N.E. 2d. 792 
262 N.Y.S. 2d. 463 (1965) and Macey v. Rozbicki 
18 N.Y. 2d. 289; 221 N.E. 2d. 380; 274 N.Y.S. 
2d. 591 {1966) respectively. 
3. J.F. Bradley. After Hurtado & Bernhard;Interest 
Analysis and the Search for Cons1stent Theory for 
Choice of Law Cases. 29 Stanford L.R. 127 at p.l41 
(1976) 
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interest analysis it apparently has no duty to consider 
the interest of states whose laws are not advanced by 
the litigants. 
Reese1 ) suggests that approaches generally have the 
defects of uncertainty, unpredictability and are time 
.consuming to apply; prove an "onerouijl difficult and 
frustrating task" 2 ) for the judiciary and that ''when the 
policy underlying a statute or decisional rule is other-
wise ascertainable, will often be difficult to 
the policy to the point of being able to determine 
whether it would or would not be furthered by the rules 
application in a case involving foreign facts ••• " 3 ) 
He suggests that approaches were developed as the existing 
rule (application of the lex loci delicti in the United 
States) was unsatisfactory. Unlike Sedler4 ) Reese 
consiQ.~;rs the field of torts in true conflict of laws to be 
vast. but suggests that rules could and should emerge 
as in other areas of the common law. He considers that a 
large number of narrow rules5 ) appealing to common sense6 ) 
have the greatest chance of success. 
Sedler7 ) suggests that " •.• The Courts have misconceived 
the judicial function in conflicts cases. It not 
necessary to adopt a "rule" for. 1 cases, particularly 
not a comprehensive system of rules designed to solve all 
1) W.L.M. Reese. Choice of Law: Rules or Approaches 
57 No.3 Cornell L.R. ~15 (1972) 
2) Ibid at p. 317 
3) Ibid 
4) Supra at p.44 
5) R.A. Sedler. 57 3 Cornell L.R. 315 at 325 (1972) 
6) Ibiq at p. 329 
7) R.A. Sedler. Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky. 
56 Kentucky L.J. 27 at p.85 (1967/8) 
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conflicts problems that may arise. All that is 
necessary is to decide whether the law of the forum 
should be displaced in the particular fact-law pattern before 
it". The lex fori will be displaced when the legitimate 
expectations of the parties demand it; policy and fairness 
rather than abstract and analytical doctrine are to 
prevail. 1 ) 
A third major difficulty would appear to be the 
classification of a given fact situation into a "false" 
"true" ~'no interest" or "disinterested forum" case. This 
can be illustrated by reference to Hurtado v. Superior 
Court2 ) a 1974 decision of the Californian Supreme Court. 
The facts were simple and typical of international 
accidents. A Mexican died in California as a result of 
a motor vehicle accident. The defendants were Californians. 
Tl18·1aw of Mexico placed an upper limit of just under 
.. 
$2,000 for compensation for wrongful-death whilst California 
had no upper limit. The Californian Court applied 
Californian law having found it to be a "false conflict" 
situation. 
Weintraub3 )however has no difficulty in analysing 
Hurtado as a "no interest" case. He says 4 )that the 
classic ''no interest" case is one in which the plaintiffs 
state has a law favourable to the defendant and the 
defendants state has a law favourable to the plaintiff. 
1) Ibid at p.86 
2) 11 Cal. 3d. 574; 522 P. 2d. 666; 114,Cal Rptr. 106 
(1974) and see infra at p.l30 
3) Weintraub. op.cit. supra at p. 52 note 4 
4) Ibid at p. 153 
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The term "no interest" comes from the argument that 
neither state is interested in having. its own law apply. 
In Hurtado the plaintiffs state law (Mexico) is favourable 
to the defendants (Californian) as they can only be liable 
for $2,000 and the defendant's state (California) has a 
law favourable to the plaintiff as the deceased Mexican's 
next of kin could get over $2,000. 
A court could also hold that it was a "no interest" 
situation by deciding that the object or policy behind 
the Mexican law was to prevent excessive financial 
burdens on Mexican defendants and as the particular 
defendants are Californians Mexico has no interest in 
the application of Mexican law. Here the Californian 
unlimited recovery rule must be seen as designed to 
protect Californian residents for:the benefit of non 
residents; California will have no interest in its rule 
extending to Mexicans. Here the unlimited recovery rule 
would be seen as having nothing to do with deterrance. 
Nyghl) writing in the same year as Weintraub 
discusses a situation where "neither btates) are interested 
in applying their policies to the particular case". This 
seems to be the same as Weintraub's definition of "no 
interest" cases above. Yet Nygh obviously aware of 
Hurtado type fact patterns considers such cases as "almost 
inconceivable". 2 ) 
The Court in Hurtado in deciding a "false conflict" 
1) Nygh. op.cit. supra at p.48 note 3 at p.943 
2) Ibid at p.945. 
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existed emphasised the deterrance aspect of the Californian 
law. California was viewed as .having an interest in 
seeing its law applied as a deterrant to negligent conduct 
in general, whilst Mexico had no interest in preventing 
full liability. The Court also noted that Mexico's 
interest in compensating resident survivors would be 
furthered if Californian law was applied so both California 
and Mexico had an interest in applying Californian law. 
Other writers have analysed the case as a false 
conflicts situation but by different reasoning. Ratner1 ) 
looks at the relative cost contribution. Californians, 
he says, have to pay for their unlimited recovery rule and 
this money comes from higher insurance premiums, higher 
transport costs and higher prices generally. The rule 
Ratner says is designed to protect Californian residents 
and also residents in other states which have an unlimited 
recovery rule because all such states have a reciprocal 
interest in unrestricted recovery by residents. 
Mexicans on the other hand do not have to con-
tribute to an expensive scheme and presumably would 
apply their rule to a Californian defendant sued in 
Mexico by a Mexican plaintiff. The visiting Mexican 
in Hurtado had not contributed to the Californian scheme 
prior to his death and his next of kin could not claim 
unequal protection because had Mexico had an unlimited 
recovery rule a Californian court would have allowed him 
1) Ratner, op.cit. supra at p.44 note 4 at pp.829-841 
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or his next of kin unlimited recovery. " •.• so no 
constitutionally invidious distinction is thereby created 
between resident plaintiffs who can fully recover from 
resident defendants and non resident plaintiffs who 
cannot."l) Ratner concludes that a 'false' conflict 
exists ",.,the defendants state is the only state with 
an interest in the application of its rule, and that rule 
requires application of the plaintiffs state rule." 2 ) 
So Ratner would apply Mexican law. 
Finally and without too much difficulty one can 
conceive of a court deciding Hurtado was a 'true conflict' 
situation with Californian law as a deterrant to negligent 
conduct in general. Mexico here would want to see 
Mexican law applied on the grounds of policy; it can be 
seen as an unjust windfall that the deceased Mexican's 
next of kin get more simply because their relation died 
across the border, and/or with the lower cost of living in 
Mexico $2,000 would be considered as adequate compensation 
by Mexican standards. 
Thus without too much difficulty a simple fact 
situation such as Hurtado ~Superior Court can be analysed 
as a false conflicts case with either Mexican or 
Californian law applying depending on how the Court 
reasoned. Secondly it could be treated as a true conflict 
situation or thirdly a "no interest" case, and the Court 
still has the task of determining the applicable law which 
1) Ibid, at p.837 
2) Ibid 
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again poses difficulties. If the Court decides it: is a 
true conflict then it still has to, for example, work 
through Cavers five principles and apply the appropriate 
one. 
Because of the difficulties attached to these 
approaches some academics and members of the judiciary 
have reverted to rules for solving certain fact situations. 
In Neumeier v. Keuhner 1 )for example, Fuld C.J. developed 
three rules for motor vehicle accidents involving more than 
one state. He suggested that: 
"1 When the guest-passenger and the host-driver 
are domiciled in the same state, the car is 
there registered, the law of that state should 
control and determine the standard of care which 
the host owes to his guests. 
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the 
state of his domicile and that state does not cast 
him in liability for that conduct, he should 
not be held liable by reason of the fact that 
liability would be imposed upon him under the 
tort law of the victim's domicile. Conversely, 
when the guest was injured in the state of his 
own domicile and its law permits recovery, the 
driver who has come into that state should not -
in the absence of special circumstances - be 
permitted to interpose the law of his state as 
a defense. 
3. In other situations, when the passenger and 
the driver are domiciled in different states, 
the rule is necessarily less categorical. 
Normally the applicable rule of decision will 
be that of the state where the accident occurred 
but not if it can be shown that displacing 
that normally applicable r~le will advance the 
relevant substantive law purposes without im-
pairing the smooth working of the milti-state " 
system or producing great uncertainty for litigants. 
However in Labree ~ Major 2 )Rule 3 was criticised 
as a thinly-disguised place of wrong standard containing 
1) 2 8 6 N. E . 2 d. 4 54 at pp • 4 57- 4 58 ( 19 7 2 ) 
2) 111 R.l. 657, 306A 2d. 808 (1973) 
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an exception so vague that it destroyed the certainty of 
application that a rule approach seeks. 
Weintraub1 } after analysing Neumeier v. Keuhner 
and Hurtado v. Superior Court proposed three rules. 
His first rule is applicable to false conflict situations. 
He said if in the light of its contacts with the parties 
or the transaction only one state will have the policies 
underlying its tort rule advanced, apply the law of 
that state. Weintraub continues with:-
"2. 'True Conflict' cases: If two or more states 
having contacts with the parties or the trans-
action will have the policies underlying their 
different tort rules advanced, apply the law 
that will favor the plaintiff unless one or both 
of the following factors is present: 
a. That law is anachronistic 
b. The state with that law does not have 
sufficient contact with the defendant or 
the defendants actual or intended course of 
conduct to make application of its law 
reasonable. 
3. ''No Interest" cases: If none of the states 
having contacts with the parties or the trans-
action wil have the policies underlying its 
tort rule advanced, apply the law that will 
favor the plaintiff unless one or both of the 
following factors is present: 
a. That law is anachronistic 
b. The state with that law does not have 
sufficient contact with the defendant or 
the defendant's actual or intended course 
of conduct to make application of its law 
reasonable. 
Again the problem with such rules is the difficulty 
of classifying the fact situation into 'false', 'true' or 
'no interest' cases. It is interesting to note that 
Weintraub justifies rules favoring the plainti on the 
grounds that the tortfeaser can take out insurance to cover 
1) Weintraub, op.cit. supra at p. 52 note 4 at pp.l62-163 
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himself, however whilst discussing Hurtado Ratner1points 
out that in effect a defendant might have only limited 
protection. He suggests that 'a Californian defendant 
will probably find that his insurance provides no cover 
more than fifty miles below the border and that the 
Mexican insurance that many Americans obtain upon driving 
into Mexico is limited to the amount of recovery under 
mexican law or not much more. 
Whilst the 'Proper Law of the Tort' and the 
American Restatement (Second) do not have the specific 
problem of true, false, no interest division~ uncertainty 
and difficulties exist to possibly the same degree. 
Boys v. Chaplin2 ) as discussed by academic writers 
illustrates this. Lord Denning M.R. in the Court of 
App~~1 3 ) applied the proper law of the tort - that is 
English law and Shapira4 ) having analysed the case as a 
false conflict and applied the proper law asserts that 
"there is no conceivable basis for an asse±.ion of interest 
5) by Malta in the application of its law .•• He says 
Malta's only connection with the case is that the accident 
occurred within its boundaries, England on the other hand 
had a clear interest in the appliciation of its "general 
damages rule .. " 6 ) 
1) Ratner op.cit. at p.34 note 4 at p.835 
2) /1971JA.C. 356 
3) {l968J 1 All E.R. 283 
4) A. Shapira. A Transatlantic Inspiration: The Proper 
Law of the Tort Doctrine. 33 M.L.R. 27 at p.30 (1970) 
5) Ibid at p. 31 
6) Ibid at p. 34 
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Nyghl) however notes that in a sense the English 
connection was as fortuitous as the place of the accident. 
Malta could be seen as having an interest in applying its 
restrictive damages rule to accidents in Malta even as 
between foreigners. 
Pearl2 )is as adamant as Shapira as to the proper 
law, however he considers it to be maltese law as 
" ••• the links connecting the proper law with England- British 
servicemen on duty abroad, both drivers insured by English 
insurance companies, and the plainti seeking hospital 
treatment in England - are a unimportant in comparison 
with the connecting factor between the proper law and 
malta: the locus. In such a case as the present the 
proper law of tort should be the lex loci on the 
simple"· ground that when foreigners drive on strange roads, 
they are impliedly bound by the criminal and the civil laws 
as well as the administrative regulations of the lex loci 
unless a special contractual relationship ••• can be 
imposed II 3) 
It is perhaps little wonder that some courts 
have opted to apply the tradition~l law rather than face 
the problems inherent in the alternatives. One can feel 
a certain sympathy with the sentiments expressed by the 
. h' 4 ' d M1c 1gan Supreme Court . when aske to apply the Second 
Restatement it decided not to abandon the lex loci as 
1) Nygh, op.cit. supra at p.48 note 3 at p. 947 
2) D. Pearl. Case & Comment Carob. L.J. 219 (1968) 
3) Ibid at p.222 
4) In Abendschein v. Farrell 382 Mich. 510, 170, N.vl. 2d. 
137 (1969) discussed by Sedler op.cit. supra.at p.43 
note 5. 
" ••• the quagmire of unanswerable questions 
arising out of the proposed new doctrine 
appears less attractive than our admittedly 
hard and fast - and occasionally unjust it is 
true - rule that the law of the place of the 
wrong is applied whl~ the forum is a 
Michigan Court ••• " J 
The Court obtains one's total support and 
sympathy when an academic writer can say in reply that 
" ••• it is hard to conceive of a more circular, 
amphibolic, elenctic and fatuous statement 
71 
to support the retention of the lex loci rule .• " 2 ) 
o-o-o-o-o 
1) Ibid at p.l39 
2) S.I. Shuman. Conflict of Laws 16 Wayne L.R. 535 at 
p.554 (1970) 
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PART B LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
By way of introduction it should be noted that 
very few English Statutes deal exclusively or even sub-
stantially with questions of conflict of laws, " ••. no 
other branch of law has been so completely a judicial 
creation .•• "l) On the other hand in Europe various 
Codes ,have made legislative provisions at a national 
level for the choice of law dilemma. These laws are 
generally what Cavers 2 )calls "legislatively localised 
laws", in othffwords they are limited by their terms either 
to "certain events or transactions within the enacting 
state" or "to certain persons connected with thatstate 
in a specified way, even though the acts or events 
involv~ng them occur outside the state." 
Part B starts with the legislative possibilities 
for international accidents represented in diagramatical 
form. The possibilities range in scope from world 
participation in a multilateral treaty or convention for 
all torts (and thereby including accidents) to national 
legislation for international accidents alone. A mid way 
possibility is regional participation in a convention which 
deals with all torts or alternatively just international 
accidents. Examples of each possibility are given. 
1) R.H. Graveson. Philosophical Aspects of the English 
Conflict of Laws. 78 L.Q.R. 337 at p. 353 (1962) 
2) D.F. Cavers. The Choice-of-Law Process. p.225-6 
(1965) 
These 
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are:-
1. 
2. 
3. 
For world participation in a convention dealing 
with all torts the late Professor Jitta's views 
are discussed. A note on Uniform Laws follows. 
For regional participation in a convention dealing 
with all torts The.European Economic Community 
Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to.Contractual 
and Non-Contractual'.Obligations 1972. 1 ) (herein~ 
after referred to as the E.E.C. Draft)~ and the 
Tentative Draft of a Foreign Torts Act proposed by 
a Special Committee of the Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada in 1966. 2 ) 
(hereinafter referred to as the Draft Foreign Torts 
Act (Canada)) are discussed. 
For regional participation in a convention dealing 
exclusively with traffic accidents the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents 
1968 3 ) is discussed together with the Canadian 
Conditionally Approved Draft of a Uniform Conflict 
of Laws (Traffic Accidents) Act. 4 )5 )(hereinafter 
1) In English in 21 Am.J.Cornp.L. 587 (1973) 
2) Report of proceedings of the Conference of Commissioners 
on Unformity of Legislation in Canada p.62 (1966) 
3) In English in 16 Am. J. Cornp.L. 589 (1968) 
4) Printed in 18 Am. J. Cornp. L. 36 at p.36-37 (1971) 
5) See Appendices A, B and C for the complete E.E.C. 
Draft, the Canadian Draft (Traffic Accidents) Act 
and the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents 1968 respectively. 
4. 
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referred to as the Canadian Draft (Traffic 
Accidents) Act. 
For national legislation the following are 
discussed: 
a) New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act 1972 
b) Article 25 of the Preliminary Dispositions of 
the Italian Civil Code of 19421 ) (hereinafter 
cited as Article 25 Italy). 
c) Shapira's Draft Bill for Israel2 ) (hereinafter 
cited as Shapira's Bill). 
The few examples given above have been chosen as 
they represent examples of actual and proposed legislation 
from'a variety of jurisdictions. Part B concludes with 
a brief note on the difficulties of codification. 
1) Translated by P.D. McCusker 25 Tulane L.R. 70 at p.82 
(1950) 
2) A. Shapira. Manna for the Entire World or Thou Shalt 
Love Thy Neighbour as Thyself. Comment on Neumeier v. 
Kuehner 1 Hofstra L.R. 168 (1973) and set out in full 
1nfra at p.l05 et.seq. 
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LEGISLATIVE POSSIBILITIES 
Multilateral Treaties 
or Conventions 
v. National Legislation 
Uniform Laws 
Vbrld Participation Regional Participation National Legislation 
A C 
eg. All E.E.C. l) 
Countries, all P v. E 
jurisdictions. 
E 
B 
All Torts, delicts 
non-contractual 
obligations 
Examples -
1. AD··& ·AD 
2. CB 
2. (b) 
3. CD 
3. (b) 
4. ED 
5. EB 
5. (b) 
D 
Specific Tbrts or fact 
situations eg. notor · 
vehicle accidents. 
B 
All torts, delicts 
non-contractual 
obligations 
Jitta. 1. (b) Uniform Laws 
The E.E.C. Draft 
Draft Foreign Torts Act (Canada) . 
The Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Traffic Accidents 1968. 
The Canadian Draft (Traffic Accidents) 
Act. 
New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 1972 · 
Article 25 Italy. 
Shapira's Bill 
1) Phillips v. Eyre 
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1. The possibility of world wide ratification of a 
treaty or convention is obviously unrealistic although 
there have however been optimists appearing from time to 
time who contemplate such a possibility. For example a 
Dutch Professor of Private International Law, D. Joesphus 
Jitta, writing at the beginning of the century suggested 
that legal relationships of an international character 
should be submitted to the "international corrunon law of 
mankind" consisting "of principles of law recognised by 
all nations as emanations of natural reason"l) 
It has been suggested that even if supranational 
laws could be developed they would fail because they could 
not take account of local elements, the legal traditions 
and general expectations actually involved; and a law 
which failed to take these elements into account would be 
as unsatisfactory as an application of the municipal law 
of the lex fori 2 ). 
1. (b) Uniform Laws: 
It has been suggested that results could be achieved more 
easily by the adoption of uniform rules rather than by the 
preparation and ratification of multilateral treaties or 
conventions. 3 ) These internationally agreed rules of 
substantive law would be written as if they were national 
rules of Private International law and countries which for 
po.litical or o.ther reasons would not ratify a convention 
1) D.J. Jitta. The Renovation of International Law on the 
Basis of a Juridicial Community of Mankind. 1 et.seq. 
and 91 (1919) 
2) See G.G. Hoff. Adjustment of Conflicting Rights 38 
Virginia L.R. 745 at p. 751 (1952) 
3) See The American Proposal At The Hague Conference on 
Private International Law to Use The Method of Uniform 
Laws in 7 Am.Jo. Camp. Law pp.239-247 (1958) 
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would thus be able to introduce the uniform rules into their 
national law on their own initiative. 
Shapira1 ) considers that certain torts lend 
themselves to this type of legislation. Mass air 
accidents and defamation he cites as examples and suggests 
that they might best be handled by the concurrent enactment 
of uniform substantive laws on the matter. Morse 2 ) 
considers pollution problems would be best dealt with in 
this way. 
2. In June 1972 The E.E.,C. Draft was completed. 
Article 10(1) contains the basic rule for torts, its states: 
"1. Non-contractual obligations resulting 
from an event causing damage shall be 
governed by the law of the State in which 
such event occurred." 
Morse criticises this general rule in favor of the lex 
loci delicti; he suggests that the drafting is "so 
defB·e·tive that it can be regarded as establishing either 
the place of acting as the basic rule, or the place of 
harm where those places are different." 3 ) He goes on to 
say that: 
"The position is obscured to an even greater 
degree when one reads that the working group 
did not intend to resolve the dilemma which 
exists in the ascertainment of the lex loci 
delicti where the place of acting and place 
of harm are different 'in order not to 
impede ongoing developments in the jurisprudence 
of the Co:rnmunity Countries.'" 
1) A. Shapira. The Interest Approach to the Choice of 
Law with Special Reference to Torts Problems (1970) 
(hereinafter cited as Shapira) Shapira p.239 note 135 
2) C.G.J. Morse. Torts in Private International Law (1978) 
(hereinafter cited as Morse) p.323 
3) Morse, pp.329-30 
Unfortunately Morse does not state the source 
of the article 10 that he quotes and relies upon. 1 ) 
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Article 10 as printed in 21 Arn.J. Camp. Law, which is the 
only reference he gives is translated as above. Morse 
however in setting out Article 10 on p.327 states Article 
10(1) as follows: 
"Non-Contractual obligations arising out of an 
event which has resulted in damage or injury 
shall be governed by the law of the country in 
which that event occurred."2) 
This is more ambiguous than the Article 10 reported above 
which cou~d possible be intended as a place of injury rule. 
However if a general rule is to be followed by exceptions 
as the Draft is, it would be preferable to have as a general 
rule a clear and unambiguous rule. 
It would seem to be of paramount importance that 
a general rule be certain. 
Article 10 (2), {3) & (4) state as follows:-
"2. However, if, on the one hand no significant 
link exists between the situation resulting from 
the event which caused the damage and the State 
in which the event occurred and, if, on the other 
hand, such situation has predominant connection 
(connexion preponderante) with another State, the 
law of that State shall apply. 
3. Normally, such a connection must be based on 
a connecting factor common to the victim and the 
author of the damage or, if the liability of a 
third party as author is involved~a connecting 
factor common to the victim and the third party. 
1) On p.326 (note 19 p.347) Morse states the English Text 
is in 21 Arn.J. Camp. Law. 
2) See note 29 p. 348 where Morse says " •.. the Article can 
comprehend a place of acting rule, in so far as it 
refers to the event which has resulted in damage or 
injury. 
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"4. v7here there are two or more victims, the 
applicable law is determined separately for each 
of them. 
Problems associated with Article 10 can be summarised as 
follows; 1 ) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Uncertainty of the basic rule (10{1)) as above. 
Scope of 'non-contractual obligations' Article 
I excludes certain non-contractual obligations but 
the scope of the Draft is not clearly defined. 
Lack of definitions for "significant link" 
"predominant connection" and "normally". 
To treat victims differently 'Sl0(4) could offend 
some state's notions of natural justice. 
Article 11: 
"The law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations under Article 10 shall determine 
in particular 
1. the conditions and extent of liability; 
2. the grounds for exemption from liability 
as well as any limitation and division 
of liability; 
3. the existence and nature of damages for 
which there may be compensation; 
4. the kinds and extent of compensation; 
5. the extent to which the victim's rights 
to damages may be exercised by his heirs; 
6. the persons who have suffered damage and 
may claim damages in their own right; 
7. vicarious liability; 
8. rules prescription and limitation, 
Article 12: 
including rules relating to commencement 
of a period of prescription or limitation, 
to interruption or suspension of such a 
period. 
Whatever the applicable law under Article 10, 
in determining liability account shall be taken 
of rules of safety and public ordeT in force at 
the place and time of the event which caused the 
damage. 
1) Discussed in detail by Morse p.326 et.seq. especially 
at pp.330-333 
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Article 13: 
"Non-contractual liability resulting from an event 
other than one causing damage shall be governed by 
the law of the State in·which such event occurred. 
However, if due to a connecting factor common 
to the parties involved, a predominant link exists 
with the law of another State, that law shall be 
applied. 
Article 14: 
"The provisions of Articles 10 to 13 shall not 
apply to the liability of States or other legal 
persons of public law, or to that of their organs 
or agents for acts involving public administration 
ahd done by them in the performance of their 
functions. 
Article 15: 
1. The law governing an obligation shall also 
determine requirements pertaining to its 
execution, the various ways in which it may be 
discharged and the consequences of non-execution. 
2. As regards the means of execution of an 
obligation, the law of the State where the 
execution takes place shall be taken into 
account. 
Morse makes specific criticisms of these articles1 ) 
and concludes that these are "symptomatic of a more funda-
mental problem - the problem of reconciling the need to 
avoid the mechanical jurisprudence of traditional doctrine 
without engendering an unacceptable level of uncertainty." 2 ) 
It is the writer's view that the Draft is unnecessarily 
complex. This point is discussed-below. 
2. (b) The Tentative Draft of a Foreign Torts Act 1966 
proposed by a Special Committee of the Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada 
1) Morse, pp.333-336 
2) Ibid at p. 335 
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is of particular interest as it involves proposed 
legislation for both Phillips v. Ey~e jurisdictions and 
French Civil Law provinces. 
In 1956 the Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniformity of Legislation appointed a Committee to study a 
proposal put forward by the Canadian Bar Association that 
Phillips v. Eyre be amended. The following year in a 
preliminary report the Committee urged that in view of 
the numerous criticisms the Committee should not confine 
its study to the proposed Amendment alone but should 
consider the desirability of replacing the formula with 
. . 1 1) some new prlnclp e. 
Nine years later the Committee put forward the 
following proposed Act:-
"Foreign Torts Act 
1. ~\Then deciding the rights and liabilities 
of the pa~ties to an action in tort the court 
shall apply the local law of the state which 
has the most substantial connection with the 
occurrence and with the parties regardless of 
whether or not the wrong is of such a character 
that it would have been actionable if committed 
in this Province. 
2. ~vhen determining whether a particular state 
has a substantial connection with the occurrence 
and the parties the court shall consider the 
following important contaqts: 
a) the place where the injury occurred; 
b) the place where the conduct occurred; 
c) the domicile and place of business of the 
parties; and 
d) the place where the relationship, if any, 
between the parties is centred. 
3. When deciding which state, among the states 
having any contacts with section 2, has the most 
substantial connection with the occurrence and 
1) See 1957 Proceedings of the Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada p. 122 at p. 125 
and see H.E. Read What Should be the Law in Canada 
Governing Conflict of Laws in Torts. Canadian Legal 
Studies 1 at p.277 (1968) (hereinafter c!~t:_ed as Read) 
the parties, the court ~hall consider chiefly 
the purpose and policy of each of the rules of 
local law that is proposed to be applied."l) 
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Whilst resembling the American Restatement, Second, 
in its approach Hancock 2 ) suggests that in its general 
conception the Draft Act.is of British origan and he refers 
back to "the Proper Law of the Tort" enunciated by Morris 
in the 1950's. 
The differences to the Restatement, Second, can be 
listed as follows:-
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Section 1 of the Draft Act refers to an "action" 
rather than an "issue" in tort which perhaps 
excludes the possibility of applying different 
laws to different issues in a case. 
The first limb of Phillips v. Eyre is abolished 
by the Draft Act. 
Residence and nationality in 2(c) of the Restate-
ment, Second, are not incorporated into 2(c) of the 
Draft Act. This is perhaps a pity. .If the 
object of legislation in this field is to work 
towards uniformity it would be good manners at an 
international level to include nationality. 3 ) 
The Draft Act has no equivalent of Paragraph 6 
of the Restatement, Second, by section 3 the 
court shall consider "chiefly" the purpose and 
policy of each of the rules. of local law that is 
1) Report of Proceedings of the Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada 1966 at p.62. 
2) M. Hancock. Canadian American Torts in the Conflict of 
Laws: A Revival of Policy-Determined Construction Analysis 
46 Can. Bar Rev. 226 at p. 248 (1968) 
3) See infra at p.llS It would have been preferable to avoid 
such conflicts altogether in view of the domicile-nation-
ality controversy prevailing in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. 
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proposed to be applied. Express reference 
to the relative interests of concerned states 
is excluded, however Morsel) contents that a Court 
would inevitably consider these interests if asked 
to apply the Draft Act. 
5. The Draft Act applies to all torts whilst the 
Restatement, Second, has specific rules for 
individual torts. 
Despite these differences the Draft Act is 
basically similar to the Restatement Second, and many of 
the criticisms of the latter can be applied to the Draft. 
It would not be an easy Act to apply in practice, its 
inherent vagueness would be of little assistance to judges 
or members of the bar. Hancock2 ) appears to commend the 
Draft Act when writing in 1968 by hoping it would receive 
the "recognition and support it deserves"~) However, he 
seems to see its chief merit being in that it would do 
away with Phillips v. Eyre rather than it having an 
intrinsic merit. 
The Draft has not come into force. 
3. The two most important provisions of The Hague 
Draft Cohvention on the Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents 
1968 are Artic~es 3 and 4 which state: 
"The applicable law is the internal law of the 
State where the accident occurred. 
Article 4: 
"Subje.ct .to Article .5 the following exceptions 
1) Morse, p. 325 
2) Hancock, op.cit. supra at p.82 note 2 at p.248 
3) Ibid at p. 251· 
are made to the provisions of Article 3 -
a) where only one vehicle is involved in the 
accident and it is registered in a State other 
than that where the accident occurred, the 
internal law of the State of registration is 
applicable to determine liability 
towards the driver, owner or any other 
person having control of or an interest in 
the vehicle irrespective of their habitual 
residence, 
84 
towards a victim who is a passenger and 
whose habitual residence is in a State other 
than that where the accident occurred. 
towards a victim who is outside the vehicle 
at the place of the accident and whose 
habitual residence is in the state of 
registration. 
Where there are two or more victims the 
applicable law is determined separately for 
each of them. 
b) Where two or more vehicles are involved in 
the accident, the provisions of {a) are 
applicable only if all the vehicles are 
registered in the same State. 
c) Where one or more persons outside the 
vehicle or vehicles at the place of the accident 
are involved in the accident and may be liable 
the provisions of {a) and (b) are applicable only 
if all these persons have their habitual 
residence in the State of registration. The 
same is true even though these persons are also 
victims of the accident."l) 
Unlike the E.E.C. Draft the general rule in 
Article 3 is unambiguous, the place where the traffic 
accident occurred is to apply. Article 2 states that the 
Convention shall not apply to the liability of manufacturers, 
sellers or repairers of vehicles thus avoiding any potential 
problems of accidents occurring in one state caused by an 
event in another state. 
1) See generally J.G. Castell and P.A. Cr~peau,Views 
from Canada. 18 Am.J. Comp.Law 17 at pp.l9-25 
(1971) 
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By way of exception the only other law which can 
apply is the law where the vehicles are registered. The 
drafting does however appear to be unnecessarily complex 
and Cavers1 ) has pointed out that if the convention was 
widely ratified ease and certainty of application would be 
purchased at a "considerable price•• 2 )and he gives various 
fact situations which would "produce choices that seem 
arbitrary" 3 ) 
For example:-
(1) A German invited an Englishman whose 
acquaintance he has made in Paris to drive to 
the airport in his German registered car. 
The Englishman is killed in a one-vehicle 
crash. The Convention would restrict the 
Englishman's family to the level of recovery 
permitted by German law which is lower than 
that allowed by either French or English law. 
The Convention would not deprive a French 
passenger in the same car of the French standard 
of financial protection in these circumstances; 
there appears no good reason to deny equal 
treatment to the Englishman. 
(2) A German driver loses control of his 
German-registered car and runs into a queue of 
Frenchmen waiting for a bus in Paris. Sev-
eral were killed. One of them had his habitual 
residence in Germany. His family may recover 
only the economic damage recoverable under 
German law. 
There appears nothing to be gained from intro-
ducing such complexity into the Convention and as Cavers 
illustrations show the results could be unjust. 
Another unnecessarily complex piece of legis-
lation is the Canadian Draft (Traffic Accidents) Act. 
1) D.F. Cavers. Legislative Choice of Law: Some European 
Examples. 44 s.calif. L.R. 340 at pp.354'-359 (1971) 
2} Ibid at p. 358 
3) Ibid at p. 356 
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Article 3 applies the law of the state where the accident 
occurred as a basic rule but this is eroded by the 
following Articles. Article 4 allows the state of 
registration to be the applicable law in certain situations 
and article 7 allows the law of the state where a vehicle 
was "habitually stationed" to apply in the situations 
stated in 7(a) and 7(b). The criticisms levelled at 
the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Traffic 
Accidents 1968 equally apply here. 
4. New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act 1972 
is an-example of national legislation which considers 
actions occurring outside New Zealand. The legislature 
has, like the Hague Convention on Traffic Accidents 
taken one fact situation, namely personal injury by 
accident and in the one Act has dealt with both the 
domestic and conflict aspects of the problem. Torts 
that do not involve personal injury by accident remain 
to be determined by the common law. 
In 1972 the Accident Compensation Commission 
was created by the Accident Compensation Act and on 1st 
April 1974 the Accident Compensation Scheme started to 
work. The fault concept which was fundamental to the common 
law was "thrown out and accident compensation for every-
one was written into the law."l) The Woodhouse Report 
from which the Act initially originated was based upon 
the principles of community responsibility, rehabilitation, 
real compensation and adminis.tr.ative. efficiency. 2 ) The 
1) H. W •. Dahl. Injury Compensation for Everyone? The New 
Zealand Experience. 53 Jo. of Urban Law 925 (1976) 
2) Report on the Royal Commission of Inquiry: Compensation 
for Personal Injury in New Zealand. 39 (1967). 
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Report gave some consideration to the international aspects 
of accident compensation; for example paragraphs 286 and 
287 hold as follows: 
286. New Zealand Res·idents· Injured Overseas 
(a) New Zealand residents temporarily abroad 
for periods not exceeding twelve months 
should continue to enjoy the protection 
of the scheme. 
(b) In the case of New Zealand Residents 
absent from the country for periods 
longer than twelve months, protection 
should be continued upon application to 
and at the discretion of the controlling 
authority. 
(c) The level of compensation for hospital 
and medical attention should be limited 
to equivalent charges for those services 
in New Zealand. 
(d) On the principle that a man should not be 
compensated twice for the same injury, 
compensation received by a New Zealand 
resident should be refunded out of any 
damages or compensation obtained by him 
in respect to the same accident. 
(e) On the other hand we do not think it 
necessary that New Zealand residents 
should be required to take action abroad 
for recovery of these amounts. The return 
to the fund would rarely justify the 
administrative problems or the costs. 
(f) In certain cases, at lease, the assessment 
of permanent partial disability and pay-
ment of compensation in respect of such 
a disability would have to await return to 
the country. 
287. Visitors to New Zealand 
(a) In general a visitor to a country always 
takes it as he finds it, and the absence 
of common law rights in respect of personal 
injury claims would not justify, in our 
opinion, an extension of the comprehensive 
insurance system to include visitors. New 
Zealanders. abroad are obliged to accept 
risks 6f this sort and usually insure in 
respect of the contingency. 
(b) On the other hand persons employed by a 
New Zealand employer should be protected 
if injured at any time or place within 
New Zealand while the contract of service 
remains current. In such cases the 
employer concerned would qualify the 
employee by reason of the contribution to 
the fund based upon payments of wages. 
(c) Persons employed by employers domiciled 
outside New Zealand should be protected 
in terms of regulations designed to meet 
circumstances of this sort. 
(a) Visitors in general should be permitted 
and perhaps encouraged to obtain the 
protection of the scheme on a voluntary 
basis on terms approved by the controlling 
authority." 
88 
The most important section in the Act is section 5 
which states that "where any person suffers personal 
injury by accident in New Zealand or dies as a result of 
personal injury so suffered, or where any person suffers 
outside New Zealand personal injury by accident in respect 
of which he has cover under this Act or dies as a result 
of personal injury so suffered, no proceedings for damages 
arising directly or indirectly out of the injury or death 
shall be brought in any court in New Zealand independently 
of this Act, whether by that person or any other person, 
and whether under any rule of law or any enactment ... " 
From a conflict of laws st.andpoint there are a 
number of interesting fact situations; these are firstly 
situations where New Zealanders suffering personal injury 
by accident outside New Zealand bring an action in New 
Zealand; secondly ,situations where non New Zealanders 
bring an action in New Zealand for injury occurring 
outside New Zealand and thirdly cases where non New 
Zealanders injured in New Zealand bring an action in a 
foreign jurisdiction. 
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The first situation is simply decided. New 
Zealanders injured abroad must, to be eligible under the 
Accident Compensation Act fall within Sections 60, 61 and 
63 in other words they must all be earners of some kind and 
their presence overseas must have something to do with their 
employment or the earning of money. All other New Zealanders 
tourists being the obvious group with the greatest numbers, 
are not entitled to compensation .. if they suffer personal 
injury by accident while overseas. Even those 
New Zealanders who do come under Sections 60, 61 and 63 
are not automatically entitled to compensation. 
rights are set out in Section 131 of the Act. 
To differentiate between tourists and New 
Their 
Zealanders working overseas appears arbitrary and contrary 
to the philosophy behind the Act, namely that New Zealanders 
should enjoy compensation twenty-four hours a day. 
Non eligible New Zealanders therefore join the 
second category, that is non New Zealanders beinging an 
action in New Zealand in respect of an overseas accident. 
Section 5 of the Act is not relevant to these persons 
although the section becomes indirectly relevant when the 
plaintiff is establishing actionability in New Zealand. 
It will be recalled that the first limb of Phillips v. 
Eyre required that " .•• the wrong must be of such a 
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character that it would have been actionable if committed 
in (the forum) ul) or " ••• in other words is an act 
which if done in (the forum) would be a tort •. " 2 ) 
The Plainti in order to succeed must argue 
that Section 5 did not abolish the common law and that all 
Section 5 does is to prohibit the bringing of proceedings 
for damages where compensation is payable under the Act. 
The action itself not abolished. 3 ) If the plainti 
is not entitled to compensation under the Act section 5 
does not apply and a common law action could be brought. 
Support for this argument can be found in the fact that 
exemplary damages have been awarded in personal injury 
claims since the Act came into force. 
In Howse v. The Attorney-General 4 )for example 
O'Regan J. held that: 
" ••• punitive damages do not attach and form 
part of compensatory damages. They stand 
apart and must be considered apart from such 
••• punitive damages arise ••• from the acts 
done contrary to law and not from the harm to 
the plainti caused by such acts ••• (thus) •• 
the punitive damages •. do not arise either 
directly or indirectly out of the personal 
injury which he suffered by accident ••• " 
Hence the action in so far as it related to punitive 
damages was not barred by Section 5. ( 1) • 
Following this decision it was argued that, 
although unlikely, a Court might award punitive damages 
in a motor vehicle accident causing personal injury if 
1) (1870) L.R.6 Q.B.l. at pp.28-29 per Willes J. 
2) Dicey & Morris Rule 178(1) (a} The Conflict of Laws 
9th Edit. p. 938 
3) M.A. Vennell. The Scope of National No-Fault Accident 
Compensation in Australia and New Zealand 4,9 A. L. J. 22 
(1975) argues this. 
4) Sup.Ct. (Palmerston North) 19 October 1977 (A.l32/75) 
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the defendant had behaved in some outragious manner."l) 
However, two later Supreme Court cases take an 
opposing view. Jeffries J. in ·Betteridge & Another v. 
McKenzie & Others 2 ) disagreed with the decision in Howse 
and held that exemplary damages arose,. indirectly at least, 
out of the injury and that the action for exemplary 
damages was therefore barred. Likewise McMullin J. in 
Stowers v. The Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City 
of Auckland 3 ) held the same. Prior to Stower's case 
academic writers had been divided on the issue. 4 ) If 
Howse is not followed in the future a plaintiff could 
still perhaps argue that section 5 has not abolished the 
common law as in Betteridge & Another v. McKenzie & Others 
Jeffries J. following Donselaar v. Donselaar5 ) held that 
1) R.P. Boast. In Spite of Accident Compensation Injury 
Claims can Still go to Court. Automobile Association 
Motor World Dec.78/Jan.79 
2) Sup.Ct. (Wellington) 24 November 1978 (Al03/77). 
3) Sup.Ct. (Auckland) 22 February 1979 (A.l064/77) 
4) D.B. Collins. Proceedings for Punitive Damages In the 
Regime of Accident Compensation. N.Z.L.J. 158 (1978) 
argues for the view taken by O'Regan J. in Howse v.A.G. 
whilst R.D. Mcinnes. Punishing the Words of Section 5(1) 
The Other School of Thought Replies. N.Z.L.J. 8 (1969) 
takes the view that S.5(1) effectively bars proceedings 
for exemplary damages in a situation of personal injury 
by accident. A.A.P. Willy. The Accident Compensation 
Act and Recovery for Losses Arising From Personal Injury 
and Death by Accident. 6 N.Z.U.L.R. 250 (1975) takes the 
view that an injured plaintiff is precluded by S.5 from 
bringing an action at common law to recover exemplary 
damages but leaves open the question of whether the cases 
involving personal injury in the context of some other 
additional tort such as false imprisonment or intimidation, 
may not arise in respect of which an award of exemplary 
damages may be justified. 
5) Sup.Ct. (Wellington) 25-29 July 1977 and August 1977 
(A.454/76) 
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" .•• the legislature did not wish to exclude other remedies 
such as injunction, for example." 
The plaintiff's argument here can be said to be 
in accordance with the policy of the Act. The policy of 
the Act is to replace certain common law actions with a 
statutory form of relief. The plaintiff gives up his right 
to bring an action but this is counteracted by giving him 
something else - a statutory remedy allowing compensation. 
When the person is not covered under the Act he is corn-
pensated by the fact he still has his common law action. 
I 
The plaintiff could argue that any other interpretation 
would be unjust. 
The plaintiff should not have difficulty with the 
second limb of Phillips v. Eyre1.Jvhich requires that " ... the 
Act must not have been justifiable by the law of the place 
where .. it was done .•• " in situations not involving ·workmen's 
2) Compensation Acts. If the conduct causing the personal 
injured occurred in, say a Canadian province such as 
Ontario which has a Workman's Compensation Act and which 
would be applicable if the plaintiff had brought his action 
in Ontario then his position is less strong. The Privy 
Council cases of Walpole v. Canadi·an Nor·thern Railway Co. 3 ) 
and McMillan v. Canadian Northern Railway Co. 4 ) are 
relevant here. 
1) (1870) L.R.6 Q.B.l. at pp.28-29 per Willes J-., 
2) J.G. Castel. Canadian Conflict of Laws Vol;2 pp.633-634 (1975) 
discussing the several statutory rrotor vehicle accident reparation 
scherres which have been adopted in Canada says "these scherres, by 
diminishing a Victims right to recover in tort to the extent of 
the benefits received or payable, may constitute a good defence to 
an action based on an accident taking plac~ in one of the provinces 
of Canada under Phillips v. Eyre." 
3) /1923} A.C. 113 
4) [l923J A.C. 120 
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In both cases the action was brought in 
- Saskatchewan whilst the negligent conduct occurred in 
British Columbia and Ontario respectively. In both 
jurisdictions the loci delicti had Workmen's Compensation 
Acts which barred common law court actions. Viscount 
Cave said in Walpole's case that the deceased held his 
contract of employment subject to the double condition that 
firstly he should be entitled to compensation for accidents, 
however caused, and secondly, that he should have no other 
remedy, and whilst Viscount Cave considered it unnecessary 
to conn~der th~ precise meaning of justifiable he did say: 
" •.• at all events, it must have reference to 
legal justification, and an act or neglect 
which is neither actionable or punishable 
cannot be said to be otherwise thay)justifiable 
within the meaning of the rule .•• " 
arid in McMillan Viscount Cave said 
" •.• the mere fact that the employer is liable 
to pay compensation for such an accident does 
not in my opinion, attach any character of 
wrongfulness or unjustifiableness or guilt 
(as opposed to innocence) to the act upon 
which an action in this province founded entirely 
on tort, can be supported. The gist of the 
action is negligence, the ground for compen-
sation is the accident."2) 
Both plaintiffs failed. However if the plaintiff 
is a New Zealander he would either be a section 60,61 and 
63 New Zealander and therefore within the New Zealand 
Accident Compensation Act or if he is a tourist then he 
will not be within the scope of such acts as the Workmen's 
Compensation Act of British Columbia, so in this latter 
1) /1923/ A.C. 113 at p. 119 
2) [1923J A.C. 120 at p. 125 
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case he should be able to satisfy the requirement of non 
justifiability by the lex loci delicti. If, on the other 
hand, the plaintiff is a non New Zealander and brings an 
action in New Zealand then if one makes him a Canadian from 
Ontario and that was where the accident occurred it will be 
a Walpole and McMillan situation and he could fail. If 
however the accident occurs in Ontario but in a situation 
where the Ontarian Act does not apply the plaintiff could 
presumably establish non justifiability but he could well 
be faced with the possibility of a stay on the grounds of 
forum shopping. On the other hand the plaintiff, 
still from Ontario, suffers personal injury by accident whilst 
in Fiji which has no compensation legislation whatsoever he 
should be able to succeed under the second limb of Phill 
X)and if the defendant is a New Zealander who 
the accident returned horne where all his assets 
are situated then plaintiff should not have too much 
difficulty regarding forum shopping. 
Perhaps from the point of view of the Accident 
Compensation Act and Conflict of Laws the third situation 
is the most interesting. This involves the cases where 
non New Zealanders suffer injury to their persons whilst 
3) 11 ••• There is no earnings related compensation paid in 
respect of your earnings outside New Zealand, but you 
could, after you have left this country, continue to 
receive compensation based ~on your loss of New Zealand 
earning capacity •• " Accident Compensation Commission 
for Travellers Arriving in New Zealand (1975} 5. 
l) ll870} L.R.6 Q.B.l at pp.28-29 per Will~s J. 
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in New Zealand and then on returning home bring an 
action in their local courts. This is a real possibility 
as visitors to New Zealand are not entitled to compensation 
pursuant to the earners scheme:) Cover under the Act is 
defined as cover under one or more of the three compensation 
.schemes set up by the legislation; 1 ) these are the earners 
scheme, the motor vehicle accident scheme and the supple-
mentary scheme. The last mentioned scheme provides cover 
for personal injury in New Zealand for all those not having 
cover pursuant to the other two schemes. A visitor is 
covered under the second scheme (section 93) if he is 
injured but he will not be able to obtain compensation 
for loss of past or future earnings. As Section 5 will 
thwart any attempt by the plaintiff to recover for loss 
of earnings in New Zealand his only option is to bring an 
action in the state or country in which he resides, and 
here uifferent considerations arise depending on whether 
the court chosen by the plaintiff is in a state or country 
adhering to Phillips v. Eyre or not. 
W bb d b 2 ) . d' . th f th e . an Au urn 1n 1scuss1ng e case o e 
plaintiff bringing his action in a Phillips v. Eyre 
jurisdiction other than New Zealand start by noting that 
the " •.• defendant might request a stay in reliance upon 
the modifications to the general rule laid down by Scott L.J. 
introduced by the majority of the House of Lords in The 
Atlantic Star~ However Webb and Auburn suggest that unlike 
1) Section 2(1) 
2) P.R.H. Webb and F.M~ Auburn. New Zealand Conflict of 
Laws in a Birds Eye View. (hereinafter cited as Webb 
and Auburn.) 26 I.C.L.Q. 971 at p.97~ (1977) 
3) See note 3 on p.94 
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the fact situation in The Atlantic Star the plaintiff would 
have a good case because he would be seen to have a strong 
connection with the forum - it being his country of 
residence. The plaintiff would not presumably be held to 
be forum shopping, they say, and point out that granting a 
stay in this situation would be unjust. 
The plaintiff should have no difficulty with the 
first limb of Phillips v. Eyre as no Phillips v. Eyre 
jurisdiction has an Accident Compensation Act with a 
Section 5. 
As outlined in Part A different interpretations 
have been placed on the words "not justifiable" and a 
plaintiff might succeed in one jurisdiction but fail in 
another. Belll) takes the view that whilst a Scottish 
plaintiff would fail a Canadian plaintiff might be able 
to establish some breach of New Zealand criminal law and 
cites ·for example Culpable Homicide in the case of death 
(section 160 Crimes Act 1961) and Injuring by an Unlawful 
Act (Section 190 Crimes Act 1961) 
Much depends on the interpretation future cases 
will give to Boys v. Chaplin2 ) and that case's effect on 
Machado v. Fontes~) Webb and Auburn4)note La Van v. 
Danyluk5 ) a 1970 decision of th~ Supreme Court of British 
1) R.M. Bell. Conflict of Laws Aspects of the Accident 
Compensation Act: 1975 Dissertation for LLB (Hons) 
University of Auckland (1975) p. 76 et.seq. (herein-
after cited as Bell.) 
2) fl971J A.C. 356 
3) [189l7 2 Q.B. 231 
4) Webb and Auburn at p. 988 
5) (1970) 75 W.W.R. 500 
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Columbia. '. Both parties were from British Columbia and 
the accident occurred in the State of Washington where 
contributory negligence is a complete defence. British 
Colombia law only reduces damages in this situation. The 
rule in the State of Washington could be circumvented by 
interpreting "not justifiable" as either referring to civil 
or criminal liability. Webb and Auburn1 ) suggest that the 
Canadian view would be particularly attractive in the not 
unlikely situation of a young New South Wales businessman 
"enjoying a substantial income and excellent future 
prospects being incapacitated whilst a visitor to New 
Zealand in the normal circumstances in which he would 
not be eligible within the earner scheme." 
Webb & Auburn 2 ) also refer to the Privy Council 
decisions of Walpole v. Canadian Northern Railway Co. 
and McMillan v. Canadian Northern Railway Co. as discussed 
above. 
They also consider other factors a plaintiff 
would invoke, such as the flexibility argument in Boys 
v. Chaplin3 } and the argument that the New Zealand 
legislation was contrary to the public policy of the forum. 
Webb & Auburn 4 ) consider it unlikely that a Commonwealth 
Court would accept the latter argument. 
It must however remain a matter of speculation 
as to whether a. plaintiff would or would not succeed if 
1) Webb & Auburn pp.988-989 
2) Ibid 
3) [197~ A.C. 356 at p. 406 per Lord Pearson 
4) Webb & Auburn p.989 
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he brought an action in a Phillips V. Eyre jurisdiction 
for personal injury sustained in New Zealand whilst a 
visitor here. 
The final situation envisages a non New Zealand 
plaintiff bringing an action in a jurisdiction which does 
not adhere to tha Phillips v. Eyre conditions for an accident 
occurring in New Zealand. Belll) has outlined a number of 
situations where he considers a foreign court might apply 
its own law. Firstly the forum might consider that 
sections of the Act go beyond the policy of the Act which 
is to replace a plaintiffs right to bring an action by 
giving him compensation pursuant to the Act itself. This 
would apply to visitors unable to succeed under the earners 
scheme. 
The second situation envisaged by Bell is where 
the foreign court considers that although the plaintiff has 
entered New Zealand he should not be regarded as having 
submitted himself to New Zealand's compensation laws. 
"In personal injury cases it is not necessarily 
true that by entering a country you submit 2 ) your::self to the special laws of that country." 
Here the plaintiffs presence in New Zealand is purely 
fortuitous, it is a case, for e:xamp·le, where a foreigner 
is on a flight between Sydney and Fiji which is diverted 
to Auckland for one reason or another. Through passengers 
1) Bell, p.82 et.seq. 
2) Boys v. Chaplin jl971J A.C. 356 at p.380 per Lord Hodson 
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could also come into this category 1 ~ 
Bell's third group consi of situations where 
both the parties are of the same nationality or domicile 
or residence and are here temporarily or there is some 
other spec 1 relationship between the parties that is 
based outside New Zealand. In this situation Bell 
suggests that a court might well choose to apply its own 
law, he gives the fact situation of Babcock v. Jackson2 ) 
and Boys v. Chaplin3 ) as examples of his second and 
third situations respectively. 
Applying the proper law of the tort concept 
a court in an American State might find that forum law 
was the appropriate law. Likewise an American Court 
might analyse the case in terms of "true" and "false" 
conflicts. If only one state or country is interested 
then that state's law will apply; presumably in the 
majority cases this will be New Zealand but situations 
could arise where there is a true conflict with both 
New Zealand and some other state interested in the issue. 
1) In 1978 there were 16~733 through passengers arriving 
and departing in New Zealand; this figure had 
jumped to 176,586 in 1979 and increased to 176,822 
for 1980. ·Crews could also in certain cases be 
here fortuitously. and their numbers made them a 
sizeable group. Crew arrivals into New Zealand 
in 1978, 1979 and 1980 numbered 18~176, 174825 and 
17~810 respectively whi departure figures for the 
same period are 182~27, 173,817 and 176,795. 
New Zealand Official Year Book 1980. p.977. 
2) 12 N.Y. 2d. 473 (1963) 
3) /1971J A.C. 356 
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The forum which may or may not be the 'other state' 
then has to decide which law is to prevail and as, it is 
submitted, it is a natural tendancy to prefer one's own 
law than the forum could well allow a plaintiff to 
succeed. This would seem especially likely if the 
plaintiff is only claiming loss of past and future 
earnings, as such a solution would appear to be a just 
solution. 
Relevant here is the United States equivalent 
of Walpole 1 ~ 16ase and McMillan v. Canadian Northern 
Railway Co. 2 ) that is Wilson v. F&ull3 ) which was 
a decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey~) The 
plaintiff unable to bring an action in one jurisdiction 
attempted to bring his action in another jursidbtion 
under the compensation laws of which the defendant was 
not protected. The court looked at the policy behind 
compensation statutes and found they involved a balance 
with both the employees and employers losing something on 
the one hand and both benefiting on the other. The 
employees lost their common law action but no longer had 
to prove fault whilst the employers incurred strict 
liability but became immune from common law actions. To 
allow a common law claim in another jurisdiction would 
upset this balance and therefore on policy considerations 
should not be allowed. 
1) /1923J A.C. 113 
2) /1923J A.C. 120 
3) 141 A.2d. 768 (1958) 
4) Cited and discussed by Bell p.97 et.seq. 
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This principle that the underlying policies of 
compensation laws should be recognised and upheld has 
been adopted by the Second Restatement. 
Paragraph 184 holds: 
"Recovery for tort or wrongful death will not 
be permitted in any state if the defendant is 
declared immune from such liability by the 
workmen's compensation statute of a state under 
which the defendant is required to provide 
insurance against the particular risk and under 
which -
(a) the plaintiff has obtained an award for the 
injury, or 
(b) the plainti could obtain an award for the 
injury, if this is the state -
(1) where the injury occurred, or 
(2) where employment is principally located, or 
(3) where the employer supervised the employee's 
activities from a place of business in the 
state, or 
(4) whose local law governs the contract of 
employment under the rules of paragraphs 
187-188 and 196". 
One can however argue that the difference between 
comparing North American Workers Compensation Acts, on 
the one hand, with each other and to comparing such 
legislation with the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act 
1972 involves such acdifference in scope as to render such 
comparison pointless. 
Webb & Auburn11nd also Bell 2 )discuss the 
possibility of the plaintiff fmming his action in 
contract rather than tort law, and here again the result 
1) Webb & Auburn, p.989 
2) Bell, p.ll9 et.seq. 
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could differ if the forum was a Commonwealth or foreign 
court. The plaintiff in a Commonwealth Court would argue 
that a breach of contract action governed by New Zealand 
law would be allowable as section 5 only applies to 
actions brought within New Zealand. 
Once again it is impossible to predict the outcome 
for a foreign visitor injured in New Zealand who later 
brings an action in his own state or country; as yet 
there appear to be no decided cases despite the arrival 
of some four and a half hundred thousand temporary 
visitors in 1980 to New Zealand.!) 
As a final matter for speculation is the question 
of enforcement of judgments in New Zealand. Webb & 
Auburn 2 ) discuss the possibility of a non New Zealand 
plaintiff successfully obtaining judgment in a foreign 
court seeking to enforce it in New Zealand. They suggest 
the plaintiff might be successful and state that this view 
is based on the words of the Act and not on an interpretation 
1) New Zealand Official Year Book 1980, p.977 states for 
year ending 1978 390,940 temporary visitors arrived in 
New Zealand, in 1979 the number given is 418,744 and 
1980 445,195. In 1978 there were 10,384 reported 
traffic accidents in New Zealand (654 people died and 
irrpries to 15,176 other people .were reported) and in 
1980 there were 1,297,253 cars on New Zealand roads. 
Ibid at p.978. Unfortunately there appear to be no 
statistics available on the number of accidents 
involving visitors. 
2) Webb & Auburn at p.990 
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or ambiguity in the legislation. Section 5(1) states 
that "no proceedings for damages arising directly or 
indirectly out of the injury ..• shall be brought in any 
court in New Zealand independently of this Act •.• " 
Webb & Auburn1 )argue that 'damages' can be seen to be 
used in the legal sense thus permitting proceedings for 
an injunction. "The words 'directly or indirectly' 
refer to 'damages' not to 'proceedings'". 2 ) 
To conclude, the New Zealand legislation has 
created a number of matters for speculation. The Act 
is not clear in its cotilicts provisions, the absence of 
decided cases (because New Zealand is in a Phillips v. 
Eyre jurisdiction) means that the Act will remain 
uninterpreted for the immediate future. This has the 
effect of making it difficult to advise clients as to the 
possibility of success if they choose to litigate torts 
with an international element that result in personal 
injury by accident. 
5. Turning to the Italian legislation the relevant 
provision is contained in the Second Paragraph of Article 
25 of the Preliminary Dispositions of the Italian Code of 
1942 which states: 
"Non-Contract obligations are governed by 
the law of the place where the facts from 
which they arise took place."3) 
1) Webb & Auburn p.990 
2) Ibid 
3) P.D. McCusker. The Italian Rules of Conflict of Laws 
25 Tulane L.Rev. 70 at 82 (1950) 
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As a rule this provision has the serious 
limitation of uncertainty. McCusker: 1 ) for example 
interprets the article to mean that "the obligation 
to pay damages arising from the commission of a tort is 
governed by the law of the place of the tort (lex loci 
delicti) and not by the law of the place where the damage 
occurred" and cites an article by one Monaco as support. 2 ) 
However Cavers 3 ) interprets article 25 to include the 
place where the damage occurred. He says: 
"The draftsmen, with accidental or studied 
ambiguity, have written a provision broad 
enough to embrace both the place where the 
Defendant's conduct occurred and the place 
where that conduct caused the plaintiff's 
injury. Both sets of facts are essential 
to his cause of action. Perhaps the rule 
was written to reflect the prevailing 
preference on the Continent 'for the law of 
the defendant's conduct, but it certainly 
could be stretched to support choosing the 
law of the place of injury."4) 
This ambiguity on the place of acting, place 
of injury issue is not unique to Italy. The Benelux 
countries, Belguim, the Netherlands and Luxemburg 
together with France also leave the problem unresolved. 5 ) 
It is difficult to see why the respective draftsmen 
should retain the dilemma when from a practical point of 
view the difference can be vi t.al. 6 ). 
1) Ibid 
2) Ibid at p.83 
3) Cavers op.cit. supra at p.85 note 1 at p.350 
4) Ibid 
5) Ibid at pp.350-351 
6) see supra at p. 77. 
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In 1942 the Civil Law jurisdictions did seem to favor the 
place of acting, 1 )however it is possible that the Italian 
draftsmen intended to combine both theories. Rabel notes 
that the German Reichsgericht has combined the place where 
the actor engages in his conduct and the place where the 
effects of his conduct occur. The injured person could 
choose which of the two laws to sue under and the German 
Courts then applied that law. Rabel goes on to state that 
this view was followed by the Italian Supreme Court in 1927. 2 ) 
Possibly the Italian Legislature intended in Article 25 
to give legislative status to the 1927 decision. Whatever 
was intended however remains obscure and this cannot be 
attributed to the novelty of legislation in Italy as the 
1942 Code with its Preliminary Dispositions followed on 
from a previous Code with similar Preliminary Dispositions 
dating back to 1865. 
5. (b) In 1973 Dr. Shapira in a Comment on Neumeier v. 
Keuhner 3discussed a Draft Bill that he had submitted to 
the Israeli Ministry of Justice. The Draft which remains 
a Bill, reads as follows:-
II Choice of Law in Torts 
A Draft Bill 
1. Prima facie Applicability of Local Law 
When deciding the rights and liabilities of 
the parties with respect to a tort committed 
wholly or partly abroad, a court in Israel 
shall apply Israeli law. 
1} Rabel. The Conflict of Laws: A Comparative Study 
Vol.2 pp.303-4 (1960) 2Edit. (hereinafter referred 
to as Rabel). 
2) Ibid at p.305 
3) Shapira op.cit. supra at p.74 note 2 
Israeli law shall not be displaced by 
foreign law except as hereinafter provided 
in this Act. 
2. Displacement of Local Law by Foreign Law 
(a) A court entertaining an action in tort as 
aforesaid shall not displace Israeli law 
by foreign law unless convinced that, as 
to the issue or matter at bar, a foreign 
law has a closer relationship to the facts 
of the case and to the parties than has 
Israeli law. 
(b) When determining whether, as to the issue 
or matter at bar, a foreign law has a 
closer relationship to the facts of the 
case and to the parties than has Israeli 
law, the Court shall consider chiefly the 
tenor and purposes of the laws - Israeli 
and foreign - that are proposed to be 
applied, as they relate to the facts of 
the case and to the parties. For that 
purpose the Court shall take into account 
such factors as: 
1. The place where the injury occurred; 
2. The place where the conduct causing 
the injury occurred; and 
3. The domicil, residence, nationality 
place of incorporation and place of 
business of the parties. 
3. Foreign Law Referring to Another Law 
If a court decides to apply foreign law as 
aforesaid, and it finds that such law 
would refer to the law of any other 
jurisdiction, the Court shall not heed any 
such reference. 
4. Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law 
(a) A party seeking to displace Israeli law 
by foreign law as aforesaid, shall bear 
the onus of proving the tenor of the 
foreign law and of convincing the court 
that, as to the issue or matter at bar, 
the foreign law has a closer relationship 
to the facts of the case and to the 
parties than has Israeli law. 
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{b) A plea regarding the displacement of Israeli 
law by foreign law shall be ra-ised by an 
interested party in his pleadings, and shall 
be considered and resolved by the Court in 
a preliminary hearing. 
The court may allow a party to raise 
a plea as aforesaid even at a later stage 
in the proceedings, and it may also post-
pone its decision in that matter until a 
later stage in the proceedings, provided 
that the rights of the other party or 
parties are not prejudiced. 
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(c) The tenor and purpose of foreign law shall 
be proved by means of oral testimony or 
affidavit given by an expert in that law. 
The court may prescribe other or additional 
means of proof, if it deems such means 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
5. Application of Local Law in Matters of 
Procedure and Evidence 
The Court shall always apply Israeli law in 
matters of procedure and evidence. 
6. Foreign Law Not to be Applied 
The Court shall not apply foreign law which 
discriminates on grounds of sex, race, 
religion or ethnic origin or which is 
repugnant to public policy in Israel." 
The Draft attempts to resolve the choice of 
laW"'dilerruna by a general rule, the lex fori, with a 
proper law type of exception. The following criticisms 
of the Draft may be made. 
1. Section 2 appears to be an unfortunate attempt 
to condense paragraphs 6 and 145 of the American 
Restatemen4 Second. The lex fori is not to be 
displaced unless the foreign law has a "closer 
relationship" (s.2(a)) to the facts and parties. 
In deciding this the court "shall consider 
chiefly the tenor and purpose of the laws •.• that 
are proposed to be applied {S.2(b)). However 
the purpose of any particular law.does not relate to 
or assist the court in determining which law has 
a closer connection. Secondly the factors listed 
in S. 2 (b) 1, 2, 3. whi'ch are o.f .assistance in 
2. 
3. 
4. 
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determining the closer relationship are, on 
a literal reading, to be used as a guide to 
deciding the "tenor and purpose of the laws." 
It seems unsatisfactory to adopt sub-paragraphs 
2 (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 145 of the 
American Restatement,Second, in in S.2(b) 1, 2 and 
3 of the Draft but for no apparent reason to ignore 
sub-paragraph (d) of paragraph 145. 
The lex fori is not to be displaced unless the 
court is "convinced" (s.2) that the foreign law 
has a closer relationship and the onus of 
"convincing" the Court is on the party seeking 
to rely on the foreign law (s.4). The problem 
is what degree of convincing is necessary. 
8.5 could lead to problems of classification. 
As the House of Lords decision in Boys v. 
Chaplin illustrates it is not always an easy 
matter to determine whether a matter is procedural 
or substantive. 1 ) 
By way of conclusion it may be noted that added 
to the problems in the legislation outlined above is the 
question of codification. 2 ) 
1) /1971] A.C. 356 and see North & Webb. Foreign Torts 
and English Courts: The effect of Chaplin v. Boys 
19 I.C.L.Q. 24 at pp.32-33 (1970) 
2) By codification is meant "the process whereby conflicting 
rules of two or more systems of law are replaced by 
a single rule common to all systems" See H.C. Gutteridge 
The Codification of Private Internationa; Law 1951 p.5 
et.seq. {hereinafter referred to as Gutteridge.) 
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It is not appropniate to discuss in any detail the problems 
associated with codification generally or for inter-
national torts or accidents in particular. Suffice to 
say that the problems involved are numerous and varied and 
may arise because of the political, social or :economic 
conditions of the age. If codification has for the most 
part been'' .•• a sombre record of failure •. "l) the 
general opinion of academic writers 2 ) is that codification 
or unification should be regarded as a more than "mere 
pious aspiration" 3 >. 
range_project. 4 ) 
1) Ibid, p.lO 
It is a goal to aim for, a long 
0-0-0-0-0 
2) See Morse, p.321 et.seq. Gutteridge p.S et.seq. 
Shapira p.237 Torts ·in Private International Law (1978) 
3) Gutteridge p.S 
4) Gutteridge pp.56-60 suggests that once international 
agreement is reached a short unifying convention 
should be all that is required. Problems of inter-
pretation, which would inevitably arise could possibly 
be determined by the International Court of Justice. 
He suggests that partial,codification is more likely 
to succeed in the long term. 
PART C 
Introduction 
"The ideal is unattainable. All ideals 
are. Never shall we see the day when 
all countries will apply the same law to 
the same situation. This does not mean1 ) 
we should give us perusing the ideal •• " 
With codification as the ultimate goal there 
is much to be said for national legislation in the 
immediate future. If states and countries enacted 
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statutes on the choice of law international accidents 
hopefully uniform rules of law would develop which would 
facilitate codification. 
Following 6n from national legislation would be 
regional codification, all Phillips v. Eyre jurisdictions 
could amalgamate firstly with each other and then with 
a '"Lhe Canadian Provinces and Civil Law jurisdictions or 
all the European Economic Community countries could 
amalgamate and so on. The legislation adopted by each 
jurisdiction would have to take cognizance of other states 
rules and states should legislate with other state's rules 
in mind and they should endeavour to legislate towards 
harmony of rules wherever possible. 
Legislation necessary because of: 
1. The unsatisfactory present situation especially 
in Phillips v. Eyre jurisdictions. 
2. The rising importance internationaL torts is 
1) 0. Kahn Freund. General Problems of Private Inter-
national Law.p323 (1976) 
3. 
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increasing technological changes "Dangerous drugs 
can cause babies to be born without arms or 
legs thousands of miles from the laboratory 
where the drugs were made. Scotch whisky .. 
is sold all over the world. Unfair competition is 
no longer confined to a single country •. "l) 
Mass communication affects defamation cases, 
increasing numbers of people take to the road 
in mptor vehicles and so on. 
The decided lack of cases, especially in 
Phillips v. Eyre jurisdictions makes legislation 
necessary. 
For example mass air disasters whilst 
devastating in their results occur relatively 
infrequently and it been pointed out that 
air commerce does not produce a steady stream 
of passenger death claims to serve "as grist 
for the slow grinding mill of the common law 
process." 2 ) 
Furthermore the difficulties facing a 
plaintiff make it such that decided cases are 
not prolific. Once a conflict of laws issue 
is involved the case obviously becomes more 
complex and hence more costly. For a plaintiff 
1) Morris, p.256 
2) B.E. Haller. Death in the Air: Federal Regulation 
of Tort Liability a Must. 54 American Bar Association 
Journal (1968) 382 atp386. 
to have the misfortune of suing in a Phillips 
v. Eyre jurisdiction the requirement of double 
actionability compounds the problem. 
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Before outlining a Draft Bill for New Zealand or 
possibly for all Phillips v. Eyre jurisdictions it is 
proposed to briefly outline the possible choices:"!that 
such legislation could take. 
Possible Choices: 
1. 
2. 
The first choice is between a Draft Bill for 
all torts or a series of Dra Bills for 
specific torts. 
The second choice relates to the rule to be 
adopted; various possibilities present them-
selves here:-
a) One general rule with no exceptions 
e.g. Article 25 of the Preliminary Dispositions 
of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1942. 1 ) 
the general rule could be:-
(i) the lex fori - This denies the problem 
of choice of law. 
(ii) the lex loci delicti commissi - eg.Article 
25 Italy2 )if this is chosen then the place 
commission of the tort can be 
a) left undetermined 
b) the place of acting 
c) .the place of harm 
1) Supra at P·73 
2} Ibid. 
iii) 
iv) 
v) 
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d) By election 
e) the place of the substance of the 
wrongdoing. 
A combination of the lex fori and lex 
loci delicti comm:i·ssi (however determined) 
eg the traditional English approach as 
regarded in some jurisdictions. The 
disadvantages of such a rule are set out 
above. 1 } 
The Pro:eer Law of the Tort eg. Clause I 
the Draft Foreign Torts Act (Canada} 2 ) 
Governmental Interest Analysis eg. Clause 
of the Draft Foreign Torts Act (Canada) 3 ) 
B. A General Rule with Exceptions 
The general rules in A. (i) - (iii) can have 
by way of exception A. (iv) thus:-
i) The lex fori plus a proper law exce:etion 
eg. Shapira's Bill. 4 ) 
ii) the lex loci delicti commissi plus a 
3 
5) pro:eer law exce:etion eg. the E.E.C. Draft. 
iii) the lex fori and lex loci delicti commissi 
plus a :eroper law exception eg. English 
Court of Appeals approach in Church of 
Scientology of California v. Commissioner 
of Police for the Metropolis. 6 ) 
1} Supra at p. 14 et.seq. 
3) Supra at p. 73 note 2 
5) Supra at p. 73 note 1 
6) ll976) 120 Sol.J.690 
2) Supra at·p. 73 note 2 
4) Supra at p. 74 note 2 
c. 
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iv) Further, where legislation is concerned 
with specific torts other exceptions 
could be evoked as an exception or 
adopted as a general rule. eg. 
- lex loci delicti commissi plus state 
of registration 
- state of parties habitual residence 
eg the Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Traffic Accidents 19681 ) 
- Law of the Garage 
eg. proposed by Ehrenzweig & Jayme2 ) 
for the Conflict of Laws of enterprise 
liability for automobile accidents. 3 ) 
v) Public policy could be a general exception 
for (A) and (B) • 
A g_eneral rule with more than one exce:etion 
eg. the lex loci delicti commissi plus both 
the state of registration and the state where 
the vehicle is habitually stationed. 
eg. The Canadian Draft (Traffic Accidents) Act. 4 ) 
D. One general rule for torts and specific rules 
for specific torts within this. 
eg. the approach of the American Restatement 
Second. 
1) Supra at p. 73 note 3 
2) Ehrenzweig & Jayme. Private Internation.al Law Vol. III 
~977)p.60 et.seq. 
3) Ibid 
4) Supra at p.73 note 4 
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In making a choice consideration should be 
given to the following points. 
1. With the ultimat~ goal being codification 
international harmony must be balanced against internal 
consistancy. For this reason the proposed Bill should 
avoid reference to the concepts of domicile, nationality 
and habitual residence. Unification of Phillips v. Eyre 
jurisdictions with civil law countries would be facilitated 
if the domicile versus nationality controversy was avoided. 
2. The proposed Bill should aim at a compromise between 
rigidity and flexibility. By the very nature of things 
legislative draftsmen cannot possibly anticipate all the 
potential mixed contingencies. A relatively short piece 
of legislation should be all that is required. This 
would allow for flexibility and would compliment the 
adoption of a specific basic rule which could otherwise 
tend to make for rigidity. 
3. The Bill should aim at a compromise between 
justice in the individual case and certainty. Ease of 
application and predictability are also important factors 
in the field of conflict of laws. 1 ) 
1) H.E. Read at p.294 in discussing the Draft Foreign 
Torts Act (Canada) quotes Chief Justice Kenison's 
judgment in Clark v. cl·ark (1966 222 A (2d) 205 
where he said the goals were predictability of 
results (this protects the parties justifiable 
actions) uniformity of decision; the maintenance 
of reasonable orderliness and good relationship 
among states; simplification of the judicial task; 
the advancement of governmental interests and 
application of the better law. 
116 
Because of the wide variety of torts generally, 
the writer considers that legislation for certain torts 
only should be initially undertaken. With this in mind 
the following Draft Bill is proposed for accidents with 
an international element;-
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
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A DRAFT BILL 
When deciding the rights and liabilities of 
the parties with respect to an accident occurring 
wholly or partly outside New Zealand, a New 
Zealand court shall apply the law of the place 
where the conduct causing the harm occurred. 
A reference to the laws of a state shall be read 
as a reference to its internal laws excluding 
the conflict rules. 
The party seeking to displace the law of New 
Zealand by foreign law shall bear the onus 
proving the foreign law. 
The foreign law may be proved by means of oral 
testimony or affidavit given by an expert in 
that law. The court may prescribe other or 
·additional means of proof if it deems such means 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
The Court shall always apply the law New 
Zealand to matters of procedure and evidence. 
The court shall not apply foreign law which 
discriminates on grounds of sex, race, igion 
or ethnic origin or which is repugnant to 
public policy in New Zealand. 
o-o-o 
Section 2 is Article 1. (1) (2) of the 
Conditionally approved Draft of a Uniform Conflict of 
Laws (Traffic Accidents) Act1*hilst sections 3 and 4 
are based on Shapira's Draft Bill Sections 4(a) and 
4 (c) • Sections s· and 6 correspond to Sections 5 and 6 
of Shapira's Draft Bill. 
The following points may be noted:-
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1. Section 2 should overcome any possible problems 
of renvoi. 
2. Section 6 provides a safety measure whereby the 
lex loci delicti can be avoided if necessary. In such 
a case the court could apply the lex fori or any other law. 
As such situations are likely to be rare it is considered 
preferable to leave the alternative or alternatives to 
the lex loci delicti open. 
3. Although favoring the place of acting, Section 1 
iG not out of harmony with the Privy Council decision in 
the Distiller•s 26ase as the answer to where, in substance 
did this cause of action arise should in most cases be 
the place where the conduct causing the harm occurred. 
In this context it should be noted that the use of the term 
'conduct; is sufficiently general and that Section 1 
refers to 'a tort' rather than 'an issue in tort' or 
'an action in tort'. 
4. The draft Bill makes no reference to questions 
of jurisdiction. The relevant rules in the Code of Civil 
Procedure in individual jurisdictions would Obviously 
1} See:::App'end.ix B. 
2) Distillers Co. (Bio-Chemicals) Ltd. v Thompson 
/197.Jj' All E. R. 694; fl97lj A. C. 458. 
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continue to apply. However no specific reference is 
made to the Phillips v~ Eyre rule and its abolition as 
does the Tentative Draft of a Foreign Torts Act 1966 for 
Canada. Such a clause should perhaps be included in a 
Phillips v. Eyre jurisdiction such as New Zealand, 
5. By adopting the lex loci delicti commissi rule 
critics of the Draft Bill would argue that flexibility 
and justice in the individual case has been sacrificed 
to the goals of certainty and predictability. Whilst 
the rule in harmony with various jurisdictions1 ) and 
is therefore more readily acceptable to a number of 
jurisdictions its application to a number of decided 
cases indicates that the Draft Bill would work in practice. 
The following cases have been chosen on the 
following criteria:-
(a) They pert~in to a veriety of situations; 
(b) come from different jurisdictions; 
(c) where possible are controversial or much 
criticised; 
(d) have been referred to above; 
(e) have been considered by the highest court in 
the jurisdiction concerned. 
1} Rabel Vol.2, pp. 235/6 lists the countries which use 
the lex loci delicti rule and see C.M. Semmler. The 
Foreign Party to an Auto Accident in the USSR: 
Calculation of Damages. 12 International Lawyer 505 
at p.508 (1978). The Soviet view according to Semmler 
is that the lex loci delicti governs and it is defined 
as the place of the cause of injury. 
The cases discussed are:-
In re Paris Air Crash of Ma~ch 3, 1974 
Hurtado v. Superior court 
Kieger c. Amigues 
Boys v. Chaplin 
M'Elroy v. M'Allister 
La Van v. Danyluk 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. Anderson v. Eric Anderson Radio &. T.V. Pty. Ltd. 
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1. In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 19741 ) 
On March 3, 1974, shortly after takeoff from 
Paris, France, a Douglas D.C.lO passenger aircraft owned 
and operated by Turkish Airlines crashed in France 
destroying the place and killing all 346 occupants 
aboard. The defendants were the United States, two 
American manufacturers and Turk Hava Yallari A.O. whilst 
the deceased passengers were from 24 countries and 12 
states of the United States, a total of 36 jurisdictions. 
The defendants agreed to a formula amongst 
themselves that precluded litigation about liability and 
which left for settlement or trial only the issue of 
damages. Peirson M. HalL S~nior, District Judge of the 
District Court in California commenced his judgment on 
the choice of law applicable to damages by saying that the 
law here was " .. a veritable jungle which, if the law can 
he found out, leads not to a 'rule of action' but a reign 
of chaos dominated in each case by the judge's 'informed 
guess' as to what some other state than the one in which 
he sits would hold the law to be." 2 ) He noted that 
various arguments had been advanced as to which law should 
be applied to damages and that these included the law of: 
1. California; 2. domicile of decedents; 3. domicile 
of claimants; 4. France; Japan and 6. California plus 
French 'moral' damages. 3 ) 
1) 399F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975) 
2) Ibid at p. 739 
3) Ibid. 
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Of the 12 states of the United States involved 
some used the "significant contacts" approach, whilst 
others the place of the wrong rule. The measure of 
damages varied, "one state limited the amount to $50,000 
another to $75,000; four allowed full recovery with 
varying limitations; one had full recovery plus pain 
and suffering and mental anguish •.• " l) 
The court discussed Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft 
Co. 2 ) which had failed to take into consideration three 
important points, viz: 
1. deterrance aspect; 
2. The distinction between the place of 
wrong and that of the accident -
" •.• if the wrong is in defective 
design or manufacture, it occurred 
at the time and in the place of design 
and manufacture, the place where it 
came to fruition is purely fortuitous •. "3 ) 
3. The rights of the manufacturer. Applying 
Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co. to the 
present facts would result in application 
of French law which the Court thought an 
"undesirable result". 4 ) 
The Court then went on to note that California 
had adopted the governmental interest approach as its 
choice of law rule~) It was held ~hat the interests of 
1) Ibid at p. 742 
2) 520 F. 2d. 608 and ibid at p.740 
3) Ibid 4) Ibid 
5) A.A. Ehrenzweig & E. Jayroe. Private International Law 
Vol.III (1977) at p.l66 suggests (whilst emphasising 
fueirlex fori views) that the Court merely paid lip 
service to the Governmental-interest doctrine. 
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the United States and the State of California were 
significantly greater than the interest of countries 
or states of which either the victims or claimants were 
citizens. The plane was designe~ constructed, manufactured 
and tested in California (where the alleged negligence had 
occurred) and -the United States had issued a Certificate 
of Airworthiness so both had a significant interest in 
seeing Californian law applied. California was held 
to be 
" mainly interested in deterring conduct 
of its defendants, 2. avoiding the imposition 
of excess financial burdens on its resident 
defendants and 3. providing a uniform rule of 
liability and damages to those who come under 
the ambit of California's strict product 
liability law and market their p~oduct outside 
California ••• may know what risks they are 
subject to w~yn they make and sell their 
products •.. " 
California law would also be applied to the 
issue of damages (and liability) if the Draft Bill was 
applied. The lex loci delicti would be Californian 
law. The place of acting would not be in France but 
in California where the alleged negligence had occurred. 
This would be an acceptable result in the writer's opinion 
for the following reasons: 
1. In mass accidents the magnitude of the problem 
is such that certainty, predictability, ease of applic-
ation are vital, as justice to the victims dependants 
as a group1 requires .that they receive prompt compensation. 
1) 399 F. Supp. 732 at p. 743. 
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Speed of process is required and this is achieved if 
everyone knows what law will be applied as soon as the 
accident occurs. The place of acting rule is certain. 
This may be arbitrary but it is more satisfactory to 
the group of dependants as a whole. 
2. It is probable that justice to each individual 
victim's family is an impossibility by all standards 
anyway. Should for example, the victims dependants or 
heirs be treated identically if they (the victims) die 
in the same accident or do the heirs of a victim from a 
country with a low standard of living and/or a low upper 
limit on damages recoverable receive less by having their 
law applied, or should the families of two victims from 
the same country, one accustomed to a high standard of 
living and the other a low receive the same amount of 
damages? Allen1 ) for example says " •• _.the system, which 
permits (the plaintiff) to do better in the courts of 
a foreign country is plainly wrong, or at best illogical." 
and argues that compensation should be determined here 
by the country which determines the passengers personal 
living standards. 
3. The problems involved above are magnified when 
one considers for example case No. CV 75-255-PH discussed 
by the judge in the Paris Air Crash case. 
1) J.V. Allen. Air Disasters. The Case of Rationalization. 
43 Journal of Air Law and Commerce. pp.555-64 esp. 
p.558 (hereinafter cited as Allen) 

4. 
" .•• the heirs are alleged, at the time of the 
crash, to be citizens and domiciliaries 
distributed among four countries, viz. France, 
United Kingdom, Morocco and Israel. This 
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is not the only case with such a divergence, 
which produces an unanswerable enigma. If the 
law of damages of each country controlled, i.e. 
if the one country (or state) beneficiaries are · · 
limited to linear descendants, in another they 
may be lateral descendants and in another they 
may be dependants regardless of blood affinity, 
and if one country (or state) limited damages, 
another imposed a penal fine ..• the result would 
be chaotic, and against the faintest instinct for 
justice by unequal results to those standing in 
the same relationship to each other and to the 
decedent."!) 
The alternatives to the place of acting rule do 
not yield a more satisfactory result on the facts of the 
case. The alternatives suggested all have disadvantages:-
(a) domicile of decedents and domicile of claimants~ 
This would be too complex to provide a workable 
solution, as (3) above illustrates. 
(b) France. On the facts the case the fact that 
the accident occurred in France was purely 
fortuitous. 
(c) Japan. An arbitrary choice. 
(d) California and French 'moral' damages. as for 
(b) above. 
On the other hand there are no objections on 
policy grounds for not applying the Californian rule. 
Californian defendants would be deterred from negligence and 
so on. Finally adequate compensation .should be awarded 
1) 399 F. Supp. 732 at p. 741 
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due to the wording of the Californian rule itself, which 
provides that the heirs of uhe decedent are entitled to 
recover such sum, as under all the circumstances of the 
case, will be just compensation for the pecuniary loss 
which each heir has suffered by reason of the death of 
the decedent. 1 ) 
5. The law of California will be applied under the 
Draft Bill no matter where the forum, whilst in the case 
itself the fact that the forum was California was not 
without significance. 
6. Governmental interest analysis may have worked 
satisfactorily in the Paris Air Crach case fact situation 
but its application to a slightly altered fact situation 
is significantly more difficult. If 346 persons died on 
March 3, 1974 due to the negligence of the pilot then 
California has no obvious interest in applying its law 
other than the fact that it is the f9rum. Turkey however 
would have an interest from the deterrant point of view in 
applying its law to a negligent turkish pilot; France would 
either be seen an uninterested, the place of injury being 
fortuitous again or it might be argued it was as interested 
as Turkey in deterring negligence within its borders. Thirty-
six jurisdictions would also be interested in seeing that 
its deceased's dependants and heirs were adequately 
1) Californian Code of Civ. Proc. 8.377 set out in 
Hurtado v. Supeiior Court 522 P.2d.666 at p.669 
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and quickly provided for. In other words governmental 
interest analysis would fail on the grounds of lack of 
predictability. The Draft Bill in such a fact situation 
would apply French law. 
and not unjust. 1 ) 
Arbitrary perhaps but predictable, 
If the Draft Bill was applied to the Mt. Erebus 
air disaster case New Zealand law would apply. This is 
so it were to be alleged that the accident resulted 
from pilot error in the Ross Dependancy or because of New 
Zealand Airlines procedures within New Zealand itself~) 
(Governmental interest analysis,would probably yield the 
same result.) 
By way of conclusion it should be noted that 
many 1 that mass accidents resulting from aircraft 
disasters is a fit subject for specific legislation. 3 ) 
Allen suggests that existing conventions such as the 
Warsaw Convention (which was held inapplicable in the 
Paris Air Crash Casef) be abolished and that an International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (I.C.A.O.) Convention be 
entered into by all nations with major airlines. The 
Convention would totally regulate the financial consequences 
of air disasters. As this regulation would not be 
achiev.ed. for many years ~llen 5 ) suggests that as an interim 
1) It is arguable that on these facts whichever approach 
is adopted will produce an arbitrary result. 
2) Assuming the Ross Dependancy is accepted as New Zealand 
Territory. 
3) See Allen at p.559 and B.E. Haller. Death in the Air. 
54 Am. Bar Assn. Jo. 382 (1968). 
4) 399 F. Supp. 732 (1975) at p. 747. The Warsaw Convention 
f929, .as am~nded, ~ela~ing to international air transport 
~s pr~nted· ~n Engl1sh 1n 5 Am.Jo~ of Comp. Law 90 (1956) 
5) Allen at p.559 
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solution the major commercial aviation nations of the 
world, evolve, on a country by country basis an equivalent 
solution subject only to differing national legal and 
procedural requirements. Allen's solution would provide 
automatic compensation without proof fault with a 
set upper limit. To this on proof of loss a further sum 
could be awarded. Allen leaves open the question of 
whether proof of fault should be established here. 1 ) 
Until such time as special legislation is 
adopted to cope with mass accidents the Draft Bill would 
provide an adequate solution. 
l)&Haller op.cit. supra at p.l28 note 3 at p.386. Haller 
in discussing .. the requirements of a proposed Federal 
Statute for the United States is against a fixed dollar 
limitation. Obviously any statute or qonvention imposing 
a fixed upper limit would have to provide a means for 
increasing the sum. 
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2. Hurtado v. Superior Court bf Sacramento Countyl) 
This was an action for damages for wrongful death 
arising out of a motor vehicle accident in California. 
Hurtado, a mexican, was a passenger in his cousins car 
which hit a parked truck. The truck in turn collided 
with a parked car in which was the truck owners son. 
All three vehicles were registered in California and 
everyone concerned except the deceased were residents of 
California. Californian law had no upper limit on 
the amount of damages available whilst Mexico's upper 
limit was, in u.s. dollars $1,946.72. 
Sullivan J. having pointed out that the objective 
of governmental interest analysis is "to determine the 
law that most appropriately applies to the issue involved." 2 ) 
noted that the interest of a state in a tort rule limiting 
damages for wrongful death is to 'protect defendants from 
excessive financial burdens or exaggerated claims." 3 ) 
California applies its own law unless mexico has an 
interest in having its measure of damages applied. 
Mexico having no interest in seeing California's 
defenda~ts protected/California law was applied. 
Sullivan J. then went on to discuss, obiter, various 
arguments advanced by the defendants pertaining to 
governmental interest analysis. 
1) 11 Cal 3d. 574, 522 p 2d. 666, 114 Cal.Rptr.l06 (1974) 
2) 522 p. 2d. 666 at p. 669 
3) Ibid 
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Applying the Draft Bill to the facts above 
Californian law would be applied, indeed there seems to be 
no other law that, on the facts, could possibly be used. 
It would be within the defendants expectations to have 
Californian law applied as of the four persons involved 
three were Californians acting in their own state in 
Californian registered vehicles. No injustice results 
to the deceased mexican's family. Maria de Jesus Flores 
de Hurtado and her children would receive " ••• such 
damages as may be just ••. "l) rather than 25 pesos 
per day for 730 days, 2 ) which, assuming a large number 
of young Hurtados could be something of a blessing. 
l) Cal.C.C.P. 377 
2} 522 p 2d. 666 at p.668 note 1. 
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3. Keiger c. Amigues 1) 
In 1961 the case of Kieger c. Amigues was started 
in the French courts. A frenchman driving on a German 
road attempted to overtake a truck in heavy traffic. A 
driver coming from the opposite direction, also a frenchman, 
was forced to brake suddenly and collided with a truck. 
He was injured and his brother, who was a passenger in 
the car, died in the accident. The father sued for 
damages for mental suffering and pecuniary loss resulting 
from the death of his son. Under French law such 
damages can be granted. 
The court of first instance held in favor of 
the plaintiff and allowed damages for mental suf ing 
although under German law this was not available. The 
court emphasised the nationality of the parties~ the Court 
of Appeal :r~~ected the nationality argument but allowed 
the decision on the grounds of French public policy. The 
fact that German law did not permit compensation for 
mental suffering was, the court held, contrary to French 
public policy. 
Appeal was taken to the Court of Cassation which 
reversed the Court of Appeal's decision and held:-
1) Cour de Cassation, Chambre Civile (1967) Recueil 
Dalloz sirey 38e Cahier 629 (1967) Revue Critique 
de droit international prive v.56 (1967) 728. 
Bulletin des arrets de la cour de Cassation (1967) 
137 No. 189 
t' 
"Attendu que, quelle que soit la nationalite 
des parties, la loi, comp6tente pour r~gir 
la responsabilite extra-contractuelle est 
la loi du lieu ou '·· le fait dommageable s 'est 
produit •. "l) 
It may be noted that there is no provision in 
the French Civil Code which requires the application 
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of the lex loci delicti to foreign torts. The proposition 
was only settled in 1948 by the decision of the Cour de 
Cassation in Latour c. Guiraud. 2 ) 
The third case in the trilogy is Thomas c. Erste 
Allgemeine decided in 1969~ In all three cases the parties 
were french and the accident occurred in other European 
countries; Germany, Spain and Austria. In all three 
cases the lex loci delicti was applied and in each case 
the final solution worked to the detriment of the victims 
interests, who, had the accident occurred in France would 
have received full compensation. 
What makes the trilogy of great interest is 
that the fact situations are the same as that in Boys v. 
Chapli~)in so far as the parties were both french/English 
and the accident happened outside the forum and in 
particular the issue in Kieger c. Amigues was " precisely 
the same as in Chaplin v. Boys decided by the House of 
1) ibid. "Whatever the nationality of the parties, the 
law applicable to tort liability is the law of the 
place in whichthe tort is committed." Writer's translation. 
l ' 
2) Cour de Cassation. Sirey (1949) 1.21. Chambre Civile 
Jl948) Dalloz 357 (1949) Revue Critique 89 (1949) 
3) Cass May 30,1967, Journal du Droit International 1967 
622, Revue Critique de droit International Prive 1967 
728. Recueil Dalloz 1967, 629. 
4) /1971J A.C. 356 
Lords two years later, but with a different and better 
result."l) 
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Delaume 2 ) discussing all three french cases says: 
"Though the secrecy surrounding the making 
of French judgments does not permit more than 
the formulation of a purely speculative guess 
it is not inconceivable that in reaching its 
decision, the Court considered that, because 
of the French nationality of both sides, the 
subjective interests of the parties did in 
effect cancel each other out since whatever 
law was applied, whether the lex loci or the lex 3 ) fori, a Frenchman would suffer the consequences." 
Another reason for retaining the lex loci rule 
in all three cases according to Delaume is the fact that 
compensation for mental suffering is under heavy attack 
in France, and that "the forum's (France) own system 
might not be so firmly rooted as to justify invoking 
public policy against foreign laws accomplishing in effect 
what a vocal segment of French legal opinion is 
advocating." 4 ) 
Both Kieger and Thomas were decided in full 
knowledge of the work of the Hague Conference. 5 ) It 
is therefore a cause of particular regret that the French 
system of judgments and of ~eporting cases is such 
that one is unable to discover the reasons why the Cour de 
Cassation comes to the decisions it does. 
1) Morris, p. 273 
2) G.R. Delaume. Recent French Decisions. 18 Am.J.Comp. 
Law 1 (1971) at p.lO. 
3) Ibid 
4) Ibid 
5) Ibid 
In the notes accompanying the Dalloz Sirey 
report of Rieger, Professor Malaurie 1 ) makes reference 
to the most significant relationship test and says: 
' 
"Une telle complication serait contraire a 
l'esprit juridique franyais pour lequel 
la verit~ et la justice se trouvent dans la 
simplicite". 
The Draft Bill conforms with the French spirit 
of simplicity and in the three cases above the lex loci 
would apply and the same result would be achieved as 
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in fact occurred. The french father of the deceased in 
Rieger would not be able to recover for mental suffering. 
In Latour c. Guiraud2 ) the french widow would have to 
prove fault or negligence and in Thomas c. Erste 
Allgemeine 3 )the Austrian lex loci would apply. The 
result in Latour c. Guiraud would be such that the widow 
would not be able to recover as it was impossible to 
prove negligence. 4 ) 
Briefly the facts were that a convey of trucks 
were conveying oil and other supplies to the Republican 
Government during the Spanish Civil War. In Spain one 
french truck, driven by a frenchman collided with a Spanish 
railway engine and exploded; the plaintiff's husband, 
also French and driving another French truck in the Convoy 
was killed. Both drivers were employed by French firms 
1) Professor P. Malaurie, p. 630 
2) Cour de Cassation, Chambre Civile (1948) Dalloz 357 
(1949) Sirey 1.21 (1949) Revue Critique 89. 
3) Cour de Cassation. December 15, 1969. Dalloz 87 (1970) 
4) See Morris, p. 272-3. 
136 
and Morris 1 ) says there was nothing to indicate that 
they knew each other personally. Morris 2 ) concludes 
that as the case turned on the standard of liability, 
the lex loci delicti had a stronger claim to regulate. 
In the Thomas case, a Frenchman was on a 
conducted tour in Austria when he was injured by a 
vehicle driven by another Frenchman. There was no 
fault on the part of the travel agency. The Austrian 
law only allowed compensation for non-economic losses 
in cases of wilful misconduct or gross negligence which, 
in the case, was not established. 
The Draft Bill would produce the same results as 
those arrived at by the Cour de Cassation. No injustice 
results, it was fortuitous that both parties in all 
cases were french, it would have been much more likely 
that either the frenchman acting or the victims had been 
German Spanish or Austrian. The Draft Bill produces 
the same result as the most significant relationship 
test{in the writers opinion~. In none of the cases did 
the parties know each other3 )in France, so there would be 
no personal relationship between then centred in France 
so the most significant law is, perhaps by default, the 
lex loci delicti. 
1) Ibid 
2) .Morris, p.273-4 
3) Except perhaps in Latour ·the drivers might have got 
to know each other driving the convoy but even so 
there is no evidence they knew each other before 
the convoy set off. See Morris p.273-4. 
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4. Boys v Chaplinl) 
As noted above this was a House of Lords 
decision involving members of her Majesty's Armed 
Forces. David Boys sustained serious injuries in a road 
accident in Malta caused by the negligence of Richard 
Chaplin. The issue before the House of Lords was what 
law was to be applied in determining the heads or measure 
of damages to be awarded to the plaintiff. As in the 
three Court of Cassation cases the lex loci delicti was 
less favourable to the victim than the forum. David 
Boys could recover£53 as special damages if Maltese law 
were to apply whilst by English law the sum would have 
been£2,303; as by English law recovery is possible for 
pain and suffering. 
Following a bewildering variety of approaches 
in the judgments Boys ended up with[2,303. 2 ) 
The Draft Bill would allow him t 53. 
Before sympathising with Boys it may be noted 
that the Royal Air Force continued to pay him his full 
pay as a Serviceman until he was discharged and he 
obtained a better paid post in civilian life than that 
which he had had in the services. 3 ) 
1)[~967J 2 All E.R. 665, /1968] 2 Q.B.l, /19682 1 All E.R. 
2 8 3 , /19 6 §/2 W. L • R. 3 2 8 , £19 6 9 J 3 W. L • R . 3 2 2 , /19 6 9 J 
2 All E.R. 1085 
2) Supra at p. 27 et. seq. 
3) See P.M. North & P.R.H. Webb. Foreign Torts and English 
Courts : The effect of Chaplin v. Boys. 19 l.C.L.Q. 
24 ,(1970)' at p.24 
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Arguments ·in favor of the Draft Bill's 
application of the lex loci delicti, that is Maltese law, 
may be summarised as follows:-
1. The confusion and difficulties of the present 
English law avoided. 
11 
••• lt is extremely difficult to state with 
any degree of precision what now the 
English choice of law rute where a tort has 
been committed abroad. 11 1 
2. The differences of opinion as to what is the 
proper law is circumvented. Lord Denning M.R. in the 
Court of Appeal held English law to be the proper law whilst 
Pearl2 ) argues 11 the proper law of the tort should be the 
lex loci on the simple ground that when foreigners drive 
on strange roads, they are impliedly bound by the criminal 
and the civil laws as well as the administrative regulations 
of the lex loci, unless a special contractual relationship 
such as carrier and passenger can be imposed by another 
. 3) 
legal system ••• 11 Morris ambiguous, he says after 
discussing Kieger c. Amigues that 11 •• that issue was 
precisely the same as in Chaplin v. Boys, decided by the 
House of Lords two years later, but with a different and 
better result. 11 It is arguable he is meaning that the 
Kieger result is the better result in which case he would 
presumably apply Maltese law as the proper law. 
1) North & Webb op.cit. supra at p. 137 note 3 at p.24 
2) D. Pearl. Camb. Law Jo. 219 at p.222 ,(1968)' 
3) Morris at p.273 
3. Applying the lex loci to the facts in Boys 
v. Chaplin works no injustice to the parties. One 
can argue it is fortuitous that the accident occurred 
139 
in Malta but it is equally arguable that it was fortuitous 
that a negligent Englishman happened to injure another 
Englishman rather than a Maltese. Both were off duty; 
there is no evidence that they knew each other (one was 
in the Air Force the other the Army) • It is arguable 
that the parties would expect Maltese law to apply. 
4. Certainty, predictability and ease of 
application are achieved. 
5. Uniformity of results are also a result of 
applying the lex loci. Thus if Chaplin had injured a 
Maltese in Malta Maltese law would apply, likewise if 
he had injured a New Zealander or Arab Maltese law would 
apply. Under the present English rule different laws 
might be applied (especially if Boys had been Maltese). 
6. The results would be in harmony with the 
French Cour de Cassation decisions. 
7. With road accidents in general the parties 
actions are judged against the local situation. 
Negligence is determined with reference to the local 
laws on speed, left hand/right hand side of the road 
rule and so on. It is logical that the local law 
determines the issue of negligence and other issues such 
as heads of damage and so on. 
5. M'Elroy v. M'Allister1 ) 
M'Elroy, a Glasgow resident, was travelling 
in a truck during the course of his employment. He 
was employed by a Glasgow company and the driver of 
the truck, a fellow employee, also lived in Glasgow. 
In Westmorland, M'Allister, the driver, negligently 
collided with a heavy sheep truck. J'-1'Elroy was 
killed in the collision. 
By a special court of seven judges the Court 
of Session in Scotland held that M'Elroy's widow could 
recover £40 for funeral expenses and nothing else. 
The pursuer's first claim had been for solatium. Had 
the accident occurred in Scotland she would have been 
entitled to a substantial sum under this head. How-
ever the claim for solatium failed because it was a 
substantive and independant right of action and not a 
mere i tern in a damages claim and was not recognised by 
the English law, the lex loci delicti. 
The pursuer's second claim, for loss of her 
breadwinner, was based on the English Fatal Accidents 
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Act. Had the action been brought in England she would 
have been able to recover substantial damages here. 
However the claim failed because the action was begun 
more than twelv.e months after the accident contrary to 
1) 1949 S.C.llO 
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Section 3 of the Act of 1846. 
Finally the widow claimed pursuant to the 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 for loss 
of the deceased's expectation of life. The widow was 
suing here as executrix-dative. This claim also failed 
because pursuant to Scots law all rights of action for 
personal injuries due to negligence die with the injured 
person, and therefore the wrong was not actionable 
by the lex fori. 
Lord Keith dissented on both the last two 
claims and said: 
" ••• The present case is a·typical case 
where insi$tance on the double rule 1 
enunciated by Willes J. may work injustice." ) 
This much discussed and criticised case led 
Morris to develop his proper law theory. He says: 
" ••• It was surely far more significant 
that the parties were resident in Glasgow, 
that the fatal trip began in Scotland, and 
that the pursuer's husband was a passenger 
in a lorry and not, e.g. a pedestrian on the 
highway. The parties were thus socially 
insulated from their geographical environment 
in England. It would have been more 
sensible for the Court of Session to have 
disregarded English law entirely, and to 
have applied Scots law as the proper law 
of the tort." 
The pursuer's failure pursuant to the Fa~al 
Accidents Act cannot be blamed on the choice of law 
1) 1949 S.C. 110 at p.l32 
2) Morris at p. 254 
applied but to a misfortune unrelated to the problem. 
Had all the persons involved been English and the 
accident been in England the widow would have failed 
under the English Acts if she had been out of time~ 
because the case involved conflict of laws is no 
reason to treat the widow differently. 
On applying the Draft Bill the widow would 
be able to claim substantial damages under the English 
Fatal Accidents Act as English law as the lex loci 
delicti would be applied. If she failed to bring 
her action within the requisite time period that is 
misfortunate but it is hardly a ground for departing 
from the lex loci delicti as the rule. 
It is arguable that it is fairer to apply 
the same law to all accidents in Westmorland as this 
makes for certainty and predictability etc. Morris' 
Proper Law exception may work on the actual facts of 
the case but if his approach was adopted as the 
basic rule problems would arise as to when the elements 
ceased to be sufficiently Scottish to warrant the 
application of Scottish law. Would the negligence of 
the English sheep truck driver rather than the Scottish 
M'Allister have been enough to apply English law? 
The Draft Bill is adequate for the facts of M'Elroy v. 
M'Allister. 
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The defendant was speeding - a punishable 
offence by the law of Washington and negligent by 
1) the law of British Columbia. 
".: •• Both branches of the test I must apply 
are satisfied, and therefore the law of 
this province applies ••. u2} 
However Kirke Smith J. continues by saying 
"I confess to having been deeply concerned 
in arriving at this conclusion, for 
although it accords both with the authorities 
binding on me, .•• and also with the "proper 
law of the tort" concept ..• it clashes with 
the view expressed by the majority of the 
House of Lords in the Chaplin case ••• 
contriburory negligence •.• by Washington 
law ... is a complete bar to (an) action 
for damages ••• the defendant drivers 
contributory negligence is therefore by 
Washington law, not actionable, and it 
follows that the plaintiff's action could 
not be maintained in the courts of that 
state or this province." 
Kirke Smith J. concludes that the practical result 
of'the case is satisfactory (his concern being for 
the state of the law) and British Columbia law is 
applied to both the issues of liability and quantum. 
The Draft Bill would apply the lex loci 
delicti and as contributory negligence is a complete 
bar to an action the plaintiff would fail when 
Washington law was applied. In other words the result 
would be the same as that which would result ~f Boys v. 
1) Ibid 
2) (1970) 75 W.W.R. 500 at p.502 
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Chaplinl) was applied as interpreted by Kirke Smith J. 
Although British Columbia law would apply as 
the 'proper law' no particular injustice results on the 
actual facts of the case if the Dra Bill is applied. 
The plaintiff was one of five young people in a motor 
vehic that had run out of petrol. Two went off to 
try and find petrol whilst the remaining three started 
to push the car. The defendant's car skidded into 
the vehicle killing one person and injuring the plaintiff. 
I 
The Draft Bill's advantage is that produces a certain 
result and is easy to apply even if the facts are 
altered. If Mrs. Danyluk had been from a third state 
then the proper law would be less obvious and no matter 
who the occupants of the plaintiffs vehicle are 
Washington law is going to apply rather than some 
possibly fortuitous law of the forum. The Draft Bill 
would produce a more satisfactory result if Hrs. Danyluk 
had been resident and domiciled in Washington with 
assets in British Columbia. In such a case an 
application of Washington law would accord with the 
reasonable expectations of the Danyluks. From the 
plaintiffs point view the result achieved by the 
Draft Bill is no harsher than the application of Boys v. 
Chaplin2). itself and he could presumably have taken out 
1) [1971} A.C. 356 
2) £197LJ A.C. 356 
·the necessary insurance before leaving his own state. 
Further the Draft Bill avoids the 
artificiality that the existing law produces in such 
situations. This is well illustrated by McLean v. 
Pettigrew1 ) itself. The facts were similar to 
La Van v. Danyluk and Danyluk - the parties were from 
the forum state and the effect of the lex loci 
delicti was to deny the plaintiff a remedy. 2 ) 
Taschereau J. after establishing the unambiguity of 
the relevant legislation proceeded to find both limbs 
of Phillips v. Eyre 3 ) satisfied and thus the plaintiff 
could succeed. What was in fact neither a crime or 
a tort in Ontario was converted into a tort by the law 
of Quebec. 
1) [194~ 2 D.L.R. 65 
2) The plainti and defendant were both domiciled 
in Quebec. On a journey to Ottawa the plaintiff 
who was a gratuitous passenger in the defendants 
vehicle was injured in Ontario. Section 47 of 
the Ontario Highway Traffic Act specifically 
held that an owner or driver of a motor vehicle 
could not be liable in such a situation. See 
p. 78 of the Report. 
3) (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 1 
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7. Anderson v. Eric Anderso·n Radio & T.V. Pty. Ltd. 1 ) 
The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle 
accident in the Australian Capital Territory. The 
trial judge in New South Wales held that the sub-
stantive law which he was bound to apply was the law of 
the Australian Capital Territory. 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales held 
that the law of New South Wales should have been applied. 
In the High Court of Australia Barwick C.J. held that 
the trial judge should have ascertained the law of the 
Australian Capital Territory. 
" ... not to apply it, but in order to 
determine as a fact in applying the law 
of New South Wales to the case in hand 
what the law of the Australian Capital 
Territory provided as to whether or not 
the act there committed was or was not 
there 'justifiable'"2) 
Kitto J. held that there was no actionable 
wrong and therefore the plaintiff would fail under 
the first limb of Phillips v. Eyre .3) Because 
contributory negligence is a good defence in New 
South Wales, the forum, the wrong complained of would 
not have been actionable if it happened in New South 
Wales. 
Windeyer J. said: 
1) £196~7 114 C.L.R. 20 
2) Ibid at p.24 
3) ( 18 7 0) L·~.R. 6 Q .• B. 1 at pp. 2 8-2 9 
" ... the rules applicable are derived 
from the well-known statement of Willes J. 
in Phillip~ v.· Eyre concerning the 
jurisdictionl>of English Courts in cases 
concerning foreign courts ..• "2) 
Hith regards the first limb, Windeyer J. 
notes that one can have a good cause of action even 
though some matter exists which would defeat it. 3 ) 
Once the jurisdictional limbs are satisfied 
authority shows that the court must " ... decide the 
rights of the parties as it would in an action 
based on a similar event occurring within its own 
borders ..• " 4 ) Thus for Windeyer J. the plaintiff 
or appellant gets over the two limbs but on having the 
lex fori applied fails because of the contributory 
negligence. 
On the particular facts Kitto J. and 
Windeyer J. come to the same result; but different 
results could be obtained by altering the facts; a 
clearly unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
The problems discussed by the High Court are 
avoided by application of the lex loci delicti and 
the victim would be compensated after account was 
taken for his contributory negligence. Again consist-
ancy of results would be achieved and the difficulties 
1) Emphasis added. 
2) Ibid at p. 40 
3) Ibid at p. 41 
4) p.42 and see P.M. North. Contributory Negligence & 
The Conflict of Laws 16 I.C.L.Q. 379 esp. pp.384-
392 (1967) 
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of firstly succeeding in New South Wales only to 
then fail are avoided. 
The problem of determining the 'proper law' 
is also avoided. Northl) notes that the actual facts 
of the case 'pose a nice problem for determining the 
proper law of this tort." 2 ) 
1) Ibid at p.384 note 27. 
2) The accident occurred in the Australian Capital 
Territory where the defendants carried on business. 
The forum New South Wales was where the plaintiff 
resided and where the defendant company was 
incorporated and carried on business. The 
defendant's employee resided and worked in the 
Australian Capital Territory. 
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Cavers 1 ) in criticising The Hague Convention 
on The Law Applicable to Traffic Accidents 1968 gives 
hypothetical examples to illustrate how the convention 
could produce arbitrary results. Two of these 
examples are given above. 2 ) It is proposed to apply 
the Draft Bill to these situations to see if the Draft 
Bill would produce a more satisfactory solution in 
each case. Cavers seems to suggest that the arbitrary 
results are produced because of the persuit by the 
Convention for ease of application and certainty3 ~ 
As this is the type of criticism frequently applied 
to those favoring one specific rule it is of importance 
that the Draft Bill should work well in the following 
situations: 
1. Two Danes rent a car in Amsterdam and have 
an accident in Paris. By Article 4 of the above 
Convention Dutch law applies rather than Danish law. 
Cavers 4 ) notes that some of the Delegates to the 
Convention remarked that it seemed strange that Dutch 
law should apply rather than the law of the parties 
habitual residence. (The draft Convention had 
reflected the view that such common habitual residence 
1) D.F. Cavers. Legislative Choice of Law: Some 
European Examples. 44 So. Calif. Law Rev. 340 
(1971) (hereinafter cited as Cavers) 
2) Supra at p. 85 
3) Cavers at p. 356 
4) Ibid at p. 357 
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was the most significant contact).l) 
There are however three possible choices of law 
here; Dutch, Danish or French law could conceivably 
be applied. 
The Draft Bill would apply French law as the 
lex loci delicti. 2 ) 
The advantages of applying French law rather 
than Danish or Dutch law in this fact situation are: 
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(a) The problems associated with "habitual residence" 
are avoided. If Danish law is to be applied 
then the court has to determine questions of 
"habitual residence", application of the lex 
loci delicti avoids this problem altogether 
and thereby avoids the problems in choosing 
between such concepts as 'habitual residence' 
'nationality' and 'domicile'. Whilst in 
some cases the two Danes might be clearly 
domiciled/habitually resident in Denmark 
bo~derline cases could obviously arise. 
Secondly it is arbitrary to decide that 
habitual residence is the most significant 
contact which must be argued if Danish law is 
1) See Cavers at p.357 
2) Assuming that the accident resulted from the 
negligence of the driver rather than from any 
defect in the motor vehicle. If the accident had 
resulted from a defect in the motor vehicle then 
the place of acting would have been the place where 
that defect happened - the place of manufacture etc. 
See In re Paris Air Crash discussed supra at pl21 et.seg. 
to be applied. 
(b) To apply Dutch law requires emphasis on the 
place of registration which as Caver's 
illustration shows can be purely arbitrary 
or fortuitous. Further problems could arise 
in this connection where a vehicle is 
registered in more than one state or country 
or is not registered at all. 
(c) The application of French law is, on the 
2. 
facts, no more arbitrary than either Danish 
or Dutch law. One can in fact argue that 
French law would be the Proper Law. Pearl's 
arguements could be evoked.l) Uniformity 
of results would be achieved if French law 
was applied and uniformity leads to predict-
ability. 
A German in a German registered motot vehicle 
invites an Englishman whose acquaintance he 
has made in Paris to drive to the airport with 
him. The Englishman is killed in a one 
vehicle ·crash. The Convention restricts the 
Englishman's family to the level of recovery 
permitted by German Law which is lower than 
that allowed by either French or English Law. 
1) Cavers, at p.357 and see Pearl op.cit. supra at 
p.l38 
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3. 
1) Ibid 
2) !bid 
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Cavers says that the Convention would not 
deprive a French passenger in the same car of 
the French standard of financial protection and 
that "there appears no good reason to deny 
equal treatment to the Englishman".l) 
Applying the Draft Bill French Law is 
applied no matter who : the G~rman chooses to 
take to the airport, and thus Cavers cirticism 
is avoided. The problems of passengers 
with habitual residences/dual nationalities, a 
different nationality or domicile to their 
habitual residence are also avoided as are 
complications which could occur if the German 
took more than one passenger to the airport. 
"A German driver loses control of his German 
registered car and runs into a queue of 
Frenchmen waiting for a bus in Paris. Several 
are killed. One of them had his habitual 
residence in Germany. His family may recover 
only the economic damage recoverable under 
German law. 2 ) 
If the Draft Bill is adopted and you 
stand in a french bus queue French law will 
apply to you. In the writer's opinion it 
seems more equitable to apply one law to all 
4. 
1) Ibid 
the victims in the queue than to apply 
different laws depending on where the 
vehicle is registered. It is not arb-
itrary to apply French law here nor is it 
unjust; if you do not want French law to 
apply to you, you do not stand in a French 
bus queue. Again the Draft Bill avoids 
the problem of habitual residence and multi-
registration. 
"A Frenchman, driving his French registered 
car in England, swerves to avoid an English 
bicyclist. The cyclist is not hurt, but the 
car hits a tree, and a passenger is injured. 
He sues the driver. The applicable law will 
depend on whether the cyclist was 'involved' 
in the accident, rendering it a two-vehicle 
accident in which one was not from the 
Registration State. The same problem - plus 
the difficulty of determining the nature of a 
'vehicle' for the purposes of this rule -
would be posed if the cause of the swerving 
had been an"equestrian, a baby carriage, or 
a boy on roller skates."l) 
If the lex loci delicti, that is English 
Law is applied then the problems posed by 
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Cavers disappear. 
The alternatives to the Draft Bill in 
the above situations are The Proper Law 
approach and Governmental interest analysis. 
If the two Danes above know each other in 
Denmark, if there was some personal relation-
ship between them centred in Denmark1 ) then 
it could be argued that Denmark would be The 
Proper Law, and the more appropriate law to 
apply to the specific situation. The 
advantage of the Draft Bill is that shades 
of degree are avoided. What if the two 
Danes had only met in Amsterdam or suppose 
that although habitually resident in Denmark 
they were both Swedish by nationality or one 
was Swedish and the other Finnish. If the 
proper law of Denmark is not to apply 
the parties only met in Amsterdam but would 
apply they were old friends where is the 
dividing line? It seems almost inevitable 
that an injustice could arise if the Proper 
Law was applied or not applied in this 
situation. On the other hand by treating 
the parties the same the Draf.t Bi11 produces 
1) See Morris at p.284 
155 
uniformity which can make for justice, 
predictability and certainty. 
In the second of Cavers situations 
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there appears to be no Proper Law and in the 
third case if German law is the Proper Law then 
different laws are going to apply to persons 
m.the queue with the disadvantages noted 
above. 1 ) Finally in the fourth case it 
is not possible to argue that either Frenchor 
Engli$.hlaw is the Proper Law. 
1) Supra at p. 152 et. seq. 
157 
SUt<tMARY (* Key on p.158} 1} 
Case or Variation Law ApElied Dr.Bil1 Art..25. GIA. :P~L. F~T~ (C.} EOC DRAFr .. . .HAGUE . C.D. (T .Ae, 
1. In Re Paris Air Crash GIA c Cor F c c c c poss F N/A N/A 
' ... ' ' . ' . ' ' . . . ' . . 
··.· 10(1) or 10{2). .· 
2. Make Disaster due to N/A F Cor F ? None? ? F 10 (1} N/A N/A • t 
Pilot Negligence 
3. Hurtado v. Superior GIA c c C ,P)SS. c c 10 (11 or 10 (2) A.3 or 4 8.3 c 
Court .. M. Get C. get c 
4~ Kie9:er c. Arnigues LID G G F or G? F or G? F? G - 10 (1)? A.4 (b) 8.4(1) (a) 
.. None? F .,... 10 (2}?. F. F 
5. Kieger c. Arnigues N/A G G F or G? G? or F or G? G 10(1} or A.3 G 8.3 G 
Jl'IClke Def. German 2) 'Nqne? .. 10 (2) .. ' 
6. Boys v. Chaplin p v. E M M ~1 or E? M or E? MorE? M 10(1} or A.4 (b) 8.4 (1) (a}-
.E 10 (2) . .E (e) 
7. Boxs v. Chaplin N/A M M ? None E, M or MlO (1} A.3 M 8.3 M 
mak:e Def. Gerit1an . .G?. ... 
8. Boys v. cha.;eliri make N/A M M MorE? None or M or E? M 10 (1} or A.4 (b) s. 7 (1) (b) 
Def. English but pe:r:m. M? E 10 (2) E M or 
situated·~ Malta ...... 
' ' ... ' 
8.4(1) (a) E? 
9. M'Elroy v. M'Allist~r p v. E E E sorE s s s 10 (21 A. 4 (b) 8.4 (1) (a) 
.S s 
10. La van v. Danyluk Pv.E w w Wor PC PC PC 10 (21 A. 4 (b) 8.4 (1) (a) 
·' . 
oc oc 
11. La Van v. Danyluk N/A w w ? None? PC, G? w 10 (1} A.3 W 8.3 w . 
make Def. German 
12. La van v. nanyluk make N/A w w Wor PC None? PC, W? w 10 (1} or A.3 W 8.3 w 
De£. from Washington 10 (21 . 
13. Anderson's Case P v. E Acr ACT ? None? Acr, 'NSW? .Acr 10 U> A.4lb) 8.4 (l) (a) 
NSW NSW 
* 
1) 
158 
Key to Summary on p.l57 
Abbreviations used:-
Dr. Bill - Draft Bill; Art.25 -Article 25 Italy; 
GIA - Governmental Interest Analysis; P.L. - Proper 
Law; F.T. (C.) -Draft Foreign Torts Act (Canada); 
Hague - Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Traffic Accidents; C.D. (T.A.) -Canadian Draft 
(Traffic Accidents) Act; C - Californian; 
F - French; poss. - possibly; N/A - Not applicable; 
M - Maltese; M - Mexican; A. - Article; 
P v. E - Phillips v. Eyre; LLD - Lex Loci Delicti; 
G - German; S - Section; E - English; 
S - Scottish; W - Washington; BC - British 
Columbia; ACT - Australian Capital Territories; 
NSW - New South Wales; 
2) Assume throughout that the vehicle is registered 
in the Defendant's or Plaintiff's country or 
state. 
This Summary suggests:-
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The Draft Bill produces the most certain 
results. The Italian provision, a close 
second is uncertain in Cases 1 and 2. 
Governmental Interest Analysis except in the 
most obvious of cases is unsatisfactory for 
providing solutions to international 
accidents. 
The Proper Law is only of assistance in 
Cases 3, 9~ and 10 which suggests that perhaps 
at least for motor vehicle accidents there is 
no need for a Proper Law type exception. 
Cases 9, and 10 have unusual facts and 
Case 9 was the very case which led to the 
development of the Proper Law. Case 10 is 
unusual in so far as all concerned were 
from British Columbia. It is suggested 
that Case 12 is a more likely fact situation 
and here the Proper Law exception is not 
helpful. 
The Draft Foreign Torts Act (Canada) is 
of little assistance in predicting the 
applicable law. 
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5. 
6. 
7. 
A comparison of Cases 4 and 5 and 6, 7 and 8 
illustrate that the Hague Convention and the 
Canadian Draft {Traffic Accidents) Act can 
produce arbitrary results in comparison 
with the Draft Bill. 
The E.E.C. Draft is uncertain and of limited 
assistance. 
Where the Draft Bill produces a result which 
differs from the actual law applied in the 
cases the differing result is not in any of 
the cases unjust to the litigants concerned. 
Conclusion:-
The traditional solutions to the choice of 
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law problem have been criticised as rigid and inflexible 
and this led to .the development of judicial, academic 
and legislative alternatives. These alternatives have 
made for uncertainty and confusion, in theory and 
practice, in the jurisdictions which have joined the 
conflicts revolution, and this would indicate that a 
return to the lex loci delicti is desirable. It would 
be simplistic to suggest that the place of acting -
lex loci delicti rule is the ultimate answer. It is 
however the argument of this thesis that it is the 
most satisfactory solution to date. Applied to 
actual cases it produces results that are not unsatis-
161 
factory (although admittedly the handful of decided 
cases discussed in Part C above are insufficient to 
justify anything beyond the most tentative and 
speculative of conclusions}. There may not be an 
ultimate solution except in the sense of abolishing the 
problem by having one world wide tort law and this, 
even if a possibility, is far off. Meanwhile it must 
be remembered that international torts and accidents 
in particular are unfortunately not rare events. What 
is needed is as good a system as possible, legal chaos 
should not be added to events which often result in 
traged~ Whilst conflict of laws lends itself to academic 
discussion and debate it is also a subject of considerable 
practical importance and, 
"Scholars, in their fascination with 
conflicts should not forget that the 
game is not being played so they can 
flex their jurisprudential muscles but 
in order to bett~r the human condition 
through law ••• nlJ 
There is not likely to be a decline in 
international accidents and whilst liability for some 
situations will be replaced by insurance, such schemes 
(for example the New Zealand model} may, in defining 
their personal and territorial reach lead to new 
1) Rosenberg. Comments on Reich v. Purcell 15 U.C.L.A.L. 
Rev.551 atp641 (1968) quoted by F. Jeunger. Choice 
of Law in Interstate Torts 118 Univ. of Pen.L.R. 
202 at p. 218 (1969). 
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conflicts. 1 ) 
Finally it has been said that 
" ... the pursuit of harmony is the principle 
task of those who make it their concern 2 ) to think about private international law .•. " 
Application of the lex loci makes for inter-
national harmony in so far as it is, of any one 
approach, the most widely used. 3 ) The lex loci 
delicti works. 
o-o-o-o 
1) See N.G. Baer. Limited Automobile Accident Insurance 
& Choice of Law. 19 No.2 McGill L.J. 284 (1973) & 
W. Pfennigstorf 'Unification of the Protection of 
Traffic Victims in Europe 15 Arn.Jo. of Comp. Law 
436 (1967) 
2) 0. Kahn Freund. General Problems of Private 
International Law (1976) p.323 
3) Supra at p.ll9 
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APPENDIX A 
1973] 
. DOCUMENTS 587 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL 
AND NON-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
PREAMBLE 
The High Contracting Parties 
[to the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community], 
Anxious to pursue in the domain 
of private international Jaw the work 
of unification of law undertaken in 
the Community, 
Desiring to establish uniform 
rules relating to the law applicable 
to contractual and non-contractual 
obligations, · 
Have decided to conclude the 
present convention and have to that 
effect designated as plenipotentiaries 
TITLE I: FIELD OF APPLICATION 
Article 1 
(1) The rules of private interna-
tional law of this Convention shall 
apply to contractual and non-con-
tractual obligations in situations of 
an international character. 
(2) They shall not apply 
(a) to matters of status and capac-
ity, save as regards Article 20, nor 
to matters of matrimonial property, 
succession, testaments, or gifts, 
(b) to commercial papers such as 
bills of exchange, cheques or promis-
sory notes, 
(c) to agreements on arbitration or 
choice of court, 
(d) [to insurance contracts], 
(e) to the constitution, internal op-
eration or dissolution of corporations 
and other legal entities, 
(f) to matters relating to damages 
in the nuclear field.l 
'l'ITLE II: UNIFORM RULES 
Article 2 
(1) Contracts shall be governed 
by the law chosen by the parties. 
(2) The requirements pertaining 
to the validity of the consent of the 
parties as to the applicable law shall 
be governed by that law. 
(3) [However, in labor relations, 
the choice of the parties may in no 
case affect mandatory provisions for 
the protection of the worker in force 
in the State where he works habit-
ually.] 
(4) [From'Annex] First Variation 
The meaning of silence of a party 
to a proposal made by the other party 
before the formation of the contract 
or in connection with it concerning 
the applicable law shall be evaluated 
according to the law of the habitual 
residence of that party. However, 
notwithstanding the provisions of that 
law, agreement on the choice of the 
applicable law may be deduced from 
the silence of one of the parties if 
such interpretation results from hab-
its previously established between the 
parties or from usages of interna-
tional commerce of which the parties 
have, or should have, knowledge on 
account of their profession. 
· Second Variation 
Agreement on the choice of the 
applicable law may be deduced from 
the silence of one of the parties only 
if such interpretation results from 
the habits previously established be-
tween the parties or from usages 
practiced in international commerce. 
However, if the contract has been 
formed already, the law governing 
the contract shall determine whether 
silence does or does not mean a 
choice of the applicable law. 
Article 3 
The choice by the parties of the 
npplicablc low muy be made at the 
time of contracting or at a later date. 
It may be modified at any time by 
an agreement between the parties. 
Any such modification as to the de-
termination of the applicable law 
which occurs subsequent to the con-
clusion of the contract shall not affect 
the rights of third parties. 
1. The question of the law applicable to ententes has not ?een settled. 
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Article 4 
(1) Failing an express or implied 
choice, the contract shall be governed 
by the law of the State with which 
it is most closely connected (presente 
les liens Ies plus etroits). 
(2) That State shall be 
(a) that in which the party who is 
to carry out such performance as is 
characteristic of the contract (la 
partie qui doit journir la prestation 
characteristique) has his habitual 
residence at the time of contracting, 
(b) if the characteristic perform-
ance is due in execution of a contract 
concluded in pursuance of profession-
al activity, that in which such party 
had his principal place of business at 
the time of contracting, or 
(c) that in which such party has a 
secondary place of bu~iness if it re-
sults from the contract that the char-
acteristic performance will be carried 
out by that place of business. 
(3) The preceding paragraph shall 
not apply if the characteristic per-
formance, the habitual residence, or 
the place of business cannot be deter-
mined or if it results from all the 
circumstances that the contract is 
more closely connected with another 
State: 
Article 5 
Failing an express . or implied 
choice, contracts relating to labor re-
lations shall be governed by the law 
of the State 
(a) where the worker performs his 
work habitually, or 
(b) if the worker does not habit-
ually perform his work in one and 
the same State, where the place of 
business is located which hired him, 
unless it results from all the circum-
stances that the labor contract is 
more closely connected with another 
State. 
Article 6 
·Failing an express or implied 
choice, contracts involving immovable 
property shall be governed by the 
law of the place where the property 
is located, unless it results from all 
the circumstances that the contract 
is more closely connected with an-
other State. 
Article 7 
Where a contract is connected also 
with a State other than , the State 
whose law is applicable. under Arti-
cles 2, 4, 5, 6, 16, 17, 18 and 19(3) 
and where the law of that other State 
contains provisions regulating the 
subject matter in a mandatory way 
so as to exclude application of any 
other law, such provisions shall be 
taken into account to the extent that 
their particular nature or purpose 
can justify_ that exclusion. 
Article 8 
(I) The requirements concerning 
the validity of the consent of the par-
ties to the contract shall be governed 
by the law applicable under the pre-
ceding articles. 
(2) [From Annex] First Variation 
The meaning of silence of a party 
as regards the formation of. the con-
tract is evaluated according to the 
law of the habitual residence of that 
party. However, notwithstanding the 
provisions of this law, consent to a 
contract may be deduced from the 
silence of one of the parties if this 
interpretation results from the habits 
previously established between the 
parties or from usages of internation-
al commerce of which the parties 
have or should have knowledge on 
account of their profession. 
Second Variation 
The formation of the contract 
may be deduced from silence of one 
of the parties only if that interpre-
tation results from the habits previ-
ously established between the parties 
or from usages practiced in interna-
tional commerce. 
Article 9 
The ·provisions of Articles 2 to 8 
shall not apply to the transfer of 
prope'rty or to in rem effects of the 
contract. 
Article 10 
(1) Non-contractual obligations 
resulting from an event causing dam-
age shall be governed by the law of 
the State in which such event oc-
curred. 
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(2) How.ever, if, on the one hand, 
no significant link exists between the 
situation resulting from the event 
. which caused the damage and the 
State in which the event occurred 
and if, on the other hand, such sit-
uation has predominant connection 
(connexion preponderante) with an-
other State, the law of that State 
shall apply. 
(3) Normally, such a connection 
must be based on a connecting factor 
common to the victim and the author 
or the damage or, if the liability of 
a third party as author is involved, 
a connecting factor common to the 
victim and the third party. 
(4) Where there are two or more 
victims, the applicable law is deter-
mined separately for each of them. 
Article 11 
The law applicable to ·non-con-
tractual obligations under Article 10 
shall determine in particular 
1. the conditions and extent of 
liability; 
2. the grounds 
from liability, 
limitation and 
bility; 
for exemption 
as well as any 
division of lia-
3. the existence and nature of 
damages for which there may 
be compensation; 
4. the kinds and extent .of com-
pensation; 
5. the extent to which the vic-
tim's rights to damages may 
be exercised by his heirs; 
6. the persons who have suffered 
damage and may claim dam-
ages in their own right; 
7. vicarious liability; 
8. rules of prescription and lim-
itation, including rules relating 
to commencement of a period 
of prescription or limitation, 
to interruption or suspension 
of such a period. 
Article 12 
Whatever the applicable law under 
Article 10, in determining liability 
account shall be taken of rules of 
safety and public order in force at 
the place and time of the event which 
caused the damage. 
Article 13 
Non-contractual liability rcsu1ting 
from an event other than one causing 
damage shall be governed by the law 
of the Slate in which such event oc-
curred. However, if due to a con-
necting factor common to the parties 
involved, a predominant link exists 
with the law of another State, that 
law shall be applied. 
Article 14 
The provisions of ·Articles 10 to 13 
shall not ·apply to the liability of 
States or other legal persons of pub-
lic law, or to that of their organs or 
agents for acts involving public ad-
ministration and done by them in the 
performance of their functions. 
Article 15 
(1) The law governing an obli-
gation shall also determine require-
ments pertaining to its execution, the 
various ways in which it may be dis-
charged and the consequences of non-
execution. 
(2) As regards the means of ex-
ecution of an obligation, the law of 
the State where the execution takes 
place shall be taken into account. 
Article 16 
(1) Obligations between assignor 
and assignee of a debt shall be gov-
erned by the law applicable under 
Articles 2 to 8. 
(2) The law governing the orig-
inal debt determines whether the 
debt may be assigned; it also regu-
lates the relations between assignee 
and debtor and the conditions under 
which the assignment may be in-
voked against the debtor and third 
parties. 
Article 17 
(1) A statutory assignment of a 
debt shall be governed by the law 
regulating the legal institution for 
which the assignment has been 
created. 
(2) Nevertheless, the law govern-
ing the original debt shall determine 
whether the debt may be assigned, 
590 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 21 
and it determines the rights and ob-
ligations of the debtor. 
Article 18 
(1) To be valid as to form, a 
juridical act must satisfy the requir£:-
ments established by either !J1e law 
which governs its essential validity 
or governed that validity at the time 
it was done, or by the law of the 
place where it was done. Where a 
juridical act results from several de-
clarations of intention, the formal 
validity of each is determined sep-
arately. 
(2) The provisions of this article 
shall not apply to the creation, as-
signment or extinction of rights in 
rem in a thing. 
Article 19 
(1) Existence and force of legal 
presumptions as well as burden of 
proof shall be governed by the law 
applicable to the legal relationship. 
However, consequences which may be 
deduced from the attitude of the par-
ties during the litigation shall be 
governed by the law of the forum. 
(2) Admissibility of various kinds 
of evidence for proof of juridical acts 
shall be determined by the law of the 
. forum. However, the parties . may 
also avail themselves of any kinds 
of evidence admissible under laws 
identified in Article 18 which sup-
port the formal validity of such act, 
provided such kinds of evidence are 
not incompatible with the law of the 
forum. 
(3) The extent to which a private 
written document stating obligations 
due by its signatory or signatories is 
sufficient evidence of these obliga-
tions, as well as the admissibility. of 
evidence to add to, or contradict the 
contents of such document shall be 
determined by the law governing the 
formal validity of the act under Arti-
cle 18. If this document is acceptable 
as evidence under both the law gov-
erning the essential validity and that 
of the place where it was done, only 
the first of these two laws shall apply. 
Article 20 
No natural person may invoke his 
own incapacity against a party who 
in a juridical act in good faith and 
without acting imprudently consid-
ered him as having capacity in con-
formity with the law of the place 
where the act was done. 
Article 21 
For the purposes of the preceding 
provisions, the law of the State shall 
mean rules of law in force in that 
State, excluding, however, the rules 
of private international law. 
· Article 22 
The application of any of the laws 
designated by the preceding provi-
sions may be refused only if mani-
festly contrary to public policy 
(ordre public), 
Article 23 
For the interpretation and applica-
tion of the preceding uniform rules 
their intern a tiona! character shall be 
taken into account as well as the 
desire to achieve uniformity in their 
interpretation and application. 
TITLE III: FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 24 
The application of Articles 1 to 23 of 
this Convention shall be independent 
of any condition of reciprocity. The 
Convention shall apply even if the 
npplicable law is not that of a Con-
tracting State. 
Article 25 
This Convention shall not prevent 
the application of rules of private in-
ternntional law relating to special 
matters contained in Normative Acts 
emnnating from the Institutions of 
the European Communities or in na-
tional low harmonized in execution of 
these Acts. 
(2) This Convention shall not af-
fect provisions of private international 
law contained in Conventions· to 
which the Contracting States are or 
will be Parties within the set-up of 
the treaties instituting the European 
Communities. 
Article 26 
(1) If, after the entry into force of 
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this Convention for a Contracting 
State, in a special matter that State 
desires either to derogate from the· 
provisions of the preceding Title or to 
supplement them, the State shall com-
municate its intention to the other 
Signatory States through the inter-
mediary of the Secretary General. 
(2) Within six months from the 
communication to the Secretary Gen-
eral, any State may ask the latter to 
organize consultations between the 
Signatory States designed to reach an 
agreement. 
(3) If within this period no State 
hns asked !or the consultation or 
within the ·two years following the 
communication addressed to the Sec-
retary General no agreement has been 
reached in consequence of the consul-
tations, the State may modify its leg-
islation in the sense it had indicated. 
The measure taken by that State is 
brought to the attention of the other 
Signatory States. 
Article 27 
This Convention shall not affect the 
application in a Contracting State of 
bilateral or multilateral Conventions 
already entered into by that State. 
Article 28 
If, after the entry into force of this 
·convention for a Contracting State, 
that State desires to become a party 
to a multilateral Convention whose 
principal purpose or one of the prin-
cipal purposes is regulation of private 
international law in one of the mat-
ters covered by this Convention or if 
it desires to denounce such a Conven-
tion, the procedure established in 
Article 26 shall apply. However, the 
time period of two years provided for 
in subsection 3 of Article 26 is re-
duced to one year. 
Article 29 
If a Contracting State deems the 
unification achieved by this Conven-
tion endangered by conclusion of 
agreements not envisaged in the pre-
ceding Article, the State may ask the 
Secretary General of the Council of 
the European Communities to organ-
ize a consultation between the States 
signatory of this Convention. 
Article 30 
·· After consultation of the other Sig-
natory States through the intermedi-
ary of the Secretary General of the 
Council of the European Communities, 
each Contracting State may ask for 
revision of this Convention. In that 
event, a conference of revision shall 
be called by the President of the 
Council of the European Communi-
ties. 
Article 31 
(1) This Convention shall apply 
to the European Territory o! the Con-
tracting States, to the French over-
seas departments and to the French 
overseas territories. 
(2) The Kingdom of the Nether-
lands may at the moment of the sig-
nature or ratification of this Conven-
tion or at any time thereafter declare 
by way of notification of the Secre-
tary General of the Council of the 
European Communities that this Con-
vention shall apply to Surinam and 
the Netherlands Antilles. 
Article 32 
This Convention shall be ratified 
by the Signatory States. The instru-
ments of ratification shall be depos-
ited ·with the Secretary General of 
the Council of the European Com.;. 
munities. 
Article 33 
This Convention shall enter into 
force the first day of the third month 
after deposit of the fifth instrument 
of ratification. The Convention shall 
enter into force for each Signatory 
State which ratifies subsequently on 
the first day of the third month after 
deposit of his instrument of ratifica-
tion. 
Article 34 
The Secretary General of the Coun-
cil of the European Communities shall 
give notice to the Signatory States of: 
(a) the deposit of each instrument 
of ratification; 
(b) the date on which this Conven-
tion enters into force; 
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(c) communications made in appli-
cation of Articles 26, 28, ~29, 30 
and 31. 
Article 35 
This Convention is concluded for an 
unlimited time. 
Article 36 
This Convention in a single copy in 
the German, French, Italian, Dutch, 
•.. and .•. languages, these texts 
being equally authentic, shall be de-
posited in the archives of the Secre-
tariat of the Council of the European 
Communities. The Secretary General 
shall send a certified copy to each of 
the governments of the signatory 
States. 
JOINT DECLARATION 
At the moment of proceeding to 
the signature of this Convention, the 
governments •.. 
anxious as far as possible to avoid 
the dispersing of rules of conflict of 
laws over multiple instruments and 
divergences between these rules, 
desire that in exercising their juris-
diction on' the basis of the treaties 
which have established them, the In-
stitutions of the European Commun-
ities make an effort when the case 
arises to adopt rules of conflict as far 
as possible in harmony with those 
of this Convention, 
desire that for the preparation of 
Community Acts carrying rules of 
conflict of laws these Institutions se-
cure the views of governmental ex-
perts on private international law and 
use all proper means to give full ef-
fect to assistance coming from these 
experts. • · 
• Note of the Translator. For a 
possible conflict see art. 3 of the pro-
posed draft Regulation concerning 
conflicts of laws in the matter of labor 
relations submitted to the Council by 
the Commission on March 23, 1972 
(J.O., n. C 49/26, 18 May 1972). The 
rule of the article refers to the law 
of the state of the location of the es-
tablishment in which the laborer is 
employed, with no room left for ap-
plication of . the law chosen by the 
parties or law becoming applicable 
under the principles of private inter-
national law and more favorable to 
the laborer. See Pocar, "La legge 
applicabile ai rapporti di lavoro se-
condo il diritto italiano," 8 Rivista 
di diritto internazionale privata e 
processuale 727, 751-54 (1972). 
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APPENDIX 
CoNDITIONALLY APPROVED DRAFT OF A UNIFORM 
CONFLICT OF LAWS. (TRAFFIC AcciDENTS) AcT I 
1. (1) In this Act, 
(a) "accident" means an accident that involves one or more 
vehicles and is connected with traffic on a highway; 
(b) "highway" means any place or way, including ~ny struc-
ture forming part thereof, which the public is ordinarily, 
or a number of persons are, entitled or permitted to use 
for the passage of vehicles, with or without fee or charge 
therefor and includes all the space between the bounqary 
lines of any right-of-way or land taken, acquired or used 
therefor, and includes 
(i) a privately owned area designed and intended and 
primarily used for the parking of vehicles and the 
necessary passage ways thereon, and 
(ii) a publicly owned area designed and intended to. be 
used exclusively for the parking of vehicles and the 
necessary passage ways thereon; 
(c) "pedestrian" includes any person who, at the place of the 
accident, was not carried on a vehicle; 
(d) "state"includes a province [and territory] of Canada and 
a territorial entity of a state, if this entity has its own 
legal system in respect of tortious liability arising from 
an accident; and 
(e) "vehicle" means a dev~ce, whether motorized or not, in, 
upon or by which a person or thing is or may be trans-
ported or drawn upon a highway except a device used 
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. · 
(2) A reference to the laws of a state shall be read as a refer-
ence to its internal laws excluding the conflict rules. 
(3) A reference to the registration of a vehicle shall be read 
as a reference to its registration at the time of the accident in question. 
(4} The reference to chattels carried on a vehicle shall be read 
as a reference to chattels lying, standing or resting on any part of the 
vehicle. 
2~ (1) Subject to subsection (2) and to section 11, this Act deter-
mines the law applicable to tortious liability arising from an accident. 
(2) This Act does not apply 
(a) to the liability of manufacturers, sellers or repairers of 
vehicles; · · 
(b) to the liability arising out of a breach of duty to maintain 
a highway or attaching to the ownership, occupation, pos-
session or control of land; 
(c) to vicarious liability other than that of the owner of a 
vehicle, of a principal, or of a master; 
(d) to an action by or against a person who caused or con-
tributed to an accident for contribution, indemnity or any 
other relief over; 
(e) to an action for contribution or indemnity from, or any 
other relief over against, an insurer or a subrogation ac-
tion by an insurer; or 
(f) to an action by or against a person administering a work-
men's compensation fund, a social insurance or similar 
scheme, by or against an unsatisfied judgement fund or 
any person administering a similar fund, or to any exemp-
tion from liability provided by the law governing these 
persons, institutions, funds or bodies. 
3. Subject to sections 4, 5, 6 and 7, the law applicable under 
sectwn 2 is the law of the state where the accident occurred. 
4. (1) Where 
(a) one vehicle is involved in the accident and is registered in 
a state other than the state where the accident occurred, 
or, where more than one vehicle is involved, each is regis-
tered in the same state being a state other than the state 
where the accident occurred; and 
(b) each pedestrian, if any, who caused or contributed to the 
accident has his habitual residence in the state mentioned 
in clause (a), whether or not he is also a victim of the 
accident, 
the law of the state of registration, subject to section 7, determines 
(c) liability to the driver, owner or any other person having 
control of, or a proprietary interest in, the vehicle, if at 
least one of these persons has his habitual residence 
v.'ithin the state of registration; 
(d) liability to a passenger whose habitual residence is in a 
state other than the state where the accident occurred, 
but not necessarily in the state mentioned in clause (a); 
arid 
(e) liability to a pedestrian whose habitual residence is in the 
state mentioned in clause (a). 
(2) Where there are two or more victims, the applicable law is 
determined separately for each of them. 
5. (1) The liability mentioned in clause (c) of subsection (1) of 
section 4 includes liability for damage to chattels carried on the vehicle 
other than chattels mentioned in subsection (2). 
(2) The liability mentioned in clause (d) of subsection (1) of 
section 4 includes liability for damage to chattels that are carried on 
the vehicle and that are either owned by the papsenger or have been 
entrusted to his care. 
(3) The liability mentioned in clause (e) of subsection (1) of 
section 4 includes liability for damage to chattels owned by the pe-
destrian, whether or not the chattels were carried on a vehicle. 
6. Liability for damage to chattels not carried on a vehicle at 
the time of the accident, except those mentioned in subsection (3) of 
section 5, is governed by the law of the state where the accident oc-
curred. 
· 7. The law of the state where a vehicle was habitually sta-
tioned at the time of the accident applies, instead of the law men-
tioned in subsection {1) of section 4, where 
lar, 
(a) the vehicle is registered in more than one state or is not 
registered at all; or 
(b) at the time of the accident, none of the persons men-
tioned in clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 4 had his 
habitual residence in the state of registration. 
8. The law applicable under section 2 determines, in particu-
(a) the existence of liability and its extent; 
(b) the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation 
of liability and any division of liability; 
(c) the existence and kind of injury or damage for which 
damages may be claimed; 
(d) the amount of damages; 
(e) the question whether a right to damages may be assigned 
or inherited; 
(f) the persons who have suffered injury or damage and who 
may Claim damages in their own right; 
(g) the liability of a principal or master for the acts of his 
agent or servant; and 
(h) rules of prescription and limitation, including rules re-
lating to the commencement of a period of prescription or 
limitation, and the interruption and suspension of that 
period. 
9. (1) In this section, "insurer" means an insurer of the person 
alleged to be liable. , 
(2) Where the law applicable under 'section 2 is the law of the 
state where the accident occurred, a direct action against an insurer 
lies if such action is authorized by that law or by the law governing 
the insurance policy. ,; 
(3) Where the law applicable under section 2 is the law of the 
state of registration, a direct action against an insurer lies if such ac-
tion is authorized by that law, the law of the state where the accident 
occurred or by the law governing the insurance policy. 
10. The law of the state where the accident o:curred, and in 
force at that time, determines the rules relating to the control and 
safety of traffic. 
lL No law that would be applicable under this Act applies 
if its application is manifestly contrary to public policy. 
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APPENDIX 
The Hague Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Traffic Accidents 1968 
The States signatory to the prese~t Convention, 
Desiring ro establish common provisions on the law applicable to civil non-
contractual liability arising from traffic accidents, · 
Have resolved ro conclude a Convention to this effect and have agreed upon 
the following provisions: 
Article, I 
The present Convention shall determine the law applicable to civil non-
contractual liability arising from traffic accidents, in whatever kind of proceeding 
it is sought to enforce this liability. 
For the purpose of this Convention, a traffic accident shall mean an accident 
which involves one or more vehicles, whether motorised or not, and is connected 
with traffic on the public highway, in grounds open to the public or in private 
grounds to which certain persons have a right of access. 
Article 2 
The present Convention shall not apply 
(]) to the liability of manufacturers, sellers or repairers of vehicles; 
(2) to the responsibility of the owner, or of any other person, for the 
maintenance of a way open to traffic or for the safety of its users; 
(3) to vicarious liability, with the exception of the liability of an owner of a vehi-
cle, or of a principal, or of a master; 
(4) to recourse anions among.persons liable; 
(5) to recourse actions and to subrogation in so far as insurance companies are 
concerned; 
(6) to actions and recourse actions by or against social insuranye institutions, 
other similar institutions and public automobile guarantee funds, and to any 
exemption from liabilit)' laid down by the law which governs these 
institutions. 
Article 3 
The applicable law is the internal law of the State where the accident occurred. 
Article 4 
Subject to Article 5, the following exceptions are made to the provision of Article 
3: . 
(a) Where only one vehicle is involved in the accident and it is registered in a 
State other than that where the accident occurred, the internal law of the 
State of registration is applicable to detennine liability 
-towards the driver, owner or any other person having control of or an in· 
terest in the vehicle, irrespective of their habitual residence, 
-towards a victim who is a passenger and whose habitual residence is in a 
State other than that where the accident occurred, 
-towards a victim who is outside the vehicle at the place of the accident and 
whose habitual residence is in the State of registration. 
Where there are two or more victims the applicable law is detennined 
separately for each of them. 
(b) Where rn•o or more vehicles are involved in the accident, the provisions of(a) 
are applicable only if all the vehicles are registered in the same State. 
(c) Where one or more persons outside the vehicle or vehicles at the place of the 
accident are involved in the accident and may be liable, the provisions of (a) 
and (b) are applicable only if all these persons have their habitual re-sidence 
in the State of registration. The same is true even though these persons are 
also victims of the accident. 
Article 5 
The law applicable under Articles 3 and 4 to liability towards a passenger who is 
a victim governs liability for damage to goods carried in the vehicle and which 
either belong to the passenger or have been entrusted to his care. 
The law applicable under Articles 3 and 4 to liability towards the mvner of the 
vehicle governs liability for damage to .goods carried in the vehicle other than 
goods covered in the preceding paragraph. 
Liability for damage to goods outside the vehicle or vehicles is·governed by the 
internal law of the State where the accident occurred. However the 'iability for 
damage to the personal belongings of the victim outside the vehicle or vehicles is 
governed by the internal law of the State of registration when that law would be 
applicable to the liability towards the victim according to Article 4. 
Article 6 
In the case of vehicles which. have no registration or which are registered in 
several States the internal law of the State in which they are habitually stationed 
shall replace the law of the State of registration. The same shall be true if neither 
the ov.'Rer nor the person in possession 'or control nor the driver of the vehicle 
has his habitual residence in the State of registration at the time of the accident. 
Article 7 
Whatever may be the applicable law, in determining liability account shall be 
taken of rules relating to the control and safety of traffic which were in force at 
the place and time of the accident. 
Article 8 · 
The applicable law shall determine, in particular, 
(1) the basis and extent ofliability; 
(2) the grounds for exemption from liability, any ·limitation of liability, and any 
division of liability; 
(3) the existence and kinds of injury or damage which may have to be 
compensated; 
(4) the kinds and extent of damages; 
(5) the question whether a right to damages may be assigned or inherited; 
(6) the persons who have suffered damage and who may claim damages in their 
own right; 
(7) the liability of a principal for the acts of his agent o.r of a master for the acts 
of his servant; 
(8) rules of prescription and limitation, including rules relating to tl~e com-
mencement of a period of prescription or limitation, and the interruption 
and suspension of this period. 
Article 9 
Persons who have suffered injury or damage shall have a right of direct action 
against the insurer of the person liable if they have such a right, under the law 
applicable according to Anicles 3, 4 or 5. · _ 
If the law of the State of registration is applicable under.Anicles 4 or 5 and 
that law provides no right of direct action, such a right shall nevertheless exist if 
it is provided by the internal law of the State where the accident occurred. 
If neither of these laws provides any such right it shall exist if it is provided by 
the law governing the contract of insurance. 
Article 10 
The application of any of the laws declared applicable by the present Convenuon 
may be refused only when it is manifestly contrary to public policy ('ordre 
public'). 
(Articles 11-21 omitted) 
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(2) How.ever, if, on the one hand, 
no significant link exists between the 
situation resulting from the event 
. which caused the damage and the 
State in which the event occurred 
and if, on the other hand, such sit-
uation has predominant connection 
(connexion pn?ponderante) with an-
other State, the law of that State 
shall apply. 
(3) Normally, such a connection 
· must be based on a connecting factor 
common to the victim and the author 
of the damage or, if the liability of 
a third party as author is involved, 
a connecting factor common to the 
victim and the third party. 
( 4) Where there are two or more 
victims, the applicable law is deter-
mined separately for each of them. 
Article 11 
The law applicable to · non-con-
tractual obligations under Article 10 
shall determine in particular 
1. the conditions and extent of 
liability; 
2. the grounds for exemption 
from liability, as well as any 
limitation and division of lia-
bility; 
3. the existence and nature of 
damages for which there may 
be compensation; 
4. the kinds and extent of com-
pensation; 
5. the extent to which the vic-
tim's rights to damages may 
be exercised by his heirs; 
6. the persons who have suffered 
damage and may claim dam-
ages in their own right; 
7. vicarious liability; 
8. rules of prescription and lim-
itation, including rules relating 
to commencement of a period 
of prescription or limitation, 
to interruption or suspension 
of such a period. 
Article 12 
Whatever the applicable law under 
Article 10, in determining liability 
account shall be taken of rules of 
safety and public order in force at 
the place and time of the event which 
caused the damage. 
Article 13 
Non-contractual liability resulting 
from an event other than one causing 
damage shall be governed by the Jaw 
of the State in which such event oc-
curred. However, if due to a con-
necting factor common to the parties 
involved, a predominant link exists 
with the law of another State, that 
law shall be applied, 
Article 14 
The provisions of ·Articles 10 to 13 
shall not ·apply to the liability of 
States or other legal persons of pub-
lic law, or to that of their organs or 
agents for acts involving public ad-
ministration and done by them in the 
performance of their functions. 
Article 15 
(1) The law governing an obli-
gation shall also determine require-
ments pertaining to its execution, the 
various ways in which it may be dis-
churged and the consequences of non-
execution. 
(2) As regards the means of ex-
ecution of an obligation, the law of 
the State where the execution takes 
place shall be taken into account. 
Article 16 
(1) Obligations between assignor 
and assignee of a debt shall be gov-
erned by the law applicable under 
Articles 2 to 8. 
(2) The law governing the orig-
inal debt determines whether the 
debt may be assigned; it also regu-
lates the relations between assignee 
and debtor and the conditions under 
which the ussignment may be in-
voked against the debtor and third 
parties. 
Article 17 
(1) A statutory assignment of a 
debt shall be governed by the law 
regulating the legal institution for 
which the assignment has be€n 
created. 
(2) Nevertheless, the law govern-
ing the original debt shall determine 
whether the debt may be assigned, 
